Hous. Authority of City of Harlingen v. State ex rel. Velasquez

• Decision Date: 30 June 1976
• Docket Number: No. 1078,1078
• Parties: The HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF HARLINGEN, Texas, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas ex rel. Olivia VELASQUEZ and Francisca Jimenez, Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 911

539 S.W.2d 911

The HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF HARLINGEN, Texas, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas ex rel. Olivia VELASQUEZ and Francisca Jimenez, Appellees.

No. 1078.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas Corpus Christi.

June 30, 1976.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 30, 1976.

Gordon L. Briscoe, Harlingen, for appellant.

James A. Herrmann, Harlingen, for appellee.

OPINION

BISSETT, Justice.

This is an action by Olivia Velasquez and Francisca Jimenez, occupants of a low income housing project, challenging the legality of certain expenditures by the Commissioners of the Housing Authority of the City of Harlingen.

Trial was to the court, a jury having been waived. The judgment that was rendered, in part, provided:

'It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the defendant Housing Authority of the City of Harlingen, Texas, and the Commissioners thereof, be, and they are hereby permanently enjoined from paying to said Commissioners any fixed sum as reimbursement for expenses incurred by them in the discharge of their duties, providing, however, that said Commissioners shall be entitled to receive, periodically, and upon appropriate documented claim, and necessary expenses incurred by them in the discharge of their duties.'

The Housing Authority of the City of Harlingen, Texas, hereinafter referred to as 'Housing Authority' has duly appealed that judgment.

The Housing Authority was organized in 1948 and has operated since as an independent public body pursuant to Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. Art. 1269k, commonly referred to as the 'Housing Authorities Law'. At the time the present suit was instituted, the Housing Authority, a non-profit body, owned and operated several low-rental public housing units for use by qualified low income persons in the Harlingen area. The funds utilized by the Housing Authority were received under federal grants from the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the issuance of notes and bonds, and from rental income.

In 1952, the Housing Authority passed a resolution authorizing payment of $50,00 per month to each Commissioner as reimbursement for expenses incurred in the performance of their duties. Such payments were regularly made thereafter.

Olivia Velasquez and Francisca Jimenez, plaintiffs in the trial court, who were residing as tenants in the Housing Authority's units, then brought this action, contending that the payments of $50.00 per month to each Commissioner were not authorized by the statute. They specifically challenged the Housing Authority's right to make a lump sum expense payment each month in lieu of itemized accounts detailing the incurred expenses. They, in effect, argued that such payments were stipends paid in violation of § 5 of Art. 1269k of the Housing Authorities Law, and, in addition to other relief, asked that the court enjoin future similar payments.

Art. 1269k § 5, in part, provides:

'A commissioner shall receive no compensation for his services, but he shall be entitled to the necessary expense, including traveling expenses, incurred in the discharge of his duties.'

The trial court, in the judgment, found that the plaintiff tenants 'have the requisite standing to bring this action'. In addition, the trial court also made other findings of fact, wherein, insofar as this appeal is concerned, it was found:

'The Court is satisfied that the Plaintiffs have the requisite standing to seek relief in this action.'

'The evidence showed, and the Court finds as a fact, that the $50.00-per-month payment to the Commissioners was and is an arbitrary sum and no rationale exists for the amount when related to actual expenses of the Commissioners.'

The trial court, in its conclusions of law, stated:

'The conclusion is inescapable that the $50.00 monthly stipend bears no rational nor reasonable relationship to that permitted by the statute: 'necessary expenses, including travel expenses, incurred in the discharge of . . . duties.' The Court must, therefore, conclude that such payment is prohibited by statute.

The payment of any fixed amount to Commissioners will be enjoined, but a periodic payment to the Commissioners of all reasonable and necessary expenses actually incurred by them in the discharge of their duties upon itemized claim and appropriate documentation will be permitted.'

When specific findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed, or are stated in the judgment and no additional findings are requested, and a statement of facts is also brought forward, the findings will be sustained if there is any evidence to support them. Cortez v. Corsi, 513 S.W.2d 648 (Tex.Civ.App.--Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); 4 McDonald Texas Civil Practice § 16.10(b) (1971).

The Housing Authority, in its first point of error, contends that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss plaintiffs' suit because, as a matter of law, plaintiffs, as tenants of the Housing Authority, do not have standing to maintain this action to enjoin the Housing Authority from paying an expense allowance to each Commissioner of $50.00 per month.

It is a fundamental rule of law that without a breach of a legal right belonging to the plaintiff, no cause of action arises or can accrue to his benefit. American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Hicks, 35 S.W.2d 128 (Tex.Civ.App.1931, judgment adopted). For a person to maintain a court action, he must show that he has a justiciable interest in the subject matter in litigation, either in his own right or in a representative capacity. City of Waco v. Akard, 252 S.W.2d 496 (Tex.Civ.App.--Waco 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hollar v. Jowers, 310 S.W.2d 721 (Tex.Civ.App.--Eastland, 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

The issue of standing to sue has been the subject of much discussion. As a general rule, in addition to those situations where the plaintiff is expressly authorized by statute or ordinance to bring a suit against public officials whose acts or omissions are attacked, a person has standing to sue, if: 1) he has sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a result of the wrongful act of which he complains; 2) he has a direct relationship between the alleged injury and claim sought to be adjudicated; 3) he has a personal stake in the controversy; 4) the challenged action has caused the plaintiff some injury in fact, either economic, ethic, recreational, environmental, or otherwise; or 5) he is an appropriate party to assert the public's interest in the matter, as well as his own interest. See Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 60 S.Ct. 693, 84 L.Ed. 869 (1940); Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923); Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970).

The Housing Authority says that while the right of a citizen to restrain acts of public officials is in some instances granted by statute, or ordinance, that in the absence of such a statute or ordinance, a private individual must possess something more than a common concern for obedience to the law before he will be permitted to maintain an injunction suit against public officials, and that a private person who wishes to restrain an official act by a public official is required to prove injury to himself different in character and form from that sustained by the public generally. It contends in this case that there is no showing by plaintiffs of a personal or protectable justiciable interest in the challenged expenditures. It argues that since the payments to the Commissioners were made out of the 'Farm Labor Center Account', a collection of cash and certificates of deposit which had been acquired and accumulated by the Housing Authority over the years independent of any federal aid, and without the use of public funds raised by taxation, that the plaintiffs are not entitled to question the legality of payments from such fund. We do not agree. The source of the money paid to the Commissioners by way of a fixed allowance for reimbursement of 'necessary expenses' is not controlling on the issue of standing of plaintiffs to challenge such payments as being unauthorized by law. The fund was public money. It was not a...