House v. Erwin
| Decision Date | 19 October 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 42255,42255 |
| Citation | 501 P.2d 1221,81 Wn.2d 345 |
| Parties | Jim HOUSE, Petitioner, v. Harold ERWIN et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Kelly Hancock, Omak, for petitioner.
John Hancock, Okanogan, for respondents.
The Court of Appeals held a Real Estate Broker's Employment Contract, commonly known as a 'listing' agreement, unenforceable by reason of the inadequacy of the real estate description. House v. Erwin, 5 Wash.App. 737, 490 P.2d 883 (1971). In reaching that result the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. We granted review (80 Wash.2d 1004). We reiterate herein only such of the facts as are necessary to frame the issue brought here by the petition for review.
Plaintiff, respondent in the Court of Appeals and petitioner here, is a licensed real estate broker in Okanogan County. On February 24, 1969, defendants Harold Erwin and Chris E. Albrecht signed a listing agreement with plaintiff. The agreement is a standard printed form for farm or ranch property containing blank spaces, including spaces for insertion of the legal description. But for the defendants' signatures, all blanks on the contract were filled in by the plaintiff broker. The property description portion of the listing agreement states:
Description: 534 acres, known as Albrecht-Erwin Ranch farm or ranch described as Legal to be attached. Sec. _ _ T N/S, R _ _ E/W of _ _ M., County of Okanogan, State of Wn.; for better description see owner's title deed on record, now made a part hereof.
(Underlined words and figures are the handwritten portion.) In fact, defendants were purchasing the farm lands under a recorded real estate contract; so there was no 'title deed' on record. There was a deed on record of other Okanogan County farm lands owned by defendant Erwin.
Under RCW 19.36.010(5) contracts of this nature must be in writing and signed by the party to be charged. There is a split of authority in this country as to the requirement of a specific legal description of the property which is the subject matter of a real estate broker's commission contract. See Annot., Sufficiency, Under Statute of Frauds, of Description or Designation of Property in Real-Estate Brokerage Contract 30 A.L.R.3d 935 (1970); 12 Am.Jur.2d Brokers & 46, p. 807 (1964). For nearly 60 years, in an unbroken line of cases, Washington has been aligned with the states applying the stricter rule as to the sufficiency of land description. E.g., Heim v. Faulstich, 70 Wash.2d 688, 424 P.2d 1012 (1967); Leo v. Casselman, 29 Wash.2d 47, 185 P.2d 107 (1947); Big Four Land Co. v. Daracunas, 111 Wash. 224, 190 P. 229 (1920); Cushing v. Monarch Timber Co., 75 Wash. 678, 135 P. 660 (1913). We have relaxed this rule so as to alleviate any practical burden upon real estate brokers by upholding such contracts where the seller has Expressly authorized the broker to subsequently attach a legally sufficient description to the brokerage contract. Noah v. Montford, 77 Wash.2d 459, 463 P.2d 129 (1969); Edwards v. Meader, 34 Wash.2d 921, 210 P.2d 1019 (1949).
The main thrust of plaintiff's argument on appeal is that the language of the listing agreement brings the contract within the rule of Edwards v. Meader, Supra. We are in accord with the holding of the Court of Appeals on this issue. The language of the agreement, unbuttressed by parol evidence, does not constitute express authorization for the agent to procure and attach the complete description of the realty. We adopt the analysis of the Court of Appeals on this point. House v. Erwin, Supra, 5 Wash.App. at page 740, 490 P.2d 883.
However, although the property description in the listing agreement in the case at bench does not satisfy our established rule, it is suggested that we overturn six decades of established precedent, align ourselves with those states taking a contrary view in the mentioned split of authority, and thereby uphold the enforceability of the contract before us.
The judicial process once may have been regarded more as a search for precedent than as a logical, rational development of principles and rules which respond to the needs and mores of a changing society. If stare decisis is imposed merely out of reverence to the past, it may result in blind adherence to unworkable and harmful precedent or, just as undesirably, serve as a label to comouflage the subjective conclusions of prior judges. So applied, the doctrine has properly been subject to criticism.
But as properly viewed, the doctrine retains vital importance. A basic function of any legal system is to provide rules by which people may guide their conduct in society. To fulfill this purpose, it is essential that the law be reasonably certain, consistent and predictable. In this respect, stare decisis serves an important and valid function. As we observed in In re Stranger Creek, 77 Wash.2d 649, 653, 466 P.2d 508, 511 (1970):
Stare decisis is a doctrine developed by courts to accomplish the requisite element of stability in court-made law, but is not an absolute impediment to change. Without the stabilizing effect of this doctrine, law could become subject to incautious action or the whims of current holders of judicial office. But we also recognize that stability should not be confused with perpetuity. If the law is to have a current relevance, courts must have and exert the capacity to change a rule of law when reason so requires. The true doctrine of stare decisis is compatible with this function of the courts. The doctrine requires a clear showing that an established rule is incorrect and harmful before it is abandoned.
We have no objection to changing a rule of law provided that, consonant with the above principle, we are convinced that the existing rule is incorrect and harmful and that a less harmful alternative is available. The integrity of the legal system--and the basic function that people rightfully expect it to perform--demand these prerequisites to change. These considerations are especially important in an area such as transactions involving realty, where there is particular reliance on the certainty of the applicable legal rules.
With the foregoing in mind, we consider the suggestion that we overturn our long standing rule as to the sufficiency of subject matter description in real estate brokers' employment contracts.
We see no harm or undue inconvenience in the existing rule. In cases involving real estate brokers' contracts, we are not dealing with an unsophisticated or overreached party. Brokers in this state must be licensed after successfully taking a comprehensive real estate brokers' examination.
The rule in this state regarding the sufficiency of the description of the real estate in a broker's contract has been firmly established for several decades, and is well known by every licensed broker. In practically all cases, the brokers prepare the commission contract. If the detailed legal description is not available at the time of the execution of the contract, the broker may provide in the agreement for its subsequent attachment--a simple matter. See Noah v. Montford, Supra. In our view, a less stringent rule would open the door to uncertainty, ambiguity and disputes in an area of endeavor where definiteness is of particular importance, thereby contradicting the purpose for which section 5 was added to our statute of frauds. Laws of 1905, ch. 58, § 1, p. 110; RCW 19.36.010(5).
The Court of Appeals reached the correct result herein, following long established and relied upon precedent. We are not convinced that the existing rule is incorrect and harmful. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.
This case presents a specific question of whether a contract for payment of a commission to a real estate broker must contain a full legal description of the property to be sold. This case also presents a deeper question of whether a court should be bound by prior decisions if such prior decisions are wrong.
The Court of Appeals in House v. Erwin, 5 Wash.App. 737, 490 P.2d 883 (1971) reversed the trial court and held for defendants. We granted review. House v. Erwin, 80 Wash.2d 1004.
The facts are set out in the majority opinion. Possibly better understanding will be aided by some clarification on one matter. The majority mentions 'There was a deed no record of other Okanogan County farm lands owned by defendant Erwin.' The other property in the county owned by one of the defendants could not possibly by any stretch of imagination have caused confusion herein, and is not relevant to this litigation.
Three matters were raised at the trial in defense. Defendants contended the listing agreement was not signed by Effie M. Albrecht, wife of Chris E. Albrecht. She was present at the signing, and at several conversations. Furthermore, she talked to plaintiff on the telephone on occasions. The trial court found she ratified the agreement. That finding was not challenged and, therefore, is not now before the court.
Defendants also contended plaintiff was not the procuring cause of the sale. The trial court found 'the plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale.' The Court of Appeals did not consider the matter, saying: '. . . it is unnecessary for us to decide whether plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale.' The finding of the trial court was based on substantial evidence and we are firmly committed to the rule that a finding of fact by the trial court will not be disturbed if based on substantial evidence. Thorndike v. Hesperian Orchards, Inc., 54 Wash.2d 570, 343 P.2d 183 (1959); Coy v. Raabe, 77 Wash.2d 322, 462 P.2d 214 (1969).
Defendants' third contention, relating to the lack of an adequate description, was considered by the Court of Appeals and is the only matter now before the court.
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House v. Erwin
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