Housing Authority of City of Woonsocket v. Fetzik

• Citation: 289 A.2d 658,110 R.I. 26
• Decision Date: 13 April 1972
• Docket Number: No. 1425-A,1425-A
• Parties: The HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF WOONSOCKET v. Rita FETZIK. ppeal.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Page 658

289 A.2d 658

110 R.I. 26

The HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF WOONSOCKET v. Rita FETZIK.

No. 1425-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 13, 1972.

Rehearing Denied May 26, 1972.

Lavine & Sutherland, Woonsocket, for plaintiff

Rhode Island Legal Services, Inc., V. Paul McGinn, Woonsocket, for defendant.

OPINION

PAOLINO, Justice.

This case involves certain constitutional questions which were certified to this court for determination under the provisions of G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 9-24-27. ¹ These questions raise the issue of whether certain portions of G.L.1956 (1970 Reenactment) §§ 45-25-18.1 through 45-25-18.8 ² violate the plaintiff's fourteenth amendment rights to due process and equal protection of the laws.

The material facts in this case are not in dispute. The plaintiff is The Housing Authority of the City of Woonsocket, which was established on March 8, 1940, under the provisions of an enabling act, then G.L.1938, ch. 344, as amended, and now G.L.1956, ch. 45-25, as amended. See Parent v. Woonsocket Housing Authority, 87 R.I. 444, 143 A.2d 146 (1958). On May 15, 1970, a lease was executed between plaintiff and defendant for certain premises at 29 Memorial Drive in the city of Woonsocket. The defendant occupied the premises with her two minor daughters and her sixteen-year-old son, who was undergoing therapy at the Medical Center in Cranston, Rhode Island, at the time of these proceedings. Article VIII F. of the lease provides that

'If any Tenant, in the opinion of the Management, uses the premises for immoral or illegal purposes, or maintains or permits a nuisance condition on the premises, this lease may be terminated forthwith and without notice.'

On January 12, 1971, defendant received a notice to vacate for breaking the provisions of her lease by allowing a nuisance condition to exist on the premises. She was also notified of her right to appeal to the Board of Tenants' Affairs under § 45-25-18.7. She availed herself of her right to appeal to that board.

A hearing on her appeal was held before the board. The defendant admitted to the use of drugs by her son and further admitted that a general nuisance condition was permitted on the premises.

After the hearing the board rendered a decision which contained a finding that defendant did not break her lease. It held that the alleged action of the son, as a minor, was not chargeable to the mother. After observing that the son had been removed from the premises, the board granted the appeal of defendant.

Thereafter, plaintiff filed a complaint for possession in the District Court of the Seventh Division. The complaint was based upon the same grounds as those relied upon before the board.

The defendant thereupon filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the housing authority was barred from proceeding any further with this matter by virtue of § 45-25-18.6(2) which provides that '(f)inal determinations reached on matters heard by way of review shall be binding on the housing authority.'

The plaintiff then filed an objection to defendant's motion to dismiss. It predicated this motion on the ground that the statute setting up the Board of Tenants' Affairs, §§ 45-25-18.1 through 45-25-18.8, and more specifically, § 45-25-18.6, is unconstitutional as a violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. In the circumstances, plaintiff alleged, it should not be prevented from commencing the trespass and ejectment action against defendant. The constitutionality of the statute being challenged upon the record by the allegations of plaintiff's objection to the motion to dismiss, the District Court certified three questions to this court and stayed all further proceedings until the questions are heard and determined here. The constitutional questions certified to us are the following:

'1. Is the Housing Authority of the City of Woonsocket a person within the meaning of the, Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and therefore entitled to bring suit challenging the constitutionality of a state statute under the due process and equal protection clauses of said amendment?

'2. Is a statute which grants judicial powers to an administrative agency or board and which provides no guidelines for the exercise of such judicial power and which further fails to provide for any remedy whatever against unwarranted action in the exercise of such judicial powers unconstitutional as a denial of due process?

'3. Does a statute which provides one litigant with the right to appeal from an adverse decision while at the same time binding the other litigant and giving it no recourse or avenue of appeal constitute an intentional and arbitrary discrimination and as such violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?'

The threshold question is that of the housing authority's standing to challenge the constitutionality of a state statute under the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. However, before discussing that issue, it may be helpful to summarize briefly the provisions of the statute involved here.

Section 45-25-18.1 authorizes each housing authority to adopt and promulgate reasonable rules, not inconsistent with law, relating to (A) eligibility requirements for admission to housing, (B) obligations of tenants, (C) just cause for the termination of the right of use and occupation, so that a tenant may be clearly apprised of the precise reasons for a termination, and (D), as amended, conditions for continued occupancy. This section also authorizes a housing authority to adopt other rules which are necessary to the just and effective administration of local housing projects.

Section 45-25-18.2 creates a Board of Tenants' Affairs for each city or town having a housing authority and operating one or more housing projects under this statute.

Sections 45-25-18.3 through 45-25-18.5 provide for the membership of the board, the appointment of the members, meetings, rules, quorum and compensation.

Section 45-25-18.6 invests the board with certain powers therein set forth. Section 45-25-18.6(1)(C) authorizes the board to hear and determine, as a board of review, complaints arising under §§ 45-25-18.7 and 45-25-18.6(2), mandates that final determinations reached on matters heard by way of review shall be binding on the housing authority.

Section 45-25-18.7 is the section which provides for hearings before the board. It provides for the method of notice to the tenant of determinations made by the project management or by the housing authority and it prescribes the procedure for claiming an appeal to the board. It also states that the tenant or applicant shall have the right to be represented by counsel. Insofar as pertinent here § 45-25-18.7 provides that the tenant affected shall have a right to a hearing and review by the board where a determination is made by the project management or housing authority that the tenant's right of use and occupation shall be terminated.

Section 45-25-18.8 deals with actions to regain possession in the event a decision to terminate a right of use and occupation is upheld by the board. It provides that if an action to regain possession of the premises is brought by the authority, the tenant shall have the right to trial de novo on the issue of whether there was just cause to terminate such right.

Finally, § 45-25-18.9 provides for severability.

I

The initial question, as we have said, is whether the housing authority has standing as a person, within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, to challenge the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature under the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The defendant concedes that a corporation as such is a person within the meaning of the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936). However, she argues that a housing authority is like a municipal corporation ³ in that it is a creature of state legislative fiat and, therefore, should not be allowed to invoke the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment in an action in which it seeks to challenge as unconstitutional an act of its creator because that act limits in some way its power. The defendant cites Parent v. Woonsocket Housing Authority, 87 R.I. 444, 143 A.2d 146 (1958), to support her argument. She further contends that the same reasoning would apply even if the housing authority be considered as a state agency. We do not agree. For the reasons which follow, we hold that a housing authority is a person within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment and, as such, has standing to challenge the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature under the due process and equal protection clauses of that amendment.

A municipal corporation is a political subdivision of the state, created by the state Legislature for the exercise of such governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to it as a unit of local self-government. Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 43 S.Ct. 534, 67 L.Ed. 937 (1923). It is defined in 56 Am.Jur.2d Municipal Corporations § 4 at 73 (1971) as:

'* * * a body politic created by organizing the inhabitants of a prescribed area, under the authority of the legislature, into a corporation with all the usual attributes of a corporate entity, but endowed with a public character by virtue of having been invested by the legislature with subordinate legislative powers to administer local and...