Housing Authority of Town of East Hartford v. Papandrea

• Decision Date: 04 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. 14191,14191
• Citation: 610 A.2d 637,222 Conn. 414
• Parties: HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the TOWN OF EAST HARTFORD v. John F. PAPANDREA, Commissioner of Housing.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 637

610 A.2d 637

222 Conn. 414

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the TOWN OF EAST HARTFORD v. John F. PAPANDREA, Commissioner of Housing.

No. 14191.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 3, 1991.

Decided June 4, 1992.

Berdon, J., concurred in part and dissented in part in separate opinion.

Paul K. Pernerewski, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, Atty. Gen., for appellant (defendant).

Ralph J. Alexander, with whom was John F. Sullivan, for appellee (plaintiff).

Philip D. Tegeler, Nancy Hronek and Glenn W. Falk, filed a brief for the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union Foundation et al. as amici curiae.

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS, COVELLO, BORDEN and BERDON, JJ.

GLASS, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff, the housing authority of the town of East Hartford, filed a two count complaint and application for a permanent injunction against the defendant, John F. Papandrea, in his official capacity as commissioner of the Connecticut department of housing, ¹ seeking to enjoin him from operating a rental assistance, existing housing and housing voucher program pursuant to section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (section 8 program) in East Hartford. The plaintiff alleged that it had exclusive statutory authority to administer a section 8 program in East Hartford. The plaintiff alleged further that the commissioner's authority to administer a section 8 program had been transferred from the Connecticut department of housing to the Connecticut housing authority by the enactment of No. 86-281 of the 1986 Public Acts, and that, therefore, the commissioner's administration of such a program in East Hartford was ultra vires. The commissioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff lacked standing and had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The trial court denied the commissioner's motion to dismiss. The trial court, after a hearing, granted the plaintiff the requested injunctive relief. The commissioner appealed to the Appellate Court from the trial court's judgment. We transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023.

On appeal, the commissioner claims that the trial court improperly: (1) concluded that the plaintiff was not required to exhaust administrative remedies; (2) granted the plaintiff a permanent injunction prohibiting the commissioner from operating a section 8 program in East Hartford; and (3) concluded that the commissioner had acted in excess of his statutory authority. We agree with the commissioner's first claim and, therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The facts relevant to this appeal are undisputed. The section 8 program that is the subject of this litigation is a federal housing subsidy administered by the United States department of housing and urban development (HUD). ² The purpose of the program is to assist low income families in The plaintiff administers a section 8 program in East Hartford. At the time of trial, approximately 111 tenants were participating in the plaintiff's program. The commissioner has administered a section 8 program in the state since 1976. At the time of trial, approximately 1700 rental units throughout the state had been filled by participants in the section 8 program administered by the commissioner. Since 1988, twenty-two families holding certificates issued by the commissioner have obtained housing in East Hartford.

                obtaining decent, safe and sanitary rental accommodations and to promote "economically mixed housing."  42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a);  see also 24 C.F.R. § 882.101.   The program works essentially as follows.   First, the public housing authority (housing authority) enters into an annual contribution contract with HUD.   The housing authority, applying the qualification guidelines set forth in regulations promulgated by HUD, determines if an applicant qualifies for section 8 low income housing.   If found to be qualified, the applicant is issued a certificate or voucher by the housing authority.   The applicant then finds an acceptable rental unit and presents the certificate to the landlord.   If the housing authority determines that the selected unit meets HUD's standards of habitability, that the rent is approvable and that the proposed lease complies with HUD's regulations, the housing authority approves the lease.  24 C.F.R. § 882.209.   The applicant pays no more than 30 percent of his or her income toward rent and the housing authority pays the remainder from moneys received under its contract with HUD.   See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437a(a)(1) and 1437f(c)(3)(A).   When the housing authority successfully places a section 8 tenant, it receives an initial placement fee as well as a payment for each month that the tenant remains in the section 8 program
                

Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the trial court made the following findings. A public housing authority is required by HUD to utilize at least 95 percent of the certificates granted to it under its contract. Since 1988, the commissioner had administered a section 8 program in East Hartford without the permission of either the plaintiff or East Hartford's governing body. One East Hartford landlord who owned multiple units had informed the plaintiff that he would no longer rent to section 8 tenants due to late rent payments made by the commissioner. The plaintiff had a waiting list of forty-four eligible families and, had the commissioner not placed section 8 tenants in East Hartford, the plaintiff would have done so. The trial court concluded that the commissioner had acted without statutory authority in operating a section 8 program in East Hartford, and that as a result of the commissioner's actions, the plaintiff had lost fees it would otherwise have received from HUD. The trial court concluded further that the plaintiff had suffered irreparable harm and granted the plaintiff permanent injunctive relief against the commissioner.

On appeal, the commissioner argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss made on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. ³ The commissioner argues further that the trial court improperly concluded that he had exceeded his statutory authority in operating a section 8 program in East Hartford, and that, therefore, the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff injunctive relief. The commissioner contends that the expansion of the state's section 8 program into East Hartford is within his statutory authority and "coincides with the State's attempt to better utilize its Section 8 allocation and to help homeless people, and those families residing in 'welfare' hotels and motels, find permanent, decent, safe and sanitary dwellings." The plaintiff argues that the trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff had the exclusive right to operate a section 8 program in East Hartford and that, therefore, the trial court properly enjoined the commissioner from operating such a The commissioner's first claim is that the trial court improperly concluded that the plaintiff was not required to exhaust administrative remedies. The commissioner argues that the plaintiff, prior to filing this action in the Superior Court, was required to seek a declaratory ruling from the commissioner pursuant to General Statutes § 4-176(a), ⁴ and that the trial court's ruling to the contrary was incorrect. The plaintiff contends that the trial court, in ruling on the commissioner's motion to dismiss, correctly concluded that: (1) § 4-176(a) was inapplicable because the plaintiff's complaint sought injunctive relief; (2) the commissioner had not established a procedure whereby the plaintiff could contest the agency action alleged in the complaint; and (3) the commissioner's June 13, 1989 letter to the president of the Connecticut chapter of the national association of housing and redevelopment officials constituted the commissioner's decision on the matter and, therefore, further administrative review would have been futile.

                program.   The plaintiff contends that without a permanent injunction, the approximately 2000 certificates issued by the commissioner for use statewide could be "misused" to "saturate" East Hartford
                

" 'It is a settled principle of administrative law that, if an adequate administrative remedy exists, it must be exhausted before the Superior Court will obtain jurisdiction to act in the matter.' " LaCroix v. Board of Education, 199 Conn. 70, 83-84, 505 A.2d 1233 (1986). Furthermore, "[b]ecause the exhaustion doctrine implicates subject matter jurisdiction, we must decide as a threshold matter whether that doctrine requires dismissal of the plaintiff['s] claim." Concerned Citizens of Sterling v. Sterling, 204 Conn. 551, 556, 529 A.2d 666 (1987). " ' "[W]henever a court discovers that it has no jurisdiction, it is bound to dismiss the case, without regard to its previous rulings." ' ..." (Citations omitted.) Id. at 557, 529 A.2d 666.

"The doctrine of exhaustion is grounded in a policy of fostering an orderly process of administrative adjudication and judicial review in which a reviewing court will have the benefit of the agency's findings and conclusions." Id. "The doctrine of exhaustion furthers the salutary goals of relieving the courts of the burden of deciding questions entrusted to an agency ... in advance of possible judicial review." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Moreover, resolution of the issues at the administrative level may render judicial review unnecessary. As the United States Supreme Court has noted: " 'A complaining party may be successful in vindicating his rights in the administrative process. If he is required to pursue his administrative remedies, the courts may never have to intervene.' McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195, 89 S.Ct. 1657 [1663], 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969)." Pet...