Concerned Citizens of Sterling v. Town of Sterling

• Decision Date: 04 August 1987
• Docket Number: No. 13123,13123
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: CONCERNED CITIZENS OF STERLING et al. v. TOWN OF STERLING.

Page 666

529 A.2d 666

204 Conn. 551

CONCERNED CITIZENS OF STERLING et al. v. TOWN OF STERLING.

No. 13123.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 2, 1987.

Decided Aug. 4, 1987.

Kathleen Eldergill, Manchester, for appellants (named plaintiff et al.).

John K. Harris, Jr., Town Atty., for appellee (defendant).

Before PETERS, C.J., and HEALEY, SHEA, GLASS and COVELLO, JJ.

ARTHUR H. HEALEY, Associate Justice.

The dispositive issue on this appeal is whether the plaintiffs, the Concerned Citizens of Sterling et al., were required to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing their action for injunctive relief in the Superior Court. The named plaintiff is a nonprofit citizens' organization composed of citizens, taxpayers and residents of the town of Sterling . ¹ The defendant the town of Sterling, is a Connecticut municipality that owns an industrial park, known as the Town of Sterling Industrial Park. ²

The background facts are not in dispute. In late January, 1986, town officials announced that a company known as Oxford Energy, Inc., wanted to purchase twenty acres of land in the Town of Sterling Industrial Park for the purpose of building a tire-to-energy plant. The plaintiffs petitioned for a referendum on that question pursuant to General Statutes § 7-7. ³ On February 22, 1986, a referendum was held and the voters of Sterling rejected the proposed sale.

Thereafter, certain residents of Sterling filed an application with the town selectmen, pursuant to General Statutes § 7-1, ⁴ requesting that a special town meeting be held for the purpose of reconsidering the proposed sale. On March 13, 1986, the board of selectmen published notice of a town meeting on March 20, 1986, and indicated that the board had voted to remove the proposed sale from the meeting agenda and submit it to a referendum vote to be held on March 27, 1986. At the March 27 referendum, the voters approved the sale of land to Oxford Energy, Inc.

On April 3, 1986, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking permanently to enjoin the defendant from "taking any action to effectuate the sale of land in the Sterling Industrial Park." The plaintiffs claimed that the March 27 referendum was illegal for the following reasons: (1) the earlier referendum vote on February 22, 1986, had not been rescinded in the same manner as voted, in violation of General Statutes § 7-7; (2) the municipal clerk had failed to issue a warning or a notice of the referendum held on March 27, 1986, as required under General Statutes § 7-9c; ⁵ and (3) the town of Sterling's conduct between the first and second referendum improperly had exerted undue influence upon the privilege of free suffrage of the citizens of Sterling in violation of article sixth, § 4, of the Connecticut constitution. The improper conduct alleged by the plaintiffs is that the town, during the period of February 23, 1986, through March 27, 1986, had prepared and distributed informational materials and explanatory texts which advocated the approval of the referendum question. The plaintiffs also alleged that town funds, facilities and materials had been used to prepare and distribute this information.

The plaintiffs, claiming irreparable harm and no adequate remedy at law, requested that the town be enjoined from taking any action to effectuate the sale of the land to Oxford Energy, Inc., and also requested "[s]uch other and further relief as [the trial] court deem[ed] just and proper."

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on May 21, 1986, asserting that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to interfere with a legislative action of the town and because the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge such legislative action. The defendant also argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by General Statutes § 9-7b. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain the action. ⁶

On September 30, 1986, the plaintiffs appealed claiming, inter alia, that the trial court erred in concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing. At oral argument in this court, the plaintiffs conceded that as of the date this action was filed in the trial court, they had not yet filed a complaint with the state elections enforcement commission (the commission). ⁷ We note that the plaintiffs did file a complaint with the commission twenty-six days after this action had been initiated in the Superior Court.

" 'It is a settled principle of administrative law that, if an adequate administrative remedy exists, it must be exhausted before the Superior Court will obtain jurisdiction to act in the matter. Connecticut Life & Health Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Jackson, 173 Conn. 352, 358-59, 377 A.2d 1099 (1977); State ex rel. Golembeske v. White, 168 Conn. 278, 282, 362 A.2d 1354 (1975); see 3 Davis, Administrative Law § 20.01; General Statutes §§ 4-175, 4-183.' Connecticut Mobile Home Assn., c. v. Jensen's, Inc., 178 Conn. 586, 588, 424 A.2d 285 (1979)." Cummings v. Tripp, 204 Conn. 67, 75, 527 A.2d 230 (1987).

Because the exhaustion doctrine implicates subject matter jurisdiction, we must decide as a threshold matter whether that doctrine requires dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim. The issue of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time including on appeal. "Once brought to the attention of the court, regardless of the form of the motion, it must be acted upon." Cahill v. Board of Education, 198 Conn. 229, 238, 502 A.2d 410 (1985) (Cahill II ); East Side Civic Assn. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 161 Conn. 558, 559, 290 A.2d 348 (1971); Carten v. Carten, 153 Conn. 603, 610, 219 A.2d 711 (1966). "Moreover, ' "whenever a court discovers that it has no jurisdiction, it is bound to dismiss the case, without regard to its previous rulings." ' Chzrislonk v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 101 Conn. 356, 358, 125 A. 874 (1924)." Cahill II, supra. If the trial court had no jurisdiction because the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, the action must be dismissed.

The doctrine of exhaustion is grounded in a policy of fostering an orderly process of administrative adjudication and judicial review in which a reviewing court will have the benefit of the agency's findings and conclusions. Connecticut Life & Health Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Jackson, supra, 173 Conn. 358-59, 377 A.2d 1099. "The doctrine of exhaustion 'furthers the salutary goals of relieving the courts of the burden of deciding questions entrusted to an agency ... in advance of possible judicial review.' Watergate II Apartments v. Buffalo Sewer Authority, 46 N.Y.2d 52, 57, 385 N.E.2d 560, 412 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1978)." Cahill II, supra, 198 Conn. 242, 502 A.2d 410.

The plaintiffs argue that their request for injunctive relief was properly before the trial court because a party is not required to exhaust an administrative remedy that is inadequate. Specifically, the plaintiffs maintain that the available administrative remedy, initiated by filing a complaint with the state elections enforcement commission, is inadequate because under General Statutes § 9-7b(8), ⁸ the commission has no obligation to refer the matter to the attorney general for injunctive relief and, even if the matter is referred to the attorney general, the attorney general has no obligation to seek the injunctive relief requested. The plaintiffs argue that because the commission itself has no power to seek an injunction, the administrative remedy necessarily is inadequate to redress their complaint. Although we agree that a party is not required to exhaust an inadequate administrative remedy, we disagree with the plaintiffs' characterization of their administrative remedy in this case as inadequate.

The administrative process that the plaintiffs claim is inadequate is set forth in General Statutes § 9-7b. This lengthy statute outlines the powers and duties of the commission. Under the statute, the commission has considerable power to make investigations, including the ability to hear witnesses, to review written documents, and to use subpoena power. The commission is authorized, inter alia, to levy civil penalties for various violations, to order repayment of funds spent improperly, to refer to the chief state's attorney evidence of various election law violations for possible criminal prosecutions, and to refer to the attorney general any "evidence" of violations requiring injunctive or other ancillary equitable relief. General Statutes § 9-7b(1), (2), (3), (7) and (8).

Although, under the statute, the commission itself does not have the power to seek injunctive relief, it does have the power and duty "[t]o refer to the attorney general evidence for injunctive relief...." General Statutes § 9-7b(8). The legislative history of that provision indicates clearly that the procedure of referring to the attorney general a request for injunctive relief was set up as a mechanism to avoid creating a legal staff solely for the commission. ⁹ The procedure envisioned by the legislature is that in any case where the commission has evidence indicating a violation of state election laws, it has the power and the duty, in appropriate cases, to refer this evidence to the attorney general who is authorized to seek injunctive relief.

In arguing that the administrative remedy is inadequate, one scenario presumably envisioned by the plaintiffs is that the commission would find serious error in an election process, but the attorney general would refuse, for one reason or another, to seek the injunctive relief requested. Another situation is that the commission itself would refuse to turn over evidence to the attorney general even though it had found an obvious violation of the election laws. First of all, these scenarios are not in accord with the facts as pleaded in this case. Moreover, by bypassing the...