Houston County v. Harrell
Decision Date | 17 May 2010 |
Docket Number | No. S09G2004.,S09G2004. |
Citation | 695 S.E.2d 29,287 Ga. 162 |
Parties | HOUSTON COUNTYv.HARRELL. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
287 Ga. 162
695 S.E.2d 29
HOUSTON COUNTY
v.
HARRELL.
No. S09G2004.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
May 17, 2010.
Moraitakis, Kushel, Pearson & Gardner, Albert M. Pearson, III, Colom & Brant, Charles T. Brant, Atlanta, for appellee.
HINES, Justice.
This Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Harrell v. Houston County, 299 Ga.App. 347, 682 S.E.2d 591 (2009), to determine if the appeal was properly addressed by that court. Determining that it was not, we reverse.
Camille Harrell was cited for speeding in Houston County, Georgia, in October 2004. On January 7, 2005, she appeared in the State Court of Houston County and pled nolo contendere. Before leaving the courthouse to obtain money with which to pay her fine, Harrell was required to set up a payment plan with Sentinel Offender Services (“Sentinel”), a private company that provides probation and suspended sentence services to Houston County. After she obtained the money, she returned to the courthouse, and paid her fine to the clerk of the court. A Sentinel representative then told Harrell that she could leave the courthouse, and that her
Harrell sued Houston County and Sentinel, asserting a variety of claims. Houston County moved for summary judgment, which, on November 21, 2007, was granted only as to it. On December 19, 2007, Harrell moved for reconsideration of the grant of partial summary judgment; her motion was denied on February 29, 2008. On March 12, 2008, Harrell, seeking to appeal the November 21, 2007 grant of partial summary judgment, filed a notice of appeal pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56(h); the Court of Appeals dismissed that appeal on June 25, 2008, because the notice of appeal was not filed within 30 days after the entry of an appealable judgment, as a motion for reconsideration does not extend the time in which an appeal may be filed. See Ferguson v. Freeman, 282 Ga. 180, 181(1), 646 S.E.2d 65 (2007).
Upon return of the remittitur to the trial court, Harrell moved for an “order of finality” under OCGA § 9-11-54(b); the stated reason for seeking the entry of an order of finality was that such an order would allow her to revive her procedurally defaulted appeal. On July 30, 2008, the trial court entered an order stating that the November 21, 2007 grant of partial summary judgment was certified as a...
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