Houston v. Brown, s. A94A0288
| Decision Date | 09 March 1994 |
| Docket Number | A94A0563,Nos. A94A0288,s. A94A0288 |
| Citation | 443 S.E.2d 3,212 Ga.App. 834 |
| Parties | HOUSTON v. BROWN (two cases). |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Loftiss, Van Heiningen & Ward, Walter E. Van Heiningen, Thomasville, for appellant.
Susan M. Reimer, Augusta, Duard R. McDonald, Marietta, for appellee.
We granted these discretionary appeals to determine whether the Columbia Superior Court erred in denying appellant Courtney Houston's belated motion to dismiss a counterclaim in an action for modification of child visitation and erred in entering a subsequent protective order enforcing its judgment in favor of the counterclaim. The modification petition was filed by appellant Houston in Columbia County, the county of his former wife's residence.
Both parties were awarded legal custody by the divorce decree. Appellee mother Tina Brown continued to live in Columbia County, while appellant Houston moved his residence at least twice. Appellant Houston did not move to dismiss appellee Brown's counterclaim until a year after the trial court's full hearing on the merits and ten months after a temporary order was issued. A motion to dismiss the counterclaim was filed before final order issued. The Columbia County court ruled favorably to the counterclaim. Held:
OCGA § 19-9-23(a), (c)(2) provides that a complaint by a legal custodian seeking a change of legal custody or visitation rights shall be brought as a separate action in the county of the defendant's residence in compliance with Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. VI, and shall not be made as a counterclaim in response to an action or motion seeking to enforce a child custody order. These provisions are mandatory, but they are venue provisions and may be waived. Lanning v. Lanning, 245 Ga. 19, 262 S.E.2d 788; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 237 Ga. 845, 847, 229 S.E.2d 751. In the peculiar and limited circumstances of this case, as in Daust v. Daust, 204 Ga.App. 29, 418 S.E.2d 409, we find that appellant father waived his defense to lack of venue by failing to file a motion to dismiss in a timely and expeditious manner. Waiver of venue defenses is permitted (albeit grudgingly; see Daust ) in these cases despite the strong language of OCGA § 19-9-23; the particular reason for appellant's failure to file a motion to dismiss does not mitigate the court's consideration of the best interest of the children. Appellant's failure to file a timely...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Holt v. Leiter
...Act (UCCJA). Section 30-3-20 et seq. of Ala. Code of 1975."). 2. OCGA § 19-9-41(a). 3. OCGA § 9-11-12(g) and (h). 4. Houston v. Brown, 212 Ga.App. 834, 443 S.E.2d 3 (1994); Daust v. Daust, 204 Ga.App. 29, 31, 418 S.E.2d 409 5. West v. Nodvin, 196 Ga.App. 825, 830(4)(c), 397 S.E.2d 567 (1990......
-
Colbert v. Colbert
...counterclaim for custody by failing to raise it until closing argument, after evidence was introduced on the issue); Houston v. Brown, 212 Ga.App. 834, 443 S.E.2d 3 (1994) (mother waived challenge to counterclaim for modification of custody by failing to move to dismiss until after the conc......
-
Bailey v. Bailey, A07A0610.
...See Ganny, supra, 238 Ga.App. at 125(2), 518 S.E.2d 148 (waiver found where OCGA § 19-9-23 issue not raised until closing argument); Houston v. Brown13 (waiver found where plaintiff did not move to dismiss counterclaim until after trial was complete and a temporary order was issued); Daust ......
-
Hamner v. Turpen
...child custody cases.” (Citations omitted.) Daust v. Daust, 204 Ga.App. 29, 31, 418 S.E.2d 409 (1992); see also Houston v. Brown, 212 Ga.App. 834, 834–835, 443 S.E.2d 3 (1994) (waiver of venue defense permitted despite strong language of OCGA § 19–9–23 governing actions to change legal custo......