Howard Const. Co. v. Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc.
| Decision Date | 08 November 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. WD,JEFF-COLE,WD |
| Citation | 669 S.W.2d 221 |
| Parties | 37 UCC Rep.Serv. 1040 HOWARD CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.QUARRIES, INC., Defendant-Respondent. 34001. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
John W. Ellinger, Jefferson City, for plaintiff-appellant.
David Brydon, Johnny K. Richardson, Hawkins, Brydon & Swearengen P.C., Jefferson City, for defendant-respondent.
Before CLARK, P.J., and DIXON and NUGENT, JJ.
This case arose out of an action brought by Howard Construction Company (hereinafter "Howard Construction" or "Plaintiff") against Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc. (hereinafter "Jeff-Cole" or "Defendant"), seeking damages on a breach of contract theory (Count I), or in the alternative, a promissory estoppel theory (Count II). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant on both Counts. Plaintiff contends on appeal that the trial court (1) erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Count I because defendant failed to meet the burden of proof under RULE 74.04 AND (2)1 erred in finding that the statute of frauds barred Count I of plaintiff's complaint. We affirm the judgment.
Howard Construction was the successful bidder on a Missouri Highway Department project to construct a portion of Highway 54. Before Howard Construction was awarded the contract, it received from Jeff-Cole a typewritten document entitled "Proposal" 2 which referred to the Missouri Highway Project and listed descriptions, quantities and prices on types of rock needed for the project. The proposal contains six separate entries including a base type and asphaltic types of rock. It was dated November 21, 1972, and was signed by Harry Adrian, president of Jeff-Cole. The bid letting for the highway project took place in December, 1972, and Howard Construction was awarded the contract. Within a few weeks after the bid letting, the general superintendent of Howard Construction, Glenn Moore, met with Harry Adrian at defendant's office. The foregoing facts are not in dispute.
The parties do disagree, however, as to what occurred at that meeting. Plaintiff contends that Glenn Moore and Harry Adrian reached an oral agreement at the meeting and that Glenn Moore altered the typewritten prices on the proposal in his own handwriting to reflect the agreement that was reached. Plaintiff relies on Glenn Moore's deposition which reads as follows:
....
Although defendant admits in its pleadings that discussions ensued between Jeff-Cole and Howard Construction, defendant denies that any agreement was ever reached in those discussions. Thus, the only disputed fact is whether the parties ever arrived at an agreement for the sale of asphaltic rock.
After the meeting between Mr. Moore and Mr. Adrian, at which the proposal was altered, Howard Construction, on January 12, 1973, mailed a purchase order to Jeff-Cole. It contained essentially the same items, quantities and prices listed on the altered proposal. The only other written document is a formal contract dated June 12, 1973, for the sale of base rock signed by agents of both parties. The subject matter of the contract, a base rock, is of the same description, quantity and price as the second entry on the altered proposal and the first entry on the purchase order. 3 The contract, however, does not refer to any of the other types of rock which the proposal and the purchase order listed.
On appeal, Howard Construction first claims that defendant failed to meet the burden of proof under Rule 74.04 and that the trial court's grant of summary judgment was therefore in error. Howard Construction contends that a genuine issue exists as to a material fact because the parties dispute whether or not they ever entered into an agreement for the sale of asphaltic rock.
Summary judgment is authorized where, but only where, the "pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact Jeff-Cole contends, however, that summary judgment was properly granted because this dispute does not involve material facts, "i.e., those which have legal probative force as to a controlling issue." Kohn v. Cohn, supra, at 443. Defendant argues that the dispute over whether an agreement was reached does not involve material facts because even if the court accepts as true plaintiff's assertion that an oral agreement was reached, the statute of frauds bars enforcement of that agreement.
and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 74.04(c). (As no affidavits were filed in this case, the record before us consists of the pleadings, the three documents they incorporate [the proposal, the purchase order, and the contract], and the deposition of Glenn Moore.) The reviewing court, as well as the trial court, must view the record on a motion for summary judgment in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was filed, Stanturf v. Sipes, 447 S.W.2d 558, 561 (Mo.1969); Scott v. Thornton, 484 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Mo.1972); Rule 74.04, and accord such party the benefit of every doubt. Perkins v. Schicker, 641 S.W.2d 432, 434 (Mo.App.1982); Kohn v. Cohn, 567 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Mo.App.1978). Viewed in this light, the record indicates that the factual question whether the parties ever reached an agreement is indeed disputed
If the contract for the sale of asphaltic rock is indeed unenforceable because of the statute of frauds, then the issue whether the oral contract was made is not a material issue of fact which would preclude the entry of summary judgment for Jeff-Cole. Hammonds v. Calhoun Distributing Co., Inc., 584 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex.Civ.App.1979).
Subsections (1) and (2) of § 400.2-201 4 read:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for the price of five hundred dollars or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing.
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against such party unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within ten days after it is received.
Subsection (1) sets forth the basic rules for satisfying the statute of frauds in a contract for the sale of goods for $500 or more. The Official Comment to the Uniform Commercial Code establishes "three definite and invariable requirements" as to the writing. First, the memorandum must evidence a contract for the sale of goods; second, it must be "signed," a word which includes any authentication which identifies the party to be charged; and third, the memorandum must specify a quantity.
Subsection (2) eliminates the signature requirement when both parties are merchants. 5 If the merchant sending the confirmatory memorandum has met the requirements of the subsection and if the merchant receiving the writing does not give any notice of objection within ten days of its receipt, then the confirmatory writing need not be signed by the receiving merchant in order to satisfy the statute of frauds. Courts have, however, required that the writing be signed by the sender in The primary requirement under both subsections (1) and (2) is that the writing evidence an agreement between the parties. Although the language of the two subsections differs in that subsection (1) requires "some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made" and subsection (2) requires "a writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender," courts have found that the § 2-201(2) confirmatory memorandum must satisfy the "sufficient to indicate" requirement of § 2-201(1). Harry Rubin & Sons, Inc. v. Consolidated Pipe Co. of America, Inc., 396 Pa. 506, 153 A.2d 472, 476 (1959). See also J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 62, 64 (2d ed. 1980).
order to be "sufficient against the sender." E.g., Evans Implement Co. v. Thomas Industries, Inc., 117 Ga.App. 279, 160 S.E.2d 462, 463 (1968). The confirmatory memorandum must also state a quantity term and must be sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made. Thus, in order for a writing to satisfy the requirements of subsection (2) it must meet the basic requirements of subsection (1) except that the confirmatory memorandum under subsection (2) need not be signed by the party to be charged; only the signature of the sender is required. See Perdue Farms, Inc. v. Motts, Inc. of Mississippi, 459 F.Supp. 7, 16 and
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