Howard v. Armontrout
| Decision Date | 24 March 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. WD,WD |
| Parties | Frank HOWARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William ARMONTROUT, Warden, Donald Clines, Assistant Warden, and George Brooks, Investigator, Individually and in their official capacities as members of the Missouri Department of Corrections, and the Missouri State Penitentiary, Jefferson City, Missouri, Defendants-Respondents. 38676. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Frank Howard, pro se.
William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Winfield J. Sinclair, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Louis, for defendants-respondents.
Before PRITCHARD, P.J., and KENNEDY and LOWENSTEIN, JJ.
Frank Howard, an inmate at the Missouri State Penitentiary (MSP), sued prison officials alleging deprivation of constitutional rights. Howard now appeals the dismissal of his petition for failure to state a claim.
We reverse and remand.
On November 23, 1985, unknown inmates set fire to Howard's cell destroying all of his personal property. After MSP officials questioned Howard about the fire, they placed him in detention and denied him contact with other prisoners. On December 26, 1985, Howard was transferred to the Special Management Facility and maintained on no-contact status.
On May 7, 1986, Howard filed suit against three MSP officials seeking a declaratory judgment and money damages for violations of Federal and state constitutional rights. The trial court treated Howard's petition as a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his petition, Howard alleged that the MSP officials violated § 217.375, RSMo 1986, by placing him in punitive segregation without notifying him of the reasons for his confinement, charging him with a conduct violation, or affording him a hearing. Howard objected to his no-contact status principally because it deprived him of an opportunity to consult with other inmates regarding lawsuits against MSP officials.
The MSP officials filed a motion to dismiss on June 25, 1986. Supporting the motion to dismiss was an affidavit made by Bill Armontrout, the warden. In his affidavit Warden Armontrout stated that after the fire, Howard was placed in detention, pending investigation. Aware that Howard had many enemies among the inmates and a history of violent behavior, MSP officials considered available options before transferring Howard to the Special Management Facility on December 26, 1985. Warden Armontrout further stated that Howard was denied contact with other inmates not for punitive purposes, but for his own safety and the safety of other inmates. To his affidavit, the warden attached certified copies of prison documents, including reports of the fire, correspondence between Howard and prison officials regarding his no-contact status, detention orders, and classification committee forms.
In his response to the motion to dismiss, Howard maintained that the prison officials had not informed him of any rule violations, given him reasons for his confinement, or afforded him a hearing.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court found that the MSP officials confined Howard for his own safety and the safety of others and that his confinement was constitutionally and legally permissible because the prison officials had complied with § 217.375 by conducting the requisite hearings.
In their briefs both parties discuss whether the trial court properly dismissed Howard's petition for failure to state a claim under Rule 55.27. However, presentation of matters outside the pleadings converts a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Rule 55.27; Black Leaf Products Company v. Chemsico, Inc., 678 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Mo.App.1984). In the present case, because the trial court considered the warden's affidavit and attached documents, we must base our inquiry on the summary judgment principles set forth in Rule 74.04. Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party presents unassailable proof showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. "Unassailable proof" means proof leaving no room for controversy. Porter v. Georgia Casualty & Surety Company, 508 S.W.2d 27, 31 (Mo.App.1974). We must scrutinize the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party resolving all doubts in that party's favor. Id.
In the present matter, the factual controversy centers on whether the MSP officials afforded Howard the requisite hearings. Section 217.375 establishes the circumstances allowing prison officials to segregate an inmate from other inmates. When an inmate has violated an institutional rule, he may be confined for a maximum of ten days in an adjustment unit without contact with the general prison population only after a proper hearing and upon order of the chief administrative officer. Sections 217.375.1, 217.150(1). The chief administrative officer may transfer an inmate to an administrative segregation unit denying him contact with other inmates when an inmate is
(1) an immediate security risk, or
(2) violent, struggling and creating sufficient disturbance to indicate he is not in control of himself, or
(3) physically violent, or
(4) in urgent need to be separated from others for his own safety or that of others.
Sections 217.375.2, 217.150(2).
Placing an inmate in an administrative segregation unit requires that a hearing be held within seventy-two hours. Section 217.375.2. Review hearings must be held thirty days after the initial period of confinement and every 90 days thereafter. Section 217.375.3.
Ordinarily prison officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the institutions they manage and lawfully incarcerated persons retain only a narrow range of protected liberty interests under the Due Process Clause. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467, 103 S.Ct. 864, 869, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). However, a state may create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause through its enactment of certain statutory or regulatory measures. Id. at 469, 103 S.Ct. at 870. Statutes regulating the use of administrative segregation in prisons create liberty interests when the language used has
an unmistakably mandatory character,...
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