Jones v. Coonce, 92-3091

• Decision Date: 15 November 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-3091,92-3091
• Citation: 7 F.3d 1359
• Parties: Craig JONES; Danny Madison; James Moore; Lawrence Payne; Aaron Phillips; Macy Jones; and Anthony McGee, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Melvin COONCE; Ruth Eddy; Thom Fischer; Harry Lloyd; William Roundtree; John Sydow; William Tinsman; Bill Armontrout; J.H. Holtmeyer; and David Wallace, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1359

7 F.3d 1359

Craig JONES; Danny Madison; James Moore; Lawrence Payne Aaron Phillips; Macy Jones; and Anthony McGee Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Melvin COONCE; Ruth Eddy; Thom Fischer; Harry Lloyd William Roundtree; John Sydow; William Tinsman Bill Armontrout; J.H. Holtmeyer; and David Wallace, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 92-3091.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted April 16, 1993.

Decided Oct. 14, 1993.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 15, 1993.

Greg Allen Perry, Jefferson City, MO, argued (William L. Webster and Greg A. Perry, on the brief), of defendants-appellants.

Sarah Alderks Brown, Overland Park, KS, argued, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before JOHN R. GIBSON, LOKEN, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

Appellants Melvin Coonce, Ruth Eddy, Thom Fischer, Harry Lloyd, William Roundtree, John Sydow, William Tinsman, Bill Armontrout, J.H. Holtmeyer, and David Wallace, prison officials at the Missouri State Penitentiary, appeal from the district court's denial of their request for summary judgment and grant of partial summary judgment in favor of inmates Craig Jones, Danny Madison, James Moore, Lawrence Payne, Aaron Phillips, Macy Jones, and Anthony McGee on their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) suit. Among other things, the inmates alleged that the officials violated their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by failing to provide, within a reasonable time, an informal, nonadversary review of the evidence supporting their placement in administrative segregation. The officials argue that they are protected by qualified immunity. They question whether the inmates had a liberty interest in remaining out of administrative segregation, and contend that the inmates received due process. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

On December 14, 1988, Coonce (a prison investigator) received a letter stating that the appellees and others were planning to stab a guard and another inmate. After discussing the situation with Warden Armontrout, Coonce moved the appellees from "Housing Unit 1" to "Housing Unit 2B," where they were placed in cell detention pending further investigation. ¹ That same day, Coonce interviewed Macy Jones, Moore, and Phillips about the incident.

On December 15, 1988, Coonce told Thom Fischer, the functional unit manager, that the appellees had been transferred to Unit 2B pending investigation. Fischer then "walked by" each inmate's cell to explain the reason for the segregation. Fischer continued this "walk-by" practice each day the appellees were housed in Unit 2B.

On December 19, 1988, Coonce interviewed Craig Jones and Payne, but never interviewed Madison or McGee. On December 20, 1988, Coonce completed his investigation, and told Fischer that none of the inmates would be charged with a conduct or rule violation. According to the prison's records, the officials released Macy and Craig Jones from cell detention on December 23, 1988, released Madison on December 27, 1988, released Phillips on December 29, 1988, and released Payne, Moore, ² and McGee on January 13, 1989.

The inmates brought suit under section 1983, alleging that the prison officials placed them in administrative segregation without due process of law, denied them access to the law library and courts, and kept them from participating in religious services, educational programs, and work opportunities. The inmates also claim that the prison officials' actions were racially motivated in violation of their right to equal protection, and McGee and Phillips allege that the prison officials failed to protect them from assault by other inmates.

The inmates moved for partial summary judgment as to their due process claims and the officials moved for summary judgment on all claims. The district court was persuaded by the inmates' argument based on the officials' failure to conduct an informal, nonadversary hearing within a reasonable time after placing the inmates in administrative segregation, in violation of the inmates' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court held that neither Coonce's investigational interviews nor Fischer's "walk-bys" constituted a "review" or complied with the prison's policies. Thus, some of the inmates were held for nine days and others were held for as many as thirty days without a proper review. Holding that Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), clearly established the law in this area, the court rejected the officials' qualified immunity argument as to the due process violation. The court then granted partial summary judgment in favor of the inmates, denied the officials' request for summary judgment, and certified the case for interlocutory appeal.

I.

The prison officials argue that the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of the inmates on their due process claim. The officials claim they were entitled to qualified immunity and, regardless, they did not violate the inmates' due process rights, for the inmates received an informal, nonadversary review of the information supporting their confinement within a reasonable time of their confinement.

We review a district court's grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir.1992). We examine the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and affirm a grant of summary judgment when there is no dispute as to any genuine issue of material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

Prison officials may generally rely on the defense of qualified immunity to protect them from liability for civil damages. Brown v. Frey, 889 F.2d 159, 165 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1088, 110 S.Ct. 1156, 107 L.Ed.2d 1059 (1990). In determining whether the officials are protected by qualified immunity, we must first decide the essentially legal question of whether the acts the inmates allege violated clearly established law, and then we must decide whether the inmates have produced evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether the officials committed those acts. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). The test focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of an official's acts, and the qualified immunity defense fails if the official violates a clearly established right because "a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

A.

We held in 1989 (after the acts in this case had taken place) that Missouri prison inmates placed in administrative segregation have a right to an informal hearing within a reasonable time. In Brown v. Frey, we held that Missouri statute section 217.375:

raises a protected liberty interest because the requirement of a hearing within three working days after confinement in administrative segregation is explicit and mandatory. As a result, ... [inmates have] a clear constitutional right of which defendants should have been aware to an informal hearing within a reasonable time following confinement.

889 F.2d at 166 (emphasis added); ³ see also Coffman v. Trickey, 884 F.2d 1057 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1056, 110 S.Ct. 1523, 108 L.Ed.2d 763 (1990). Missouri case law dating from 1987, before the acts in issue here, also established that section 217.375 created a protected liberty interest in remaining in the general population. Howard v. Armontrout, 729 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Mo.App.1987).

The appellants argue that because neither Brown nor Coffman had been decided when the incidents in this case occurred and because a 1987 unpublished Western District of Missouri case reached a result contrary to Howard, the law was not clearly established. As we explained in Hall v. Lombardi, 996 F.2d 954, 958 (8th Cir.1993), qualified immunity may not be available even though the very act in question has not specifically been held unlawful. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).

We have taken a broad view of what constitutes "clearly established law" for the purpose of qualified immunity, requiring some but not precise factual correspondence with precedents and demanding that officials apply "general, well-developed legal principles." It is only necessary that the unlawfulness of the official's act is apparent in view of preexisting law.

Hall, 996 F.2d at 958 (citations omitted).

Although we did not specifically hold that section 217.375 created a liberty interest until after the events in this case occurred, a reasonable official would have known that a liberty interest existed. In Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472, 103 S.Ct. 864, 872, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1982), the Supreme Court dealt with a similar situation and held that the prison officials were obligated to engage in an informal, nonadversary review of the information supporting the inmate's administrative confinement (including whatever statement the inmate wished to submit) within a reasonable time after confining him to administrative segregation. In so holding, the Supreme Court recognized that placing an inmate in administrative segregation is a discretionary act, and unless the State has restricted that discretion, no liberty interest arises. Id. at 471-72, 103 S.Ct. at 871. The Court then looked to the Pennsylvania statutes and prison regulations and found that the State had restricted the prison officials' discretion because the statutes and regulations contained "language of an unmistakably mandatory character, requiring that certain procedures 'shall,' 'will,' or 'must,' be employed, ... and that administrative segregation will not occur absent specified substantive predicates--viz., 'the need for control,' or 'the threat of a serious disturbance.' " Id.; see generally Hall, 996 F.2d at 958-59 (...