Howard v. People

• Decision Date: 24 February 2020
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 18SC326
• Citation: 458 P.3d 893
• Parties: Nevik Dean HOWARD, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

458 P.3d 893

Nevik Dean HOWARD, Petitioner,

v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 18SC326

Supreme Court of Colorado.

February 24, 2020

Petition for Rehearing Denied March 16, 2020

Attorneys for Petitioner: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender, John Plimpton, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, William G. Kozeliski, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amici Curiae Colorado Juvenile Defender Center, Colorado Criminal Defense Bar, and Office of Alternate Defense Counsel: Law Offices of Ann M. Roan, LLC, Ann M. Roan, Boulder, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 There are two ways that a juvenile can be charged as an adult in district court. First, the juvenile can be charged directly in district court under section 19-2-517, C.R.S. (2019) (the "direct-file statute"). Second, the juvenile can be transferred to the district court from the juvenile court under section 19-2-518, C.R.S. (2019) (the "transfer statute"). This case concerns the sentencing options available for direct-filed juveniles as compared to transferred juveniles who are both convicted of crimes of violence as defined in section 18-1.3-406, C.R.S. (2019) (the "crime of violence statute").

¶2 Nevik Howard, a sixteen-year-old, was convicted of first-degree assault (a crime of violence) and first-degree criminal trespass after his case was transferred from juvenile court to district court. During the sentencing hearing, Howard argued that he was subject to a more severe penalty for a crime of violence conviction under the transfer statute than he would be if this were a direct-file case because direct-filed juveniles are exempted "from the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in [the crime of violence statute]," whereas transferred juveniles are not. Thus, he argued that his equal protection rights were violated. To address that equal protection concern, the district court determined that the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in the crime of violence statute would not apply in this transfer proceeding, just as they would not apply in a direct-file proceeding. The court further determined, however, that this ruling did not make Howard eligible for probation. Instead, the court concluded that the statutory scheme only allowed either (1) a youth offender services ("YOS") sentence with a suspended Department of Corrections ("DOC") sentence, or (2) a DOC sentence. The court ultimately sentenced Howard to six years in YOS with a suspended fifteen-year DOC sentence.

¶3 Howard appealed, arguing that the district court violated his equal protection rights by concluding that he was not eligible for probation under the transfer statute when he would have been under the direct-file statute. The court of appeals affirmed Howard’s sentence, holding that "equal protection [did] not apply" because "Howard [was] not similarly situated to direct file eligible juveniles." People v. Howard , No. 15CA0629, ¶ 35, 2018 WL 1587546 (Mar. 22, 2018).

¶4 We granted certiorari¹ and affirm the court of appeals on different grounds. We hold that, under these facts, there is no equal protection violation because neither direct-filed juveniles nor transferred juveniles convicted of crimes of violence are eligible for probation, and the district court did not apply the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in the crime of violence statute. Hence, Howard was treated the same as a direct-filed juvenile would have been with regard to probation and the applicable sentencing range. As a result, there is no equal protection problem under the facts here.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶5 Following a car break-in and stabbing, Howard, who was sixteen at the time, was charged with first-degree assault (a crime of violence) and first-degree criminal trespass in juvenile court. After filing a delinquency petition in juvenile court, the People then moved to transfer Howard’s case to district court. Following a transfer hearing, the case was transferred to the adult court, and Howard was treated accordingly.

¶6 Early in the district court proceedings, Howard noted a disparity in the sentencing options under the direct-file and transfer statutes. Under the direct-file statute, a juvenile convicted of a crime of violence shall be sentenced "[a]s an adult," except that the "juvenile is excluded from the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in section 18-1.3-406 [the crime of violence statute]." § 19-2-517(6)(a)(I).² The transfer statute, however, does not contain the same exclusion from mandatory minimum sentencing. Instead, a transferred juvenile who is convicted of a crime of violence "shall [be] sentence[ed] ... pursuant to the provisions of section 18-1.3-401," which provides the presumptive penalties and sentences in criminal cases. § 19-2-518(1)(d)(I) ; see also § 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2019). Howard argued that this sentencing disparity violated his right to equal protection because it subjected him to mandatory incarceration and a mandatory minimum sentence, whereas direct-filed juveniles convicted of the same offense would be eligible for probation and would be excluded from the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions despite having worse criminal histories.³ The district court initially denied Howard’s request on ripeness grounds, noting that the issue was not properly before the court unless or until Howard was convicted of first-degree assault and subject to sentencing.

¶7 Ultimately, the jury found Howard guilty as charged. At the sentencing hearing, Howard renewed his equal protection argument, asserting that the "excluded from the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions" language in the direct-file statute made direct-filed juveniles eligible for probation, whereas he, as a transferred juvenile, would face the mandatory minimum sentencing that would subject him to a ten- to thirty-two-year sentence in the DOC and would render him ineligible for probation. He thus contended that it would violate equal protection if probation was not also an option under the transfer statute. To address the equal protection argument, the district court determined that "mandatory minimums don’t apply" here. It further concluded, however, that Howard was not eligible for probation. Accordingly, the district court concluded that the sentencing options were a YOS sentence with a suspended DOC sentence or a DOC sentence with a range of zero to thirty-two years.⁴ Ultimately, the court sentenced Howard to six years in YOS, with a suspended fifteen-year DOC sentence.

¶8 Howard appealed. A division of the court of appeals concluded that "equal protection [did] not apply" because "Howard [was] not similarly situated to direct file eligible juveniles." Howard , ¶ 35. The division reasoned that Howard was not similarly situated because he did not have the same criminal history as a direct-file-eligible juvenile. Id. The division further reasoned that "even assuming that the direct file statute is more lenient than the transfer statute, Howard was not subject to it" and thus could not sustain a challenge to it. Id. at ¶ 36. Accordingly, the division affirmed Howard’s sentence. Id. at ¶ 37.

¶9 We granted certiorari.

II. Analysis

¶10 We begin by outlining the appropriate standard of review. We then review the relevant equal protection law and applicable rules of statutory construction. Next, we detail the relevant sentencing ranges under the direct-file, transfer, and crime of violence statutes. After doing so, we hold that, under these facts, there is no equal protection violation because neither direct-filed juveniles nor transferred juveniles convicted of crimes of violence are eligible for probation, and the court did not subject Howard to the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in the crime of violence statute. Hence, Howard was treated the same under the transfer statute as juveniles charged under the direct-file statute with regard to probation and the applicable sentencing range. We therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals on different grounds.⁵

A. Standard of Review

¶11 We review equal protection claims de novo. Dean v. People , 2016 CO 14, ¶ 8, 366 P.3d 593, 596. Likewise, we review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. McCoy v. People , 2019 CO 44, ¶ 37, 442 P.3d 379, 389.

B. General Law

1. Equal Protection

¶12 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. While the Colorado Constitution contains no similar clause, "we have construed the due process clause of the Colorado Constitution to imply a similar guarantee." Dean , ¶ 11, 366 P.3d at 596 ; see also Colo. Const. art. II, § 25. "Equal protection of the laws assures the like treatment of all persons who are similarly situated." Dean , ¶ 11, 366 P.3d at 596. We have explained, for example, "that Colorado’s guarantee of equal protection is violated where two criminal statutes proscribe identical conduct, yet one punishes that conduct more harshly." Id. at ¶ 14, 366 P.3d at 597 ; see also People v. Nguyen , 900 P.2d 37, 38–40 (Colo. 1995) (explaining that equal protection is violated when two statutes proscribe similar conduct, yet a harsher penalty is imposed for the less serious criminal conduct).

2. Rules of Statutory Construction

¶13 When interpreting a statute, "our goal is to give effect to [the] legislative intent." People v. Hoskin , 2016 CO 63, ¶ 7, 380 P.3d 130, 133. To do so, we look to the statute’s plain language and "give its words and phrases their ordinary and commonly accepted meaning." Id. When the statutory language is clear, "we apply it as written" and need not resort to other rules of statutory construction. Munoz v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. , 2018 CO 68, ¶ 9, 425 P.3d 1128, 1130. We "disfavor a reading of a...