Howard v. S.C. Dep't of Corr.

• Citation: 399 S.C. 618,733 S.E.2d 211
• Decision Date: 12 September 2012
• Docket Number: No. 27170.,27170.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Parties: Stacy W. HOWARD, Appellant, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.

399 S.C. 618

733 S.E.2d 211

Stacy W. HOWARD, Appellant,

v.SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.

No. 27170.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Submitted Dec. 1, 2011.

Decided Sept. 12, 2012.

Stacy W. Howard, of Kershaw, pro se Appellant.

Christopher D. Florian, of Columbia, for Respondent.

Justice BEATTY.

Stacy Howard (“Appellant”), an inmate incarcerated with the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”), appeals the Administrative Law Court's (“ALC's”) summary dismissal of his appeal from a prison disciplinary conviction. Appellant contends the SCDC's actions implicated a state-created liberty interest and, thus, the ALC erred in summarily dismissing his appeal pursuant to section 1–23–600(D) ¹ of the South Carolina Code. Additionally, Appellant challenges: (1) the enforcement of the policy that formed the basis for the disciplinary conviction, (2) the procedure employed to procure the conviction, and (3) the factual basis underlying the conviction. We affirm as modified.

I. Factual/Procedural History

On June 24, 2008, Appellant was cited with a disciplinary violation for “Unauthorized Services/Piddling (845) of SCDC Policy OP–22.14” ² of the Inmate Disciplinary System. The citation was based on Appellant's preparation of a Post–Conviction Relief (“PCR”) application for an illiterate inmate.

Appellant, who had been previously employed as a law library clerk, admitted that he had provided assistance to the inmate; however, he disputed that he offered “professional services.” In support of this claim, Appellant submitted evidence that the law library was inadequate and the personnel were not trained to provide effective legal assistance. Based on these conditions, Appellant maintained that he provided assistanceby reading the “proper law” to the inmate and filling out the PCR application with the inmate's “thoughts and contention[s].” Ultimately, Appellant challenged the SCDC's policy provision that barred inmates “from furnishing [legal] assistance to other prisoners” on the ground there was no “reasonable alternative to assist inmates in the preparation of petitions for post-conviction relief.”

After Appellant refused to accept an informal resolution of the incident, the matter was referred for a disciplinary hearing. Following a hearing, the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) found Appellant guilty of the violation and issued a reprimand. This sanction resulted in Appellant's failure to earn good-time credits ³ for the month of the disciplinary infraction and a reduction in earned-work credit ⁴ for that month ⁵ AND SUBSEQUENT MONTHs.⁶ APPELLANT DID NOT LOSE any accrued good-time credits due to his conviction.

Appellant challenged his conviction using the internal prison grievance procedures. After Appellant received the final agency decision denying his grievance, he appealed to the Administrative Law Court pursuant to Al–Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000).

In response, the SCDC moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground the ALC lacked jurisdiction to review the matter. In support of this motion, the SCDC relied on a recently-enacted amendment to the South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act. The amendment ⁷ revised section 1–23–600(D) of the South Carolina Code to read in relevant part:

An administrative law judge shall not hear an appeal from an inmate in the custody of the Department of Corrections involving the loss of the opportunity to earn sentence-related credits pursuant to Section 24–13–210(A) or Section 24–13–230(A).

S.C.Code Ann. § 1–23–600(D) (Supp.2011) (emphasis added). Based on this amendment, the SCDC contended the ALC was without jurisdiction to hear “inmate appeals in which inmates have not lost good time, but have failed to earn good time for the month of their disciplinary infraction.”

Appellant filed a brief in opposition to the SCDC's motion. In terms of his conviction, Appellant challenged the SCDC's enforcement of the policy on the ground there was no other legal assistance program available to illiterate inmates. Appellant further asserted he was denied minimal due process in the administrative proceedings as he was not allowed an opportunity to present documentary evidence or witnesses. Appellant also claimed the administrative findings were “arbitrary, capricious, and characterized by an abuse of discretion.”

With respect to the imposed sanction, Appellant claimed the “erroneous extension of his sentence” implicated a state-created liberty interest and violated equal protection. Finally, Appellant asserted that section 1–23–600(D) is “being construed to such an extent that an iron curtain is drawn between Appellant and the Court.” Specifically, Appellant claimed the SCDC's interpretation would essentially preclude all appeals from prisoners “in which they have only lost goodtime for the month of the infraction.”

The ALC summarily dismissed Appellant's appeal. In so ruling, the ALC referenced the recent amendment cited by the SCDC and noted that the “statute applies not only to the loss of the right to earn good time for the month (of the infraction) but to the loss of the right to earn other credits such as earned work credits.” ⁸

Appellant appealed the ALC's order to the Court of Appeals. This Court certified the appeal pursuant to Rule 204(b) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules.

II. Standard of Review

The ALC has subject matter jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) to hear properly perfected appeals from the SCDC's final orders in administrative or non-collateral matters. Slezak v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 361 S.C. 327, 331, 605 S.E.2d 506, 507 (2004). Our standard of review derives from the APA. Al–Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 379, 527 S.E.2d 742, 755 (2000). We may affirm, remand, reverse, or modify the appealed decision if the appellant's substantive rights have suffered prejudice because the decision is:

(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(c) made upon unlawful procedure;

(d) affected by other error of law;

(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

S.C.Code Ann. § 1–23–610(B) (Supp.2011).

III. Discussion

Although Appellant raises five issues, he essentially challenges the ALC's dismissal of his appeal and the underlying disciplinary conviction. Accordingly, in the interest of logical progression, we have consolidated Appellant's issues into these two sections.

A.

Initially, Appellant contends the ALC erred in finding that his appeal did not implicate a state-created liberty interest as the sanction imposed by the SCDC effectively extended his sentence due to the reduction in the rate at which he earned sentence-related credits. In addition, Appellant challenges the Legislature's enactment and the ALC's interpretation of the 2008 amendment to section 1–23–600(D). Appellant maintains the amendment rendered section 1–23–600(D) unconstitutional as it effectively denies “Appellant and SCDC inmates judicial review of an institutional disciplinary hearing when there is only a loss of the opportunity to earn sentence related credits.”

Because section 1–23–600(D) eliminates judicial review of these types of grievances, Appellant avers that the statute violates his right to substantive and procedural due process. Appellant further contends the statute violates his right to equal protection as it essentially results in the disparate treatment of inmates who are convicted of disciplinary offenses. According to Appellant, inmates who are sanctioned to the “revocation” of good-time credits may receive judicial review of their convictions whereas those who are sanctioned to the “loss” of earning sentence-related credits will not be entitled to judicial review.

Given that section 1–23–600(D) eliminates an inmate's ability to challenge the legality of a disciplinary conviction that involves “the loss of the opportunity to earn sentence-related credits” and this Court's decision in Al–Shabazz⁹ precludes PCR for these grievances, Appellant ultimately claims an inmate will never be able to receive judicial review under these circumstances. Based on the foregoing, Appellant urges this Court to “strike down” section 1–23–600(D) as unconstitutional.

At least facially, it would appear that an analysis of this case would simply involve an application of the rules of statutory construction. “The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.” Bryant v. State, 384 S.C. 525, 529, 683 S.E.2d 280, 282 (2009). Where the statute's language is plain, unambiguous, and conveys a clear, definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning. Gay v. Ariail, 381 S.C. 341, 345, 673 S.E.2d 418, 420 (2009).

Applying these rules, the plain terms of section 1–23–600(D) precludes the ALC from hearing all inmate appeals involving the loss of the opportunity to earn sentence-related credits. Thus, the Legislature definitively limited the parameters of the ALC's subject matter jurisdiction regarding certain appeals by inmates. The Legislature has the authority to limit the subject matter jurisdiction of a court that it has created. See Black v. Town of Springfield, 217 S.C. 413, 415, 60 S.E.2d 854, 855 (1950) ( “The jurisdiction of a Court of the subject matter of an action depends upon the authority granted to it by the Constitution and laws of the State and is fundamental.”); S.C.Code Ann. §§ 1–23–500, –600 (Supp.2011) (creating the ALC and outlining the extent of its jurisdiction).

Because the effect of this statute also tangentially implicates state-created liberty interests, we believe it is necessary to clarify the amendment and re-evaluate our ...