Howe v. State, 39519
| Decision Date | 05 April 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 39519,39519 |
| Citation | 301 S.E.2d 280,250 Ga. 811 |
| Parties | HOWE v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Jerry W. Loftin, Manchester, for Tony L. Howe.
Arthur E. Mallory, III, Dist. Atty., James M. Garcia, Asst. Dist. Atty., Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., LaGrange, for the State.
Tony L. Howe, a minor, shot and killed Millie Brown with a handgun. He was convicted of malice murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He enumerates as error the admission into evidence of an incriminating statement made by him while in police custody, and the decision of the trial court not to give a jury charge on voluntary manslaughter.
1. We have treated comprehensively the first issue in Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 127-8, 226 S.E.2d 922 (1976), and Crawford v. State, 240 Ga. 321(1), 240 S.E.2d 824 (1977).
"The court in Riley then set forth several of the factors to be considered among the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the juvenile's waiver of counsel was made knowingly and voluntarily, as follows (237 Ga. at 128 ): '(1) age of the accused; (2) education of the accused; (3) knowledge of the accused as to both the substance of the charge ... and the nature of his rights to consult with an attorney and remain silent; (4) whether the accused is held incommunicado or allowed to consult with relatives, friends or an attorney; (5) whether the accused was interrogated before or after formal charges had been filed; (6) methods used in interrogations; (7) length of interrogations; (8) whether vel non the accused refused to voluntarily give statements on prior occasions; and (9) whether the accused has repudiated an extra judicial statement at a later date.' " Crawford v. State, supra, 240 Ga. at pp. 323-4, 240 S.E.2d 824.
(1) Howe was sixteen at the time of his arrest.
(2) He had completed the ninth grade and was able to read and write.
(3) Howe was arrested at approximately 8:30 A.M., a short time after the homicide of which he was convicted. The victim died around noon, and questioning of Howe began at about 1:00 P.M., at which time police officers were not aware of the death. Thus, Howe originally was told that he was being questioned about the "shooting" of Millie Brown. Howe had already admitted responsibility for the shooting when, during the course of the interview, it was learned that the victim had died. At that time, prior to the signing of a written statement, Howe was informed that the victim had died and that he would be treated as an adult and charged with murder.
Howe's rights were read to him prior to the interview and he signed a written waiver. A juvenile officer had been called and was present, in his own words, to "... make sure the rights of the juvenile [were observed]." Although Howe had been drinking during the night, there was an interval of at least four hours between arrest and questioning.
(4) Howe's mother arrived after he had admitted shooting the victim but before the written statement was signed. She was allowed to see him immediately, but was not advised as to his right to counsel. According to the interrogating officer, she simply told her son to tell the truth. She remained with Howe during the rest of the interview and the signing of the written statement.
A juvenile officer was called and was present during the interview, although he did not remain in the same room at all times. See OCGA § 15-11-19(a)(3) (Code Ann. § 24-1402).
Howe allegedly waived the right to have an attorney present during questioning.
(5) Formal charges were filed after questioning.
(6) Two officers conducted the interview, with the juvenile officer present most of the time. It is not contended that the methods of interrogation were unusual or oppressive.
(7) The written statement was signed at 2:25 P.M., after approximately 1 1/2 hours of questioning.
(8) Howe was cooperative and...
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