Hranicka v. Chesapeake Surgical, Ltd.

• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
• Citation: 443 Md. 289,116 A.3d 507
• Docket Number: No. 83, Sept. Term, 2014.,83, Sept. Term, 2014.
• Parties: Mark G. HRANICKA v. CHESAPEAKE SURGICAL, LTD., et al.
• Decision Date: 18 June 2015

443 Md. 289
116 A.3d 507

Mark G. HRANICKA
v.
CHESAPEAKE SURGICAL, LTD., et al.

No. 83, Sept. Term, 2014.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

June 18, 2015.

116 A.3d 509

L. Teri Spradlin–Dahn (Annapolis, MD), on brief, for Petitioner.

Sean E. Smith (Julie D. Murray, Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondents.

Robert J. Zarbin, Esquire, James K. MacAlister, Esquire, The Zarbin Law Firm, Upper Marlboro, MD, for Amicus Curiae brief of Maryland Association for Justice in support of Petitioner.

Amy L. Ticer, Esquire, Bonner, Kiernan, Trebach and Crociata, LLP, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae brief of The Maryland Defense Counsel, Inc., in support of Appellee's brief.

Argued before: BARBERA, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, McDONALD and WATTS, JJ.

Opinion

WATTS, J.

443 Md. 292

We decide whether an employee's workers' compensation claim is time-barred under Md.Code Ann., Labor & Empl. (1991, 2008 Repl. Vol.) (“LE”) § 9–709(b)(3), a two-year statute of limitations, where the claim is electronically submitted

443 Md. 293

to the Workers' Compensation Commission (“the Commission”) before expiration of the two-year period, but not filed on paper until after expiration of the two-year period.

We hold that an employee's claim is time-barred under LE § 9–709(b)(3) where the claim is electronically submitted to the Commission before expiration of the two-year period, but not filed on paper with the Commission until after expiration of the two-year period. Stated otherwise, we hold that, under the relevant statutes and regulations, electronic submission of a claim does not constitute “filing” pursuant to Code of Maryland Regulations (“COMAR”) 14.09.02.02A,¹ and the Commission erred in ruling that the filing date of a claim could, for purposes of the statute of limitations, be the date of the claim's electronic submission.

BACKGROUND

First Claim

This case arises out of a workers' compensation claim filed by Mark G. Hranicka (“Hranicka”), Petitioner, as a result of an injury sustained during a motor vehicle accident on January 6, 2010. On January 14, 2010, Chesapeake Surgical, Ltd. (“the Employer”), Respondent, prepared a “Workers Compensation—First Report of

116 A.3d 510

Injury or Illness.” The Employer and NorGUARD Insurance Company (“the Insurer”), Respondent, mailed to the Commission the First Report of Injury or Illness, which was received and filed by the Commission on January 21, 2010.

On January 14, 2010, Hranicka completed and executed a C–1 Claim Form, which was filed on paper with and date stamped by the Commission on January 28, 2010, and assigned claim number “W016210.” On February 3, 2010, the Commission issued a “Notice of Employee's Claim” and assigned a “consideration date” of February 24, 2010, for Respondents to

443 Md. 294

contest the claim. Respondents contested the claim before the consideration date deadline, and the case was set for a hearing before the Commission. On May 20, 2010, at the hearing, the parties appeared before the Commission, and Hranicka requested that his workers' compensation claim be withdrawn. On May 24, 2010, the Commission ordered that the workers' compensation claim be withdrawn.

Second Claim

Nothing further concerning Hranicka's workers' compensation claim occurred until 2012. On January 17, 2012, Hranicka electronically submitted to the Commission a second C–1 Claim Form, identifying the date of the accident as January 6, 2010. The Commission's online program recorded the date and time of the electronic submission at the bottom of the second C–1 Claim Form, underneath the signature and date lines, as “Received: 1/17/2012 11:26:13 AM.” On January 20, 2012, Hranicka executed two forms: (1) the second C–1 Claim Form, which he had electronically submitted on January 17, 2012; and (2) an “Authorization for Disclosure of Health Information.” On January 24, 2012, the executed second C–1 Claim Form was filed on paper with and date stamped by the Commission, and assigned claim number “W032036.” On that same day, January 24, 2012, the authorization form was filed with the Commission. On January 27, 2012, the Commission issued a new “Notice of Employee's Claim” and assigned a consideration date of February 17, 2012, for Respondents to contest the claim. The new “Notice of Employee's Claim” stated that Hranicka's C–1 Claim Form was received on January 24, 2012, the date on which the paper copy was filed. On February 12, 2012, Respondents contested the claim, contending that the claim was time-barred by LE § 9–709(b)(3).

On May 31, 2012, the Commission conducted a hearing at which Commissioner Cynthia S. Miraglia (“Commissioner Miraglia”) presided. During the hearing, Commissioner Miraglia stated:

[Hranicka]'s claim form came in on the 17th. When an electronic claim is filed, we accept the claim for statu[t]e [of

443 Md. 295

limitations] purposes. But you cannot file an electronic signature because of the concern of privacy and security. So the claim is—for limitation[s] purposes on the 17th. However, we don't have a final notice until we get in the signed claim forms.

* * *

But just for everyone's edification, when an electronic claim form comes in to the Commission, that date is the date we use for limitation[s] purposes. Now, if you never send in a signed copy, then, obviously, then we're at another issue. But in this case, they clearly did.

At the conclusion of the hearing, Commissioner Miraglia determined that the claim was not time-barred, and on June 12, 2012, issued an order stating the same.

On June 18, 2012, Respondents filed with the Commission a “Request for Rehearing,” arguing that the Commission's June 12, 2012, decision was “incorrect as a

116 A.3d 511

matter of law.” On July 11, 2012, the Commission denied the request for rehearing. On July 18, 2012, Respondents filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City (“the circuit court”) a petition for judicial review of the Commission's June 12, 2012, and July 11, 2012, decisions. On February 5, 2013, Respondents filed in the circuit court a motion for summary judgment, alleging that Hranicka's claim was barred by LE § 9–709(b)(3) and that, under COMAR 14.09.02.02A, electronic submission of a claim does not constitute “filing” of a claim. Hranicka filed a response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment as well as a request for a hearing, and the circuit court denied the motion for summary judgment.

Respondents appealed and, in an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that using the electronic submission date of the claim form for purposes of the statute of limitations instead of the date that the claim form is filed on paper with and date-stamped by the Commission is inconsistent with the Commission's regulations and

443 Md. 296

incorrect as a matter of law.² Hranicka filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted. See Hranicka v. Chesapeake Surgical Ltd., 440 Md. 461, 103 A.3d 593 (2014).

DISCUSSION

Hranicka contends that the Court of Special Appeals erred concluding that the Commission could not generate a procedural rule to relate claims back to their electronic submission dates for purposes of the statute of limitations.³ Hranicka argues that COMAR 14.09.02.02A does not prohibit the Commission from accepting the date a claim form is electronically submitted by a claimant as the filing date. Hranicka asserts that the Commission's website provides instructions indicating that a claim has been “filed” once the claim has been submitted electronically. Hranicka maintains that one of the purposes of the Commission's Web–Enabled File Management System is to facilitate the electronic filing of workers' compensation claims.

Hranicka contends that, given the remedial nature of the Workers' Compensation Act and the principle that the Act should be construed liberally in favor of employees, any ambiguity concerning the filing date should be construed in his favor. Hranicka asserts that, because Respondents knew of the claim as early as January 6, 2010, when the accident occurred, and because Respondents admitted in the circuit court that they were not prejudiced between the electronic submission and the paper filing, electronic submission of the claim was sufficient.

443 Md. 297

Respondents respond that the Court of Special Appeals correctly held that Hranicka's workers' compensation claim is time-barred.⁴ Respondents contend that COMAR 14.09.02.02A makes...