Huard v. Pion
Decision Date | 10 July 1953 |
Citation | 98 A.2d 261,149 Me. 67 |
Parties | HUARD et al. v. PION. |
Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Dubord & Dubord, Waterville, for plaintiffs.
Roland J. Poulin, Waterville, for defendant.
Before MERRILL, C. J., and THAXTER, FELLOWS, NULTY, WILLIAMSON, and TIRRELL, JJ.
This case is before the Law Court on report.
The case is a real action brought by the plaintiffs as remaindermen under the will of Pierre T. Mercier, also known as Peter Marshall. Title to a portion of land devised for life by Pierre T. Mercier to his daughter, Emma Landry, and at her death to the plaintiffs, is in issue.
Plaintiffs' writ is dated May 20, 1952, and it describes the land in question.
Defendant filed a plea of the general issue with a brief statement setting forth in substance that Emma Landry, life tenant, brought a real action asserting title to the same land against the defendant, that judgment was entered in favor of the defendant, and that the present plaintiffs are estopped from recovering judgment in the present action.
Plaintiffs filed a counter-brief statement in which they set forth that they are not bound by the judgment.
The case was reported to the Law Court with a stipulation that if the Law Court determines that the plaintiffs are bound by the judgment, the case is to be remanded to the Superior Court for entry of final judgment for the defendant, and that if the issue is determined in favor of the plaintiffs, then the cause is to be remanded to the Superior Court for trial on the merits.
Plaintiffs were not parties to the action brought by Emma Landry against the present defendant. Subsequent to the decision rendered in the suit brought by Emma Landry against the present defendant, Emma Landry quitclaimed the premises in question to the remaindermen for the purpose of giving the remaindermen immediate right of possession, which is of course an essential element in a real action.
The issue for determination is whether or not remaindermen are bound by a judgment rendered in an action brought by the life tenant, said remaindermen not having been made parties to the prior action.
The general rule is that an estoppel resulting from a judgment is available to either party in a subsequent action. It is well settle that the doctrine of res judicata does not operate to affect strangers to a judgment, that is, to affect the rights of those who are neither parties nor in privity with a party therein. Am.Jur., Judgments, Vol. 30, Sec. 220; Hill v. Stevenson, 63 Me. 364-368.
In Morrison v. Clark, 89 Me. 103, 35 A. 1034, 1035, this Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Whitehouse, said:
.'
and in Savage v. North Anson Manufacturing Company, 124 Me. 1, 4, 124 A. 721, 722, the Court stated:
.
See also Van Buren Light & Power Co. v. Inhabitants of Van Buren, 118 Me. 458, 461, 109 A. 3.
These plaintiffs had no right, in the original case, to participate in the trial thereof or to appeal from the judgment, neither did they have the right to adduce testimony or cross-examine witnesses. They were not parties to the original action.
This Court, in Burns v. Baldwin-Doherty Company, 132 Me. 331, 333-335, 170 A. 511, 512, said:
'It is a principle of the common law that when a fact is once finally adjudicated, without fraud or collusion, by a tribunal of competent jurisdiction, the judgment binds the parties and their privies. Lander v. Arno, 65 Me. 26; Van Buren Light & Power Company v. Inhabitants of Van Buren, 118 Me. 458, 109 A. 3; Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 214, 89 N.E. 193, 40 L.R.A.,N.S., 314.
'Parties, in the larger legal sense, are all persons having a right to control the proceedings, to make defense, to adduce and cross-examine witnesses, and to appeal from the decision, if any appeal lies. Greenleaf Evid., §§ 523, 535; Duchess of Kingston's Case, 3 Smith's Lead.Cas., 1808 (9th Am.Ed.); Litchfield v. Goodnow, 123 U.S. 549, 8 S.Ct. 210, 31 L.Ed. 199. The same thing may also be said of those who assume to have to right to do these things. Winchester v. Heiskell, 119 U.S. 450, 7 S.Ct. 281, 30 L.Ed. 462.
'Privity is a 'mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property.' Bouv.Law Dict. [Rawle's Third Revision 2722],...
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