Hubbard v. State

Decision Date28 February 1950
Docket Number8 Div. 787
Citation45 So.2d 795,35 Ala.App. 211
PartiesHUBBARD v. STATE.
CourtAlabama Court of Appeals

R. L. Almon, of Moulton, for appellant.

A. A. Carmichael, Atty. Gen., and Thos. F. Parker, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

The following charges were refused to defendant:

'12. I charge you that if you are not convinced from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the felonious intent to steal at the time he took the animal in question you should find him not guilty.'

'14. I charge you that the State must convince you beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence that the defendant feloniously took and carried away a cow or an animal of the cow kind, and that such animal was the property of Charles C. Nance, Junior.'

'A-5. Unless the jury believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the felonious intent existed at the time of the taking (of the calf alleged to have been stolen) they must find the defendant not guilty.'

'19. I charge you that the proof of the larceny of a bull or steer calf or yearling is not proof of the larceny of a cow.'

CARR, Judge.

Charlie Hubbard was indicted and convicted for the offense of stealing 'one cow or animal of the cow kind.' Title 14, Sec. 331, Code 1940.

Charles C. Nance, Jr. owned a male calf or yearling weighing about 500 pounds and about six months old. The animal was seen in a pasture of a neighbor and among some cattle that the appellant was charged with feeding. It remained here for a day or two and then disappeared.

A few days after its disappearance was observed, a skin and head of a slaughtered yearling were found at some secluded place. The evidence in the aspect of identification sustains the findings of the jury that the skin and head were removed from the animal which Mr. Nance lost.

Buddy Whitworth, a sixteen year old boy, testified for the State. According to the evidence of this witness, the defendant and two of the latter's brothers, Robert and James Hubbard, arranged a night deer hunt. Buddy did not have anything to do with the details of the plans, but was invited to go along. He accepted the invitation. He testified that the party met at the appellant's home and went in Robert's automobile a distance of about six or eight miles to the old homeplace of the defendant's father. It appears that no one lived here.

Upon reaching the destination, Robert gave some directions about the routes to take. When the witness and appellant had walked a distance of about one hundred yards from the old house, Robert called to them and stated he had heard a deer. The couple returned in answer to the call. The eyes of the animal were located by means of a flashlight and Buddy and James shot and wounded what the witness then discovered was a yearling. Robert and appellant then shot the animal several times. Each member of the party, except the witness, assisted in skinning and dressing the yearling. The appellant deposited the skin and head at the place where they were subsequently found, as we have indicated hereinabove.

The accused testified in his own behalf. His testimony in the main was not at variance with that of Buddy. He denied that he ever shot the yearling. He admitted sharing the meat with his brothers, Robert and James.

When the State had rested its case in chief, the appellant made a motion to exclude the evidence. This was denied. The general affirmative charge was requested for appellant when the introduction of all the testimony had concluded.

We will treat both of these questions together.

'The corpus delicti is a compound fact made up of two things: The existence of a certain act or result forming the basis of the criminal charge, as the occurrence of an injury or loss; and the existence of a criminal agency as the cause of this act or result.' 23 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 916, p. 181. See also, Weaver v. State, 24 Ala.App. 208, 132 So. 706; Medlock v. State, Ala.App., 41 So.2d 622.

The tendencies of the evidence which we have delineated above will illustrate our conclusion that the State did not fail in the essential proof of the corpus delicti. Colquitt v. State, 61 Ala. 48; Poole v. State, 30 Ala.App. 110, 1 So.2d 661.

It is evident that the legal doctrine of aiding and abetting had application to the prosecution and the conviction of the accused. Title 14, Sec. 14, Code 1940.

The evidence supported the contention of the State that the yearling was taken from the pasture of the neighbor and carried to the place where it was later killed and slaughtered. There is a strong inference from the proof that this was a part of a scheme whereby the animal would be subsequently killed and dressed and its meat would be taken by the perpetrators of the plot.

As we have pointed out above, it is without dispute in the evidence that the defendant assumed the joint possession of the animal after it was killed. He assisted in dressing it and shared in the meat with his brothers.

We held in Harrison v. State, 31 Ala.App. 68, 12 So.2d 350, that, where the corpus delicti had been established, proof of defendant's unsatisfactorily explained recent possession of the stolen property was sufficient to justify a conviction. See also, Heath v. State, 30 Ala.App. 416, 7 So.2d 579; Morrow v. State, 19 Ala.App. 212, 97 So. 106; Bell v. State, 23 Ala.App. 355, 125 So. 901.

It is urged in brief of counsel that Buddy Whitworth was an accomplice and his testimony was not sufficiently corroborated. Title 15, Sec. 307, Code 1940.

The proof does not establish conclusively that Buddy was in fact an accomplice. This question aside, and assuming that he was, his testimony was sufficiently corroborated to meet the demands of the statute.

Before resting, the State introduced a statement made by the accused to investigating officer. In this statement, the appellant admitted that he assisted in dressing the animal and that he shared in the division of the meat.

The owner never saw the yearling after it strayed from his premises into his neighbor's pasture. At the latter place it was among other cows which were tended by the appellant.

'Corroborate', as applied to the statute in question, means to strengthen. It must be some fact or facts which will strengthen the testimony of the accomplice. It is not necessary that it tend to establish or prove the exact facts stated by the accomplice. It must be sufficient and of such probative value as to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime. Brown et al. v. State, 31 Ala.App. 529, 19 So.2d 88; Bradley v. State, 19 Ala.App. 578, 99 So. 321; Morris v. State, 25 Ala.App. 156, 142 So. 592.

Justice Thomas, writing for the Supreme Court in Skumro v. State, 234 Ala. 4, 170 So. 776, 778, stated the doctrine in this language: 'It is further established that the corroboration of an accomplice must tend to connect the accused with the commission of the offense; that it need not refer to particular statements testified to by that accomplice, but must strengthen the probative incriminatory force of such accomplice's testimony. Having this effect, it is sufficient to warrant submission of the issues of fact involving defendant's guilt to the jury.'

See also, Malachi v. State, 89 Ala. 134, 8 So. 104; Smith v. State, 230 Ala. 413, 161 So. 538; Berry v. State, 231 Ala. 437, 165 So. 97; Segars v. State, 19 Ala.App. 407, 97 So. 747; ...

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  • Boone v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • January 24, 1968
    ...F.2d 788 (9th Cir.). In some jurisdictions it is required by statute. See People v. Kress, 284 N.Y. 452, 31 N.E.2d 898; Hubbard v. State, 35 Ala.App. 211, 45 So.2d 795; People v. Lyons, 50 Cal.2d 245, 324 P.2d 556. In at least one jurisdiction other than Maryland it is required by judicial ......
  • State v. Brown
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • June 13, 1966
    ...Robinson v. United States, 61 App.D.C. 370, 63 F.2d 147(2); People v. Reid, 233 Cal.App.2d 163, 43 Cal.Rptr. 379(2); Hubbard v. State, 35 Ala.App. 211, 45 So.2d 795(8); TVRZ v. State, 154 Neb. 641, 48 N.W.2d 761(8); Walker v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St.2d 136, 205 N.E.2d 394(1); State v. Jones, 52 ......
  • Cash v. State, 7 Div. 790
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    • Alabama Court of Appeals
    • August 16, 1966
    ...his testimony of the exact distance cannot be reversible error. Gettings v. State, 32 Ala.App. 644, 29 So.2d 677; Hubbard v. State, 35 Ala.App. 211, 45 So.2d 795. The fact in dispute was that appellant was in the lane to his left and not how far over he was in that lane. Appellant testified......
  • Smith v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Appeals
    • January 6, 1953
    ...find any reversible error in the portions to which exceptions were directed. Mosley v. State, 241 Ala. 132, 1 So.2d 593; Hubbard v. State, 35 Ala.App. 211, 45 So.2d 795. As we have indicated, the undisputed evidence pointed directly to the guilt of the defendant as charged. In this state of......
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