Hudson House, Inc. v. Rozman
| Decision Date | 10 May 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 42332,42332 |
| Citation | 509 P.2d 992,82 Wn.2d 178 |
| Parties | , 61 A.L.R.3d 1163 HUDSON HOUSE, INC., an Oregon corporation, Respondent, v. John I. ROZMAN, a widower, et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Stritmatter & Stritmatter, Paul L. Stritmatter, Hoquiam, Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., Temple of Justice, Jonathan Blank, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, Stanley J. Krause, Aberdeen, for appellants.
Schumacher & Charette, Robert Charette, Aberdeen, Davies, Biggs, Strayer, Stoel & Boley, Howard M. Feuerstein, Portland, Or., for respondent.
This action involves a highly unusual accretion in Grays Harbor County at the mouth of the Copalis River, where that river flows into the Pacific Ocean.
Respondent, Hudson House, Inc., is an Oregon corporation, and the plaintiff. This action was instituted to quiet title to all of the accretions lying adjacent to government lot 1, section 28, township 19 north, range 12 west of Willamette Meridian. After a trial, respondent prevailed and was awarded all of the disputed property. The several defendants have perfected this timely appeal.
All of government lot 1 was first conveyed by patent from the United States government to Mary J. Henninger on October 6, 1894. Thereafter, the patentee conveyed several tracts to various grantees. No useful purpose would be served by tracing the chain of title of each of the parties. The ownership of the several parties is best shown by the accompanying map and better than a word description. It is an old saying that 'a picture is worth a thousand words' and the same is true of a map.
From old maps of the area, particularly a map made by the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey in 1887 and a map made by the Bureau of Land Management in 1891, it is obvious the accretion has grown substantially since the patent of 1894. Those old maps, when compared to recent maps of the area, show the great change.
Respondent is the undisputed owner of approximately an acre of upland north of the Benner Road. It is respondent's claim and the decision of the trial court that all of the accretion in question, that is, accretions north of the Benner Road, become additions to the upland tract mentioned.
Appellant Rozman claims certain lands by adverse possession, under both RCW 7.28.080 () and RCW 4.16.020 (). He also claims under the rule of equitable apportionment, or 'Massachusetts rule', and he is claiming under the deeds in the chain of title.
The State of Washington, acting through the Washington State Parks and Recreation Commission, claims a part of the accreted lands lying to the west of the state park. That is, the land lying between the park and the Pacific Ocean.
The claim of the state is based upon the unfairness of being cut off from ocean frontage.
The appellant Menath is claiming the accretion on the theory that by the deeds in his chain of title he received all of government lot 1, except the specified exceptions conveyed to other persons. His contention is that since the accretion is to lot 1 and since it is not a part of any of the excepted tracts, it, therefore, must be his.
Appellants Quigg and Close are claiming a small triangular shaped tract of land. Their claim is based upon the tract being an accretion to their land, and also they rely upon the case of Rohr v. Gordon, Grays Harbor County No. 49113, which determined rights as between all of the appellants. It must always be kept in mind that respondent was not a party to that litigation.
The son of appellant John I. Rozman is referred to at several places in the record as 'Jack' Rozman. He was awarded an area by adverse possession and no appeal was taken from that portion of the decree of the trial court.
Because of the result reached, it may be well to discuss first the claim of the State of Washington, Washington State Parks and Recreation Commission. The state park in question is to the east (shoreside) of the river. It once had frontage directly on the Pacific Ocean, but the growth of the accretion has come between the park and the ocean.
At the outset, Hughes v. State, 67 Wash.2d 799, 410 P.2d 20 (1966), reversed in 389 U.S. 290, 88 S.Ct. 438, 19 L.Ed.2d 530 (1967), might seem to establish the law herein. The facts, however, are substantially different. In Hughes, the upland owner claimed lands extending 561 feet from east to west, being accretions directly in front of or west of the upland. The state claimed the area by virtue of the provision of the state constitution, article 17. In essence, the state claimed the lands between the line of ordinary high tide at the time of statehood, November 11, 1889, and the line of ordinary high tide at the time of trial. The plaintiff therein claimed the lands lying west of her upland and as far as the line of ordinary high tide at the time of trial.
In Hughes there was no river, no odd shaped accretion, but only an accretion directly in front of plaintiff's property. The question was whether the accretion belonged to the upland owner or to the state in its sovereign capacity.
Here, we have a different situation. In Hughes, the effect of the decision was to secure to the upland owner her access to the ocean. Here to award all of the accretion to respondent as the trial court did would cut off the park from access to the ocean. Hughes stands for the proposition that an upland owner should not be cut off from 'access to water which is often the most valuable feature of their property'. When thus viewed, Hughes is in nowise contrary to the result reached herein.
Washington has long adhered to the rule of treating owners equitably. As we said in Grill v. Meydenbauer Bay Yacht Club, 61 Wash.2d 432, at 437, 378 P.2d 423, at 426 (1963):
. . . a formula which works well in one situation may be inequitable in another. It is not a matter of applying a particular formula and letting the chips fall where they may. As pointed out in Mutual Chem. Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore (1940), 33 F.Supp. 881, it is desirable that all affected property owners be treated equitably.
To the same effect is Spath v. Larsen, 20 Wash.2d 500, 524, 148 P.2d 834, 845 (1944). Therein we said in part:
It must always be remembered, however, that the endless variations of shore lines within this state will present many questions concerning the ownership of tidelands, which cannot be determined by any one fixed rule, however elastic.
In line with the suggestions contained in the above quotations, together with the opening statement of this opinion that this is a 'highly unusual accretion' we find no similar situation in this state. Fortunately, however, similar situations have arisen and have reached appellate courts in some other states. The wisconsin case of Rondesvedt v. Running, 19 Wis.2d 614, 121 N.W.2d 1 (1963) involves a fresh water lake, Long Lake. The shape of the tracts involved bears considerable resemblence to the case at bar although the separation was formed by a bay or inlet from the main body of the lake rather than by a river. In that case the lateral lines of the owners of upland were extended to make a division of the alluvion.
In that case the court said in part:
The rule relied upon by plaintiff, that alluvion formed by accretion belongs to the owner of the upheld to which it is contiguous, is, in part at least, a recognition of the riparian right of that owner to access to the water. Where the circumstances are such that the full application of that rule in favor of one riparian owner would destroy or substantially impair the riparian right of another owner to access, we think the rule must yield.
An even more similar case, and probably the most similar to the instant case to be found in the annals of American jurisprudence, is Waring v. Stinchcomb, 141 Md. 569, 119 A. 336, 32 A.L.R. 453 (1922). In that case, as in this, there was a body of salt water involved, the mouth of a stream, and a substantial accretion. Therein the court found the tip of the accretion to belong long to the owner of the land to the shoreward of the stream. In Waring the court said at 582, 119 A. at 340:
In Lamprey v. Metcalf, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139, the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in discussing the reason for the law, giving accretions and relictions to the riparian owner, says:
From the cited cases, the rule can be ascertained to be that the owner of waterfront property should be protected in the maintenance of access to the water. That is often, in fact generally, the greatest value of the property and the rules are directed to the protection thereof. In those cases where a substantial accretion is built up in front of property, even if separated by a stream or other natural barrier, the accretion will belong to the upland property. Such a rule, obviously, is applicable only in those cases wherein the accretion is of considerable magnitude. In such cases the fundamental consideration of preserving frontage on the water will override the usual rule by which...
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...a “highly unusual accretion” formed at the mouth of the Copalis River on the coast in central Washington. Hudson House, Inc. v. Rozman, 82 Wash.2d 178, 179, 509 P.2d 992 (1973). The accretion started from land south of a Washington State park and extended northerly up the coast into a long ......
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...descriptions despite their variable nature." (citing Rue v. Ore. & W.R. Co., 186 P. at 1076-77). Plaintiffs cite to "Hudson House, Inc. v. Rozman, 509 P.2d 992 (Wash. 1973) for the unassailable proposition that the boundary for property that uses a waterbody moves as the waterbody moves." T......
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...of the consideration for the deed, and it may well be the most valuable feature of the property. See, e.g., Hudson House, Inc. v. Rozman, 82 Wash.2d 178, 509 P.2d 992 (1973); State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 135 P. 1035 (1913); Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 88 S.Ct. 438, 19 L.Ed.2d ......
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...43 P.3d 1240 (2002): 3.3(1) Hubbard v. State Dep't of Ecology, 86 Wn. App. 119, 936 P.2d 27 (1997): 11.3(3) Hudson House, Inc., v. Rozman, 82 Wn.2d 178, 509 P.2d 992 (1973): 12.2(5)(c)(i) Hughes v. King Cnty., 42 Wn. App. 776, 714 P.2d 316 (1986): 19.4(1) Hughes v. McVay, 113 Wash. 333, 194......
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Chapter § 4.16 - Changes in High Water Lines
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