Hudson v. State
| Decision Date | 11 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-2628 |
| Citation | 129 N.E.3d 220 |
| Parties | Joseph C. HUDSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorney for Appellant: John Andrew Goodridge, Evansville, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Chandra K. Hein, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Joseph C. Hudson (Hudson), appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress certain evidence.
[2] We affirm.
[3] Hudson raises two issues in this interlocutory appeal, which we restate as:
[4] On April 29, 2016, Officer Jason B. Wright of the Owensville Police Department (Officer Wright) was dispatched to 205 North Scott Street in Owensville, Indiana, on a report of a domestic disturbance. Officer Wright was informed that the ex-husband, later identified as Hudson, was on the scene and possibly had a handgun. When Officer Wright arrived, he saw Hudson, Caligaro Sparacino (Sparacino), and Sparacino's son standing next to a black Dodge pick-up. Officer Wright placed Hudson in handcuffs and put him in the back of his patrol car.
[5] After placing Hudson in the backseat of the police vehicle, Officer Wright "asked him what was going on this evening and where the gun was at." (Transcript p. 6). Hudson responded that (Tr. p. 6). Returning to the other people on the scene, Officer Wright spoke with Sparacino. Sparacino informed him that Hudson wanted help loading a brake press. While Sparacino was helping Hudson, an argument broke out between Hudson and his ex-wife, (Tr. p. 7). Sparacino explained that he tried to break up the parties, and he was briefly successful when Hudson returned to his truck. Hudson's daughter confirmed Sparacino's version of the event and added that "her dad hit her in the face and knocked her down." (Tr. p. 27). She advised the officer that after Sparacino interfered, she saw her father return to the truck and get a gun. "She watched him walk to the front of the truck and cock the gun." (Tr. p. 27).
[6] Based on Hudson's daughter's disclosure and his own safety concerns, Officer Wright searched the truck and "found an empty holster on the driver side seat." (Tr. p. 16). Officer Wright returned to his police vehicle to speak with Hudson again. Officer Wright (Tr. p. 17). Officer Wright told Hudson that he had found a gun holster and gave him Miranda warnings. He then asked Hudson (Tr. p. 10). The officer later located the handgun in Hudson's truck.
[7] On May 6, 2016, the State filed an Information, charging Hudson with Count I, intimidation with a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony, Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(2), (b)(2)(A) ; and Count II, battery, a Class B misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-42-2-1(b)(1). On July 18, 2016, Hudson filed a motion to suppress evidence. On October 31 and November 28, 2016, the trial court conducted a hearing on Hudson's motion, and subsequently denied his motion on September 14, 2018. On October 1, 2018, Hudson filed a motion to certify the trial court's decision for interlocutory appeal, which was granted by the trial court two days later. On October 31, 2018, the court of appeals accepted jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal.
[8] Additional facts will be provided if necessary.
[9] Hudson contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to suppress. Where a party appeals from the trial court's grant or denial of a motion to suppress, it appeals from a negative judgment and must show that the ruling on the motion was contrary to law. State v. Keller , 845 N.E.2d 154, 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). We reverse only where the evidence is without conflict and all reasonable inferences lead to a conclusion opposite that reached by the trial court. Id. We treat the review of a motion to suppress in a fashion similar to instances in which the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged. Id. To this end, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and consider the evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Id. In doing so, "we must review the totality of the circumstances, thereby requiring this court to review all the facts and circumstances that are particular to the case." Id. However, the review of a denial of a motion to suppress is different from other sufficiency matters in that we must also consider uncontested evidence that is favorable to the defendant. Jones v. State , 54 N.E.3d 1033, 1036 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied . We will disturb the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. Id.
[10] Focusing on the officer's initial encounter with Hudson and the officer's questioning to ascertain the seriousness of the situation, Hudson contends that Officer Wright should have provided him with Miranda warnings at the moment he was being handcuffed and submitted to a custodial interrogation.
[11] In Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that the "prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Prior to any custodial interrogation, "the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id. Statements elicited in violation of Miranda generally are inadmissible in a criminal trial. Loving v. State , 647 N.E.2d 1123, 1125 (Ind. 1995). The trigger to require a Miranda rights advisement is custodial interrogation. State v. Brown , 70 N.E.3d 331, 335 (Ind. 2017). Questioning an individual the police suspect of a crime does not inherently render the questioning custodial interrogation. Reid v. State , 113 N.E.3d 290, 300 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied . Courts look to the "totality of the circumstances" to determine whether a person was in custody. Brown , 70 N.E.3d at 335 ; see also Hicks v. State , 5 N.E.3d 424, 429 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (), trans. denied . Although courts have compiled a non-exhaustive list of factors which may be taken into account to determine whether a person is in custody, ultimately, the inquiry is whether there has been a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Brown , 70 N.E.3d at 335.
[12] When Officer Wright arrived on the scene, he was faced with a report of domestic disturbance, three individuals, and the allegation that a gun was possibly involved. In an attempt to decrease the tension and to provide a safe environment for everyone, Officer Wright separated the parties by placing Hudson in handcuffs and in the back of his patrol vehicle. Trying to confirm the presence or location of a possible weapon, Officer Wright asked Hudson "what was going on this evening and where the gun was at." (Tr. p. 6). After denying any knowledge about a gun, Hudson advised the officer that he and his ex-wife had gotten in an argument.
[13] We have previously held that the use of handcuffs would cause a reasonable person to feel that one was not free to leave and that one's freedom of movement was retrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Wright v. State , 766 N.E.2d 1223, 1230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) ; see also Loving , 647 N.E.2d at 1125-26. Accordingly, we find that Hudson was in custody when handcuffed for officer safety and placed in the back of the patrol vehicle.
[14] Next, we must determine whether Officer Wright's inquiry amounted to police interrogation. For purposes of Miranda , police interrogation includes both express questioning and words or actions that, given the officer's knowledge, the officer should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Wright , 766 N.E.2d at 1230. The interrogation must involve a measure of compulsion beyond that inherent in custody itself. Id. Not every question an officer asks amounts to interrogation for purposes of Miranda . Wissman v. State , 540 N.E.2d 1209, 1212 (Ind. 1989).
[15] Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Officer Wright's initial question to Hudson amounted to an inquiry into the facts of the situation, which did not require a Miranda advisement. When the officer arrived at the scene, he was aware that a gun might possibly be involved; however, unaware of its presence or its ownership, the officer commenced his investigation by separating the parties. Trying to ascertain whether his information was correct, the officer inquired as to "where the gun was[.]" (Tr. p. 6). Without more definite information about the presence, location, or ownership of the weapon, Officer Wright conducted "[g]eneral on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or...
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