Loving v. State

• Decision Date: 16 March 1995
• Docket Number: No. 49S04-9503-CR-351,49S04-9503-CR-351
• Parties: Jimmie D. LOVING, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 1123

647 N.E.2d 1123

Jimmie D. LOVING, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee.

No. 49S04-9503-CR-351.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 16, 1995.

Robert C. Perry, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Pamela Carter, Atty. Gen., Cynthia L. Ploughe, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

DICKSON, Justice.

The defendant, Jimmie D. Loving, Jr., was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and carrying a handgun without a license. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a memorandum decision. We grant the defendant's petition to transfer.

In his appeal, the defendant seeks the reversal of his conviction and remand for retrial, presenting two issues, one of which is dispositive: whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress statements obtained by police in violation of his Miranda ¹ rights.

When the police first arrived at the scene of a fatal shooting, the defendant was present, appeared intoxicated, and told police that he had been drinking in the room with other people when someone forced a door open, stood in the doorway, and shot the victim. Although police did not then consider the defendant and the victim's brother, who was also present, to be suspects, they were both asked to come to the police station to describe what had occurred. Both men were handcuffed and placed in the back seat of the squad car and taken to Indianapolis Police Department Headquarters. He was later taken into an eight foot by eight foot interrogation room inside the IPD homicide office, and Indianapolis Police Officer Richard Benton commenced questioning. The defendant was not handcuffed during the questioning; however, he was not informed that he was free to leave. Considering the defendant to be only a witness and not a suspect, Officer Benton--without advising him of his Miranda rights--proceeded to ask preliminary questions regarding name, date of birth, Social Security number, current address, and what had happened at the scene of the shooting. After the defendant's initial explanation, Officer Benton told him that his story was not consistent with what the police had found at the scene, whereupon the defendant admitted firing his handgun. At this point, Officer Benton advised the defendant of his Miranda rights. The defendant then expressed his desire to consult an attorney. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress, and Officer Benton's testimony regarding the defendant's statements was admitted at trial over objection.

The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee a suspect the right to the presence and advice of counsel during custodial interrogation by the police. Brown v. State (1991), Ind., 577 N.E.2d 221, 229, reh'g denied, 583 N.E.2d 125, cert. denied (1992), 506 U.S. 833, 113 S.Ct. 101, 121 L.E.2d 61. The United States Supreme Court held in Miranda that a person who has been "taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way" must, before being subjected to interrogation by law enforcement officers, be advised of his rights to remain silent and to the presence of an attorney and be warned that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706-07. Statements elicited in violation of this rule are generally inadmissible in a criminal trial. Id.

The law enforcement officer's duty to give Miranda warnings does not attach unless "there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.' " Oregon v. Mathiason (1977), 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714, 719 (per curiam ). To determine whether a person was in custody, we must examine all circumstances surrounding the interrogation. Stansbury v. California (1994), 511 U.S. 318, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1529, 128 L.Ed.2d 293, 298 (per curiam ). Our "ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [has been] a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." California v. Beheler (1983), 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275, 1279 (per curiam ) (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714, 50 L.Ed.2d at 719).

Whether a person was in custody at a given time depends not upon the subjective views of either the interrogating officers or the subject being questioned but upon the "objective circumstances." Stansbury, 511 U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1529, 128 L.Ed.2d at 298. An officer's knowledge and beliefs are only relevant to the question of custody if conveyed--through either words or actions--to the individual being questioned. Stansbury, 511 U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1530, 128 L.Ed.2d at 299. Likewise, a police officer's "unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question" of custody. Berkemer v. McCarty (1984), 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151, 82 L.Ed.2d 317, 336. The test is how a reasonable person in the suspect's shoes would understand the situation. Id. at 442, 104 S.Ct. at 3151, 82 L.Ed.2d at 336.

Here, the testimony of the various officers that they considered the defendant merely a witness--not a suspect--is irrelevant to our inquiry, as the record does not reflect that they ever communicated such a belief to the defendant. Rather, their actions conveyed the opposite message. The defendant was questioned at the crime scene by various police officials, handcuffed, placed in the back of a marked police car, and taken to the police station by uniformed police officers. He was thereafter taken into an interrogation room measuring approximately eight feet by eight feet by a police officer, who, without telling the defendant that he was free to leave, began to question him about what had happened....