Huerta-Ramirez v. State

• Decision Date: 15 October 2020
• Docket Number: A20A1312
• Citation: 850 S.E.2d 218,357 Ga.App. 123
• Parties: HUERTA-RAMIREZ v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

357 Ga.App. 123

850 S.E.2d 218

HUERTA-RAMIREZ

v.The STATE.

A20A1312

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

October 15, 2020

Clark & Towne, Jessica R. Towne, for appellant.

Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Daniel P. Sanmiguel, Lee F. Tittsworth, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.

Brown, Judge.

Alejandro Huerta-Ramirez and four others were indicted for crimes arising out of a series of home invasion armed robberies that occurred in Gwinnett County in 2009. Huerta-Ramirez was tried separately in 2015 on the 61-count indictment, and the jury found him guilty of seven counts of armed robbery, eight counts of aggravated assault, sixteen counts of false imprisonment, three counts of burglary, one count of possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, and three counts of possession of a firearm or knife during the commission of a felony. Huerta-Ramirez appeals his convictions and the denial of his amended motion for new trial, contending that (1) the trial court failed to properly consider the length of the delay between his arrest and his trial as it pertains to his constitutional right to a speedy trial; (2) the evidence was insufficient to prove six of the aggravated assault convictions; and (3) the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress. He also contends that the trial court improperly admitted a recording of a phone conversation between Huerta-Ramirez and his wife, as well as evidence of a "prior bad act." For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the evidence shows that in November and December 2009, three homes were invaded by gunmen, wearing bulletproof vests and shoulder-mounted radios and carrying what the victims described as an "AK-47 or an R-15" or "AR-15." The robbers held the residents — including several children and a pregnant woman — at gunpoint, stole thousands of dollars in cash, jewelry, cell phones, and other valuable items, and demanded drugs. The robbers threatened to return and kill the residents if they called police, and cut the phone line to at least one of the homes. Two of the victims of the third home invasion testified that the robbers fled in a pick-up truck or "big SUV."

Several months after the home invasions, police were led to Huerta-Ramirez after information obtained from the cell phone towers that serviced the targeted homes identified his cell phone number as having been in the respective area at the time of the robberies. In February 2010, police located Huerta-Ramirez in the parking lot of an apartment complex, at which time he consented to a search of the vehicle he was driving, a green Chevrolet Tahoe. Police recovered from the vehicle $4,200 in cash wrapped in "tin foil" beneath the cup holder, three .223 caliber rounds, and two .22 caliber rounds. Huerta-Ramirez claimed the cash was his, but denied ownership of the remaining items. Huerta-Ramirez also disavowed ownership of the vehicle after initially stating that the vehicle was his.

Police subsequently obtained a wire-intercept order for Huerta-Ramirez's cell phone and also placed a GPS tracking device on the Tahoe while it was in the parking lot of his apartment complex. The GPS device and the intercepted telephone communications led police to observe a drug transaction between Huerta-Ramirez and another man. Armed with this information, police obtained a search warrant for Huerta-Ramirez's home and the Tahoe. During that search, police recovered a "rifle magazine" from the closet in the home, and a 425-gram block of marijuana from the vehicle. Huerta-Ramirez was arrested and gave a custodial statement to police admitting that he was the lookout for the three home invasions. Huerta-Ramirez implicated Enrique Reyes and Jose Garcia, telling police that both men went into the homes with four other men Huerta-Ramirez did not know, and that Garcia "was the one getting people to do [the robberies]"; Garcia "was the boss" and got a bulletproof vest. Reyes gave a statement to police that Huerta-Ramirez discussed with him robbing one of the homes, and that the people who lived in the home were "restaurant people." Reyes told police that Huerta-Ramirez asked him to participate in the armed robbery, drove him by one of the targeted homes, gave him a bulletproof vest and guns, and paid him $2,000.¹

1. Relying on West v. State , 339 Ga. App. 279, 793 S.E.2d 180 (2016), Huerta-Ramirez contends that the trial court failed to properly analyze his speedy trial claim, and, therefore, remand is required so the trial court can enter proper findings of fact and conclusions of law. We disagree.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as the Georgia Constitution, provides criminal defendants with a right to a speedy trial. Smith v. State , 338 Ga. App. 62, 68 (1), 789 S.E.2d 291 (2016). A constitutional speedy trial claim is evaluated under a two-part framework, as established in Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), and clarified in Doggett v. United States , 505 U.S. 647, 651 (II), 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). See Redding v. State , 309 Ga. 124, 128–29 (3), 844 S.E.2d 725 (2020) ; West , 339 Ga. App. at 281 (2), 793 S.E.2d 180. "First, the trial court must consider whether the length of time between the defendant's arrest and trial is sufficiently long to be considered ‘presumptively prejudicial.’ If not, the speedy trial claim fails at the threshold." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Redding , 309 Ga. at 129 (2), 844 S.E.2d 725 (2020).

A one-year delay is "typically presumed to be prejudicial." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.

If the presumptive-prejudice threshold is crossed, ... the trial court proceeds to the second part of the framework, applying a context-focused, four-factor balancing test to determine whether the defendant was denied the right to a speedy trial. These four factors are (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for it; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. This second part of the speedy trial analysis requires courts to engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process and necessarily compels them to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.² "When addressing the first factor ..., the length of delay plays a different role than in the first stage of this analysis and is not given the same degree of weight. Rather, the length of delay is considered in balance with the three other factors." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) West , 339 Ga. App. at 282-283 (2) (b) (i), 793 S.E.2d 180. We review the trial court's balancing and weighing of the four Barker factors for an abuse of discretion. See id. at 282 (2), 793 S.E.2d 180. And, "[b]ecause the analysis of a speedy trial claim is ‘fact intensive,’ ... it is imperative that the trial court enter findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with Barker ." Redding , 309 Ga. at 129 (2), 844 S.E.2d 725 (2020).

In this case, Huerta-Ramirez challenges only the trial court's finding as to the first factor, contending that it erred in failing to accurately determine the specific length of the delay and to weigh the length of that delay. In its order denying Huerta-Ramirez's motion for new trial, wherein the trial court concluded that it properly denied his motion for discharge and acquittal, the trial court found as follows with regard to the first factor:

A. Length of the delay : ... Here, Defendant was arrested on March 24, 2010, prior to formal charges. Defendant requested numerous continuances. Defendant waited until between December 20, 2013 and January 28, 2014 to file motions to suppress. On April 7, 2014, Defendant requested immediate review from the appellate courts relating to the motion to suppress. On March 23, 2015, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and a remittitur was filed April 8, 2015.^[3] Trial began roughly six (6) months later on November 30, 2015.

The presumptive prejudice arising from delay cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other [ Barker ] criteria.... The [c]ourt finds that the length of delay weighs benignly against the State.

In West , the trial court made no findings as to the length of the delay or whether the delay was uncommonly long in relation to the other three Barker factors. 339 Ga. App. at 283 (2) (b) (i), 793 S.E.2d 180 (b) (i). We remanded the case for the trial court to make sufficiently detailed findings of fact, concluding, inter alia , that a trial court "errs when it fails to accurately determine the specific length of the delay and when it fails to weigh the length of that delay in its Barker - Doggett analysis." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 283 (2) (b) (i), 285 (2) (b) (iv), 793 S.E.2d 180. Although the trial court here did not explicitly state the length of time between arrest and trial, i.e., almost 69 months, the trial court listed the length of delay as a separate factor and specifically noted the arrest date and the date of trial as well as the events that transpired during those dates; found that the length of the delay was presumptively prejudicial; and then expressly found that the delay weighed benignly against the State.

Contrary to Huerta-Ramirez's contention, the trial court did not fail to accurately determine the specific length of the delay or weigh the length of the delay in its Barker analysis as in West . Because the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with Barker , we affirm its order denying Huerta-Ramirez's amended motion for new trial on this ground. Compare State v. Porter , 288 Ga. 524, 705 S.E.2d 636 (2011) (reversing this Court and remanding case to trial court because it erred in key factual findings and thus could not properly balance the Barker factors); York v. State , ...