The State v. Porter.

• Decision Date: 07 February 2011
• Docket Number: No. S10G0211.,S10G0211.
• Citation: 288 Ga. 524,705 S.E.2d 636
• Parties: The STATEv.PORTER.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

288 Ga. 524

705 S.E.2d 636

11 FCDR 233

The STATE

v.PORTER.

No. S10G0211.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Feb. 7, 2011.

Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Stepheny J. Luttrell, Bettieanne C. Hart, Marc A. Mallon, Paige R. Whitaker, Assistant District Attorneys, Jones Day, Richard Hunter Deane, Jr., for appellant.Jimmonique R. S. Rodgers, for appellee.Charles C. Olson, amicus curiae.NAHMIAS, Justice.

Finding a violation of Stanley Porter's constitutional right to a speedy trial, the trial court granted Porter's motion to dismiss his indictment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, see State v. Porter, 300 Ga.App. 128, 684 S.E.2d 299 (2009), and we granted certiorari to consider its ruling. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that, because the trial court clearly erred in key factual findings and failed to enter a proper order balancing the relevant legal factors, the Court of Appeals should have vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion again based on the correct facts and law. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1. Porter was arrested on November 12, 2000, for molesting one of his minor children. The State first indicted Porter on December 29, 2000, and then re-indicted him on August 31, 2001, for aggravated child molestation and other crimes. Porter was released on bond. More than four years later, on November 15, 2005, an arrest warrant was issued for Porter based on new allegations of child molestation against another of his children that occurred while he was on bond. On February 23, 2005, after Porter failed to appear in court regarding the 2001 indictment, the trial court issued a bench warrant. Porter remained a fugitive until his arrest in April 2006. In May 2006, he was indicted on the new charges of child molestation. In July and November 2007, Porter, while represented by counsel, filed pro se demands for trial on the 2001 indictment.

The trial court scheduled both indictments for trial on December 9, 2008, and again on December 16, but the trial dates were continued at defense counsel's request. On January 15, 2009, Porter filed motions to dismiss both indictments for violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial under the United States and Georgia Constitutions. On January 21, 2009, the trial court held a single hearing on the two motions. On January 27, 2009, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss the 2006 indictment; Porter did not appeal that order. Two weeks later, the court granted the motion to dismiss the 2001 indictment; the State appealed that order. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and we granted certiorari to review that decision.

2. (a) The Constitutional Framework

The basic framework for deciding speedy trial claims under the federal and state constitutions is well settled. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). See also Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992); Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 55, 663 S.E.2d 189 (2008). The first inquiry is “whether the interval from the accused's arrest, indictment, or other formal accusation to the trial is sufficiently long to be considered ‘presumptively prejudicial.’ If not, the speedy trial claim fails at the threshold.” Ruffin, 284 Ga. at 55, 663 S.E.2d 189.

If this threshold is passed, the trial court must balance four factors: “[1] whether delay before trial was uncommonly long, [2] whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, [3] whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and [4] whether he suffered prejudice as the delay's result.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651, 112 S.Ct. 2686. The four factors

“have no talismanic qualities” and “must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant” given the animating principles behind the speedy trial guarantee. Thus, the second stage of the constitutional speedy trial analysis requires courts to “engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process” and “necessarily compels them to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.”

Ruffin, 284 Ga. at 56, 663 S.E.2d 189 (citations omitted).

The trial court's weighing of each factor and its balancing of all four factors—its ultimate judgment—are reviewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion. See State v. Lattimore, 287 Ga. 505, 506, 696 S.E.2d 613 (2010); Williams v. State, 277 Ga. 598, 601, 592 S.E.2d 848 (2004). However, “where ... the trial court has clearly erred in some of its findings of fact and/or has misapplied the law to some degree, the deference owed the trial court's ultimate ruling is diminished.” Williams, 277 Ga. at 601, 592 S.E.2d 848. In addition, the trial court's order must provide sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to permit this Court to determine if the trial court properly exercised its discretion under the Barker analysis. See Higgenbottom v. State, 288 Ga. 429, 430, 704 S.E.2d 786 (2011).

We see several errors in the application of this framework to Porter's speedy trial claim by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, some of which are significant enough to necessitate remand of the case.

(b) The Threshold Inquiry

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals concluded that the pre-trial delay in this case was sufficient to trigger analysis of the Barker factors. That conclusion is correct.

However, we note that the Court of Appeals erred in calculating the delay in this case as the time “elapsed from the November 12, 2000 date of Porter's arrest [to] his initial trial date, December 9, 2008” and in stating that “generally a delay of eight months or longer is presumptively prejudicial,” citing S tate v. Giddens, 280 Ga.App. 586, 587, 634 S.E.2d 526 (2006). Porter, 300 Ga.App. at 129, 684 S.E.2d 299. Where a trial has not occurred, the delay should be calculated from the date of arrest or other formal accusation to the date on which a defendant's speedy trial motion was granted or denied (here, February 11, 2009), rather than any initial date set for the trial. See Ruffin, 284 Ga. at 55, n. 15, 663 S.E.2d 189. Otherwise, delays due to continuances of an original trial date would be excluded regardless of their length or cause. Moreover, the case law from this Court and the United States Supreme Court states that one year, not eight months, generally marks the point at which delay becomes presumptively prejudicial. See id. at 55, 663 S.E.2d 189; Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2686.

(c) The Barker Factors(1) Length of Delay

The Court of Appeals correctly noted that “[t]he State does not challenge the trial court's finding that the pretrial delay at issue should weigh against the State as uncommonly long.” Porter, 300 Ga.App. at 130, 684 S.E.2d 299.

(2) Reasons for the Delay

The trial court found that “some delay is attributable to the State,” based on the State's dismissal of the original December 29, 2000, indictment and its later filing of a “succeeding indictment on August 31, 2001.” Other than this eight-month period, however, the trial court's order does not discuss how the remaining delay of almost eight years should be attributed to or weighed against the State or Porter.

After a more detailed analysis of the reasons for the delay, the Court of Appeals determined that “approximately six years and eleven months of the delay [was] attributable to the government,” but that, due to defense counsel's requests for continuances and Porter's voluntary absence from court while he was a fugitive, about two years of the delay was attributable to Porter. Porter, 300 Ga.App. at 130–131, 684 S.E.2d 299. However, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court “did not err in weighing the reason for the delay ... against the government,” id. at 131, 684 S.E.2d 299, even though the trial court had stated only that about eight months of the delay was attributable to the government and never decided whether the bulk of the long delay at issue in this case weighs against the State or Porter. The Court of Appeals' calculations appear accurate, and it appears that the governmental delay was not deliberate but instead was the result of negligence and workloads, which are weighed only lightly, or benignly, against the State. See Sweatman v. State, 287 Ga. 872, 875, 700 S.E.2d 579 (2010). However, the Court of Appeals should not have made those findings and weighed the results in the first instance. See Higgenbottom, 288 Ga. at 430–431, 704 S.E.2d 786.

In this respect, the State argues that Porter's failure to appear for court in February 2005 and his subsequent fugitive status until April 2006 constitutes a waiver of his speedy trial right. We disagree. Although one of the cases on which the State relies holds that the accused waived his speedy trial right by fleeing the jurisdiction, the defendant there was a fugitive for the entire period of pre-trial delay. See People v. Perez, 229 Cal.App.3d 302, 308–313, 279 Cal.Rptr. 915 (1991). Without deciding whether we would follow Perez under similar circumstances, we do not believe that a defendant who becomes a fugitive forever forfeits his speedy trial right. Otherwise, the State could detain a re-captured fugitive without trial indefinitely.

On the other hand, the year that Porter spent as a fugitive cannot be counted against the State, and indeed normally would be weighed heavily against Porter, because it usually reflects a defendant's deliberate intent to delay trial. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656–657, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (holding that deliberate delay by the government weighs heavily against it); Ruffin, 284 Ga. at 59, 663 S.E.2d 189 (same). The trial court's order does not even mention Porter's fugitive status. The Court of Appeals properly stated that his fugitive time did not count against the State, but it did not address whether that...