Huey v. RGIS Inventory Specialists
Decision Date | 24 April 2018 |
Docket Number | NO. 2017–WC–00524–COA,CONSOLIDATED WITH NO. 2013–CT–00310–COA,2017–WC–00524–COA |
Citation | 269 So.3d 362 |
Parties | George HUEY, Appellant v. RGIS INVENTORY SPECIALISTS and Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Company, Appellees |
Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: T. JACKSON LYONS, JACKSON
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: JEFFREY STEPHEN MOFFETT, RIDGELAND, CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL GRAVES, BILOXI
BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, JJ.
WILSON, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶ 1. George Huey was injured in a car wreck while traveling through Alabama for work. Huey's employer, RGIS Inventory Specialists, took the position that Huey was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits because prior to the wreck he had deviated from the course and scope of his employment by becoming embroiled in a "road rage" incident with another motorist. The Workers' Compensation Commission ultimately denied Huey's claim for benefits on that ground, this Court affirmed, and the Mississippi Supreme Court denied Huey's petition for a writ of certiorari. Huey v. RGIS Inventory Specialists , 168 So.3d 1145 (Miss. Ct. App.) ( Huey I ), cert. denied , 152 So. 3d 1176 (Miss. 2014).
¶ 2. Just under a year after the appellate mandate issued in Huey I , Huey filed a motion asking the Commission to reopen his claim. Huey alleged that his claim had been denied based on a mistake in a determination of fact because new evidence showed that prior testimony about the wreck was unreliable. The Commission denied Huey's motion after finding (1) that the motion was untimely because it was filed more than one year after the Mississippi Supreme Court denied certiorari in Huey I and (2) that Huey failed to present any "newly discovered evidence" and failed to show any mistaken determination of fact.
¶ 3. We affirm the decision of the Commission. Huey's motion to reopen was timely; however, we affirm the Commission's ruling on the merits.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 4. On January 19, 2009, Huey was driving an RGIS van to Tennessee to conduct an inventory audit. On Interstate 59/20 near Livingston, Alabama, he encountered a car driven by Edwin Crawley. While Huey was trying to change lanes, his van nearly collided with Crawley's car. The near miss forced Crawley to swerve and "spin out" off the interstate before regaining control of his car. This set in motion a series of events that ultimately gave rise to Huey's claim. In our prior opinion, we described those events as follows:
Huey I , 168 So.3d at 1147 (¶¶ 3–4).
¶ 5. Based in part on Trooper Wilson's testimony, the Commission found that Huey had parked his van in the right-hand lane of the interstate as part of a "road rage" incident with Crawley. Thus, the Commission found that Huey had departed from the scope and course of his employment, so his injury was not compensable. On appeal, this Court stated that "the record support[ed] more than one possible explanation for why Huey stopped his van." However, we found that "[i]t was within the Commission's discretion to accept Trooper Wilson's testimony" and to then find that a road rage incident was "the best and most reasonable explanation for an individual parking his vehicle in the right-hand lane of an interstate highway." Id. at 1148 (¶ 8) (brackets omitted). This Court also concluded that the Commission was not required to accept Huey's version of events, and we noted that "Huey's version of the events changed to some extent at least twice, and it became more favorable to his claim each time he changed it." Id. at (¶ 9).
¶ 6. Huey continues to dispute the Commission's findings in Huey I. Huey maintains that Crawley sped to catch up with him after their initial near-collision because Crawley thought something was wrong with Crawley's car and he wanted Huey to pull over. Huey denies that there was any "road rage" incident; instead, he maintains that as he slowed down behind Crawley to pull off the interstate, the tractor-trailer struck his van from behind.
¶ 7. While his worker's compensation claim was pending before the Commission, Huey filed suit in Alabama state court against the driver of the tractor-trailer, Kenneth Dale Conner, and Dean Foods and Barber Milk, whom we assume to be Conner's employers and/or the owners of the tractor-trailer. Huey alleges that he first learned during discovery in the Alabama case that his van and the tractor-trailer had computers known as "black boxes" that recorded information about the vehicles' speeds near the time of the collision. Huey claims that the information from the black boxes indicates that his van was still moving at the time of the collision and was not parked in the right lane of the interstate.
¶ 8. On January 4, 2016, Huey filed a motion to reopen his workers' compensation case. In support of his motion, he submitted deposition testimony of two accident reconstruction experts from the Alabama litigation. One expert, Dr. Preston Scarber Jr., testified that data from the black box in Huey's van indicated that the van was traveling about seventeen miles per hour when it was struck by the tractor-trailer, which was traveling approximately sixty miles per hour. Scarber also testified that the force from the collision increased Huey's van's speed to more than thirty miles per hour before the van collided with Crawley's vehicle. Scarber believed that Crawley's vehicle was stopped or very nearly stopped when it was struck by Huey's van. Scarber disagreed with Trooper Wilson's version of events. Scarber testified that black box data and photographs did not support Trooper Wilson's conclusions.
¶ 9. The administrative judge found that Huey's case should be reopened due to new evidence and facts. However, on appeal to the full Commission, the Commission reversed and denied Huey's motion to reopen for two reasons. First, the Commission found that the motion was untimely because a motion to reopen must be filed, as relevant in this case, "prior to one ... year after the rejection of a claim." Miss. Code Ann. § 71–3–53 (Rev. 2011). Huey's motion was filed less than one year after the appellate mandate issued in Huey I , but it was filed more than a year after the Mississippi Supreme Court denied certiorari. See Huey v. RGIS Inventory Specialists , MWCC No: 0904755K7478, 2017 WL 6617668, at *2 (Miss. Workers' Comp. Comm'n Mar. 22, 2017).
¶ 10. Second, the Commission also denied Huey's motion on the merits. The Commission found that Huey's new evidence was "not newly discovered evidence since the [black boxes] had been available for inspection since the date of the accident." The Commission also found that Huey failed to show that the Commission's decision in Huey I was based on "a mistake in a determination of fact as required by [ section] 71–3–53." See id. at *3.
¶ 11. On appeal, Huey argues that his motion to reopen was timely because section 71–3–53's one-year statute of limitations did not commence until the appellate mandate issued in Huey I . Huey also argues that the rejection of his claim in Huey I was based on a "mistake"—namely, the Commission's reliance on Trooper Wilson's testimony, which, according to Huey, is refuted by new evidence. We address these issues in turn.
ANALYSIS
¶ 12. In general, this Court's "review of a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission is limited to determining whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence, was arbitrary and capricious, was beyond the scope or power of the agency to make, or violated one's constitutional or statutory rights." Gregg v. Natchez Trace Elec. Power Ass'n , 64 So.3d 473, 475 (¶ 8) (Miss. 2011). However, we review issues of law de novo. See id. at 475–76 (¶ 9).
¶ 13. Section 71–3–53 grants the Commission authority to reopen a compensation case under certain circumstances:
Upon its own initiative or upon the application of any party in interest on the ground of a change in conditions or because of a mistake in a determination of fact, the commission may , at any time prior to one (1) year after date of the last payment of compensation, whether or not a compensation order has been issued, or at any time prior to one (1) year after the rejection of a claim, review a compensation case....
Miss. Code Ann. § 71–3–53 (emphasis added).
¶ 14. As the statute's language makes clear, "[t]he statute is not mandatory." Ga.–Pac. Corp. v. Gregory , 589 So.2d 1250, 1254 (Miss. 1991). "Rather, ‘[i]t is discretionary with the [C]ommission whether or not it will reopen a case.’ " Id. (quoting Vardaman S. Dunn, Mississippi Workers' Compensation § 336, at 424–25 (3d ed. 1982) ). ...
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