Miner v. Town of Cheshire
| Decision Date | 29 September 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A.3:99CV2334SRU.,Civ.A.3:99CV2334SRU. |
| Citation | 126 F.Supp.2d 184 |
| Parties | Margaret MINER v. TOWN OF CHESHIRE, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Robert M. Fortgang, Simsbury, CT, for Plaintiff.
Gary S. Starr, Shipman & Goodwin, Michael J. Rose, Bruce J. Gelston, Howd & Ludorf, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.
RULING ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Margaret Miner ("Miner") brings this action seeking damages and other relief in connection with alleged sexual harassment and retaliatory conduct in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act ("CFEPA"), Conn.Gen.Stat. § 46a-60. Miner also seek damages and other relief for the following causes of action under Connecticut common law: intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligent infliction of emotional distress; civil battery and assault; negligent supervision; breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and defamation. Currently pending is the defendant Town of Cheshire's ("the Town") Motion to Dismiss (doc.# 12) and the defendant Kerry Deegan's ("Deegan") Motion to Dismiss (doc.# 14). For the reasons stated herein, the Town's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Deegan's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
For the purposes of the motions to dismiss, the court assumes the following facts set forth in the plaintiff's amended complaint to be true. Miner was employed as a police officer with the Town of Cheshire Police Department. Deegan is a Lieutenant with the Cheshire Police Department and was the plaintiff's Shift Commander.
Miner alleges that, in August 1997, Deegan forced Miner to kiss him in an elevator. At or around the same time, Deegan grabbed Miner's hand and placed it on his crotch. Miner alleges that, on at least one occasion, Deegan grabbed one of plaintiff's breasts. Miner alleges that, on several occasions, Deegan drove by her house and made numerous phone calls to the plaintiff at her home.
Miner repeatedly told Deegan to leave her alone. Notwithstanding her protests, Deegan continued to harass the plaintiff and to make various overtures towards her. Accordingly, Miner complained to the Cheshire Police Department on several occasions. The Cheshire Police Department conducted an investigation and certain restrictions were placed upon Deegan. Specifically, Deegan was not to work the same shifts as Miner and, for some period of time, Deegan was placed on paid leave. Miner alleges that, upon Deegan's return from paid leave, however, the harassment continued.
Miner claims that, in retaliation for her reporting the alleged sexual harassment, Deegan began to spread false rumors about her throughout the police force and the Cheshire community.
On May 19, 1998, Miner injured her back while working and subsequently filed a workers' compensation claim for the injuries she sustained. Miner alleges that Deegan and the Cheshire Police Department questioned the origin and severity of her injuries and, to this date, have contested Miner's workers' compensation claim. Miner alleges that the defendants contest her claim because she is a female and because she pursued her sexual harassment complaint. She alleges that similar workers' compensation complaints by male officers have not been contested.
Miner alleges that she was forced to leave her job as a police officer because of the sexual harassment, the defendants' response to her complaints, and the emotional distress she sustained because of the harassment. Moreover, Miner claims that harassment from other management officials created a hostile work environment that made it impossible for her to perform her job duties or for her to reasonably believe that her complaints of sexual harassment would be taken seriously.
On or about December 21, 1998, Miner filed complaints with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ("CHRO") and the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission ("EEOC"). In response to these complaints, the Town offered Miner her job back with the same work restrictions placed upon Deegan as before. Relying on representations that Deegan would not harass her and that she would suffer no retaliation, Miner withdrew from college and returned to the Cheshire Police Department.
On or about March 29, 1999, a fellow officer asked Miner to switch shifts with him for that day. Although Miner would be working on Deegan's shift, Miner agreed to work that night. An Officer Fasano, knowing about the work restrictions on Deegan, agreed with Miner to work at the dispatch desk with Deegan that night. Notwithstanding this arrangement, Deegan demanded that Miner work alone with Deegan at the front desk. Miner refused to work alone with Deegan. When Deegan insisted, Miner left the police station. Deegan issued a written reprimand of the plaintiff for insubordination and neglect of duty.
The next day, the Cheshire Police Department, in light of Deegan's written warning, accused Miner of insubordination and neglect of duty. The Cheshire Police Department informed Miner that there were no work restrictions on Deegan. Miner alleges that the hostile and offensive work environment created by Deegan forced her to resign.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) should be granted only if "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). The function of a motion to dismiss is "merely to assess the legal feasibility of a complaint, not to assay the weight of evidence which might be offered in support thereof." Ryder Energy Distribution Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir.1984), quoting Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir.1980). The motion must therefore be decided solely on the facts alleged. See Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1065 (2d Cir.1985).
When deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true, and all reasonable inferences are drawn and viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir.1996); Staron v. McDonald's Corp., 51 F.3d 353, 355 (2d Cir.1995); Skeete v. IVF America, Inc., 972 F.Supp. 206, 207 (S.D.N.Y.1997). The court "must not dismiss the action `unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [the plaintiff's] claim which would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief.'" Cohen v. Koenig, 25 F.3d 1168, 1172 (2d Cir.1994). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will prevail, but whether she should have the opportunity to prove her claims. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).
The Town moved to dismiss Counts One, Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven and Eight of the plaintiff's initial complaint. These counts are, respectively: sexual harassment in violation of Title VII, sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of CFEPA, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, civil battery and assault, negligent supervision and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Because they set forth the same causes of action, the court treats the Town's Motion to Dismiss as directed at Counts One, Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven and Eight of the plaintiff's Amended Complaint.1
Counts One and Three (Sexual Harassment in Violation of Title VII and CFEPA)
The Town argues that Miner's claims of sexual harassment in 1997 are barred by the applicable limitations period. The Town claims that complaints must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of an alleged violation if a complaint first has been filed with a comparable state commission such as the CHRO. Similarly, they argue that the CHRO has a 180-day "lookback" period that also operates as a statute of limitations.
The Town argues that Miner first filed her complaint with the CHRO on December 21, 1998. Accordingly, the 300-day EEOC period covers violations occurring after February 24, 1998 and the CHRO period covers back to June 23, 1998. Miner's complaint, however, alleges incidents of sexual harassment that allegedly occurred in August and September 1997. Thus, the Town argues, such conduct is outside the scope of either limitations period.
In opposition, Miner argues that her allegations are timely pursuant to the continuing violations doctrine.
Because federal law on this issue is applicable to CFEPA, the court will analyze counts one and three together. See Maloney v. Connecticut Orthopedics, P.C., 47 F.Supp.2d 244, 247 (D.Conn.1999), citing Malasky v. Metal Products Corp., 44 Conn.App. 446, 454, 689 A.2d 1145 (1997) cert. denied, 241 Conn. 906, 695 A.2d 539 (1997).
Title VII requires plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing an action for damages in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982); Brown v. General Services Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832-33, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976); Blake-McIntosh v. Cadbury Beverages, Inc., No. 3:96cv2554(EBB), 1999 WL 643661 at *6 (D.Conn.1999). First, the plaintiff must file a complaint with a state or local fair employment opportunity commission if one exists. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c); Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 373, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 60 L.Ed.2d 957 (1979); Blake-McIntosh, 1999 WL 643661 at *6. Second, the plaintiff must file a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See 42...
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