Huffey v. Lea

• Decision Date: 21 October 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-515,91-515
• Citation: 491 N.W.2d 518
• Parties: George W. HUFFEY and Jean Huffey, Appellants, v. Joseph LEA, Dorothy Lea, Gilbert Lea, Florence Flaherty, Linda Racek, Theresa Lea, Anthony Lea, Lavonne Lea-Peterson, Donna Lea-Faber, Ambrose Lea, and Eunice Lea, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 518

491 N.W.2d 518

18 A.L.R.5th 962

George W. HUFFEY and Jean Huffey, Appellants, v. Joseph LEA, Dorothy Lea, Gilbert Lea, Florence Flaherty, Linda Racek, Theresa Lea, Anthony Lea, Lavonne Lea-Peterson, Donna Lea-Faber, Ambrose Lea, and Eunice Lea, Appellees.

No. 91-515.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 21, 1992.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 25, 1992.

David J. Dutton and J. Scott Bayne, Dutton, Braun, Staack, Hellman, and Iversen, Waterloo, for appellants.

Andrew P. Nelson, Meyer, Lorentzen and Nelson, Decorah, for appellees Lavonne Lea-Peterson, Gilbert Lea, Donna Lea-Faber and Florence Flaherty.

Mary Jane White, Decorah, for appellees Ambrose Lea and Eunice Lea.

Harry L. Haywood, Eldora, for appellee Dorothy Lea.

Michael J. Moon, Cartwright, Druker and Ryden, Marshalltown, for appellee Theresa Lea.

J. Vance Jorgensen, Mason City, for appellee Joseph Lea.

Michael A. Smith, of Lundy, Butler and Smith, P.C., Eldora, for appellee Anthony Lea.

Considered en banc.

SCHULTZ, Justice.

The principal issue on appeal is whether the doctrine of claim preclusion prevents an action for tortious interference with a bequest when the action is not brought with the underlying will contest. The district court and the court of appeals held that the failure to join the tort action with the will contest bars a later action. We disagree.

This is a dismissal of the action based on the pleadings; therefore, we accept those allegations as true. We also take judicial notice of the appellate decision involving the will contest, Matter of Estate of Olson, 451 N.W.2d 33 (Iowa App.1989).

This appeal has its genesis in the wills of Hjalmar Olson and his wife Margaret, whose maiden name was Lea. Following their marriage in 1946, Margaret and Hjalmar lived on a farm until their deaths in 1986. The Olsons did not have children; however, they had a close relationship with Hjalmar's nephew, George Huffey. Huffey lived with the Olsons for several years and after that was a tenant on the Olson farm. For further details of the relationship, see Matter of Estate of Olson, 451 N.W.2d at 35.

On June 18, 1986, two days after Hjalmar's death, Margaret executed a will. Under this will, she, like her husband before her, provided that the Olson farm should become the property of George Huffey. In July 1986, Margaret executed a new will revoking her June 18 will. Under the new will, George Huffey would not receive the Olson farm and her brother, Ambrose Lea, and his children would receive the bulk of her estate.

Margaret died in August 1986 and the July will was admitted to probate. George and Jean Huffey (Huffeys) commenced an action contesting the will. The case was tried to a jury which found that Margaret lacked testamentary capacity and that the July will was procured by undue influence. The defendants to the will contest successfully moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial. On appeal, the court of appeals reinstated the jury verdict. Id. at 37.

On December 5, 1990, plaintiffs commenced this action against defendants Ambrose Lea, Eunice Lea, his wife, and their children (Leas). We are concerned with the tort actions which are counts one and two of the petition, maintaining that the defendants unduly influenced Margaret and tortiously interfered with her intent to devise her farm to George. They seek money damages for legal fees, loss of farming time, mental anguish and embarrassment.

In addition to dismissing the tort action under the doctrine of claim preclusion, the district court gave an additional ground for dismissing Jean Huffey's claim by ruling that she was not a real party in interest. The court also granted Donna Lea-Faber's motion to quash service. The court did not rule on the affirmative defense that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. ¹ Huffeys challenge these rulings on appeal. Leas cross-appeal on the court's failure to rule on their limitation defense. Our review is for errors at law. See Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 4.

I. Tortious interference with a bequest. In Frohwein v. Haesemeyer, 264 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1978), we recognized a law action for tortious interference with a bequest. Id. at 795. We explained that we could see no compelling reason for not extending the tort of wrongful interference with business advantage to a noncommercial context. Id. Intentional interference with an existing or prospective contract is described in Restatement (Second) of Torts, sections 766A and 766B (1979), and continues to be recognized in Iowa as a basis for recovery of damages in civil tort actions. Nesler v. Fisher & Co., Inc., 452 N.W.2d 191, 194-96 (Iowa 1990).

The Restatement also has addressed the concept of wrongful interference within other forms of advantageous economic relations. Restatement (Second) of Torts, ch. 37A (1979). Under this chapter, section 774B relates to the tort of intentional interference with inheritance or gift. This section provides:

One who by fraud or other tortious means intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third person an inheritance or gift that he would otherwise have received is subject to liability to others for the loss of the inheritance or gift.

In discussing the remedies available under this section, the Restatement recognized that the normal remedy for the loss suffered by the one deprived of the legacy or gift is an action in tort. § 774B cmt. e. These remedies include recovery of damages for pecuniary loss, consequential loss and emotional distress. Restatement § 774A. A claim for emotional distress in tortious interference claims does not require proof of outrageous conduct. Nesler, 452 N.W.2d at 199-200.

II. The doctrine of claim preclusion. As previously indicated, the fighting issue involves application of the doctrine of claim preclusion to Huffeys' tort action. Leas defend the district court's ruling by asserting that the tort action involves the same "claim" that was advanced in Huffeys' prior will contest. As an initial matter, we discuss the doctrine of claim preclusion.

As a general rule, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars further litigation on the same "claim" or cause of action. See Leuchtenmacher v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 460 N.W.2d 858, 859-60 (Iowa 1990). Under this doctrine, an adjudication in a former suit between the same parties on the same claim "is final as to all matters which could have been presented to the court for determination, and a party must litigate all matters growing out of its claim at one time rather than in separate actions." Id. at 860. The court explained:

Claim preclusion under the doctrine of res judicata is based on the principle that a party may not split or try his claim piecemeal, but must put in issue and try his entire claim or put forth his entire defense in the case on trial.

....

[To make that determination, it] is necessary to determine whether plaintiff's first and second actions were the same claim or cause of action within the meaning of this principle.

Id. (quoting B & B Asphalt Co. v. T.S. McShane Co., 242 N.W.2d 279, 286 (Iowa 1976)). A second claim is likely to be considered the same as a first claim, and therefore precluded, "if the acts complained of, and the recovery demanded, are the same, or when the same evidence will support both actions." Leuchtenmacher, 460 N.W.2d at 860. We now examine whether the will contest and the tort action are the same claim or cause of action within the meaning of claim preclusion. We do not believe that they are.

When a will is contested on grounds of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity, as it was here, the required proof focuses on the testator's mental strength and intent and whether infirmities or undue influence have affected the disposition of property under the will. See Olson, 451 N.W.2d at 36. The necessary proof in an action for intentional interference with a bequest or devise focuses on the fraud, duress, or other tortious means intentionally used by the alleged wrongdoer in depriving another from receiving from a third person an inheritance or gift. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774B (1979). Stated simply, in a will contest, the testator's intent or mental state is the key issue; in an intentional interference case, the wrongdoer's unlawful intent to prevent another from receiving an inheritance is the key issue. Because of the differences in proof, the actions are not the same nor will the same evidence necessarily support both actions.

In addition, the recovery demanded in the will contest and in this action for intentional interference is not the same. In the will contest, the recovery demanded was the setting aside of the will procured by undue influence. In this action for intentional interference, the recovery demanded is for attorney fees, value of Huffey's time lost in his farm operation, and mental anguish incurred in contesting the will. Obviously, the setting aside of the will did not provide Huffey with recovery of his consequential damages. Huffey also requested an award of punitive damages based on intentional and malicious conduct of defendants. An adequate remedy has not been provided by the mere setting aside of the will.

Our research has produced one case that seems to be relevant and corresponds with our situation. In Peffer v. Bennett, 523 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir.1975), the plaintiff brought an action in federal court for malicious interference with prospective right of inheritance to recover attorney fees and other expenses incurred in a will contest in state court. In the will contest, the probate court found that there was undue influence and invalidated a portion of the will. The plaintiff sought to estop the defendant from litigating the issue of actual fraud in her action for malicious interference. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that under Colorado law, the issues of undue influence and intentional interference were not the same. Id. at 1326. The Tenth Circuit...