Huffman, In re

• Citation: 724 P.2d 475,42 Cal.3d 552,229 Cal.Rptr. 789
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Decision Date: 22 September 1986
• Parties: , 724 P.2d 475 In re Billy Ray HUFFMAN on Habeas Corpus. Crim. 24654.

Page 789

229 Cal.Rptr. 789

42 Cal.3d 552, 724 P.2d 475

In re Billy Ray HUFFMAN on Habeas Corpus.

Crim. 24654.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Sept. 22, 1986.

David L. McKenna, Public Defender, and Scott H. McCraw, Deputy Public Defender, for petitioner.

Frank O. Bell, Jr., State Public Defender, Ezra Hendon, Chief Asst. State Public Defender, Linda Feldman, Deputy State Public Defender, Kenneth I. Clayman, Public Defender (Ventura), and Gary R. Nichols, Deputy Public Defender, as Amici Curiae on behalf of petitioner.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., John W. Carney and Jay M. Bloom, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.

GRODIN, Justice.

We granted review after the Court of Appeal denied a writ of habeas corpus. The question presented is whether petitioner, once confined for treatment as a mentally disordered sex offender (MDSO), was denied equal protection of the laws when he, unlike offenders confined for treatment as narcotics addicts, received no "conduct" or "participation" credits against a subsequent prison term for time spent in the treatment facility. We conclude that petitioner is not entitled to such credits and will disapprove certain Court of Appeal decisions insofar as they conflict with our views.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In August 1979, petitioner was convicted after pleading guilty to one count of forcible rape with great bodily injury upon a 10-year-old girl. (Pen.Code, §§ 261, subd.

                (2), 12022.7.)   Pursuant to former section 6300 et seq. of the Welfare and Institutions Code, criminal proceedings were suspended, petitioner was adjudged an MDSO, and he was committed for treatment to Patton State Hospital.  (Welf. & Inst.Code, former §§ 6302-6316.)   In early 1982, he withdrew from hospital treatment programs.  He was found unamenable to further treatment and, in November 1982, was returned to the criminal court for sentencing.  (Id., former § 6325.)
                

At the sentencing hearing, petitioner claimed his prison sentence, already subject to reduction by the actual time spent in hospital confinement (ibid.; Pen.Code, § 2900.5), should be further reduced by "conduct" and "participation" credits (Pen.Code, §§ 2930-2935) attributable to his hospital stay. While the MDSO laws make no provision for such conduct and participation credits, petitioner urged they are required by principles of equal protection, since they are allowed by the statutes governing offenders committed for treatment as narcotics addicts. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 3201, subd. (c).)

The trial court refused to grant the credits, and petitioner's contention was also rejected on appeal. After the judgment on appeal became final, and on the basis of an intervening Court of Appeal decision (People v. Jobinger (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 689, 200 Cal.Rptr. 546), petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus from this court. We issued an order to show cause returnable before the Court of Appeal, which has again rejected his contention. He renews his claim on review.

DISCUSSION

At the outset, the People claim petitioner is foreclosed from relief on habeas corpus, since the issue he presents was raised and rejected on appeal, and habeas corpus is not a second appeal. (E.g., In re Eli (1969) 71 Cal.2d 214, 219, 77 Cal.Rptr. 665, 454 P.2d 337; In re Waltreus (1965) 62 Cal.2d 218, 225, 42 Cal.Rptr. 9, 397 P.2d 1001.) This argument was accepted by the Court of Appeal, but we must disagree. The writ will lie where the trial court has exceeded its jurisdiction by sentencing a defendant "to a term in excess of the maximum provided by law" (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 750, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948), or to correct a misinterpretation of statute resulting in a confinement "in excess of the time allowed by law" (Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 18, 9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839). Moreover, this court has said that the constitutionality of legislation "is always open to challenge on habeas corpus," even if previously raised on appeal. (In re King (1970) 3 Cal.3d 226, 229-230, fn. 2, 90 Cal.Rptr. 15, 474 P.2d 983.)

Under the principles established by these cases, a prisoner may claim on habeas corpus that he was sentenced to a term in excess of that permitted by the Constitution, even if his claim was previously rejected on direct appeal. Here, petitioner asserts that denial of conduct and participation credits against his prison term was unconstitutional, resulting in a sentence "in excess of the time allowed by law." His petition is proper on that basis.

The Court of Appeal also rejected petitioner's claim on the merits. For reasons which will appear, we conclude that it reached the correct result.

The MDSO statutes (Welf. & Inst.Code, former § 6300 et seq.) were repealed in 1981 and replaced prospectively by a new treatment-confinement scheme for certain persons convicted of sex crimes (Stats.1981, ch. 928, §§ 1-4, pp. 3484-3486; Pen.Code, new §§ 1364-1365). The former MDSO law remains applicable to offenders, like petitioner, who were committed under its provisions. (Stats.1981, supra, § 3, pp. 3485-3486; see Baker v. Superior Court (1984) 35 Cal.3d 663, 666, 200 Cal.Rptr. 293, 677 P.2d 219.)

Under the most recent version of the former law, if there was probable cause to believe one just convicted of a sex offense was an MDSO--i.e., one "who by reason of mental defect, disease, or disorder, [was] predisposed to the commission of sexual offenses to such a degree that he [was] dangerous to the health and safety of others" (Welf. & Inst.Code, former § 6300)--the criminal court was empowered, on its own motion or on application of either party, to "adjourn the [criminal] proceeding or suspend the sentence, as the case may be," and certify the defendant to the superior court for MDSO proceedings. (Id., former § 6302.) If, after psychiatric examinations and appropriate hearings, the superior court found defendant to be an MDSO who was amenable to treatment, the court could commit him to the Department of Mental Health for confinement in a state hospital, to the county mental health director for confinement in an appropriate treatment facility, or to supervised outpatient status. (Id., former § 6316, subd. (a)(1).)

Under 1977 amendments, when the offender was committed as an MDSO, the committing court or the Board of Prison Terms (depending on whether defendant came under the determinate or indeterminate sentencing laws) was required to compute the "longest term of imprisonment" for the underlying offenses. Except as otherwise provided, this period represents his "maximum term of commitment" as an MDSO, beyond which he may not be kept in "actual custody." (Id., former § 6316.1, subds. (a), (b).) The "longest term of imprisonment" is to include credit for actual days spent in presentence custody (see Pen.Code, § 2900.5), ¹ but is to "[disregard] any [good-conduct and participation] credits which could have been earned under Sections 2930 to 2932, inclusive, of the Penal Code." (Welf. & Inst.Code, former § 6316.1, subd. (a).) ²

Under various circumstances, an MDSO may be returned to the criminal court before expiration of his "maximum term of commitment," and criminal proceedings may then be resumed. This may occur, for example, if he is found no longer dangerous or, like petitioner, not amenable to further treatment. (Id., see former §§ 6325, 6325.2, 6327.) If the person is then sentenced for his criminal offense, he must receive credit on his prison term for his actual days of hospital confinement as an MDSO. (Id., former § 6325.) But the statute makes no provision that the actual period of imprisonment be further reduced by conduct or participation credits earned as an MDSO hospital patient.

If a still-committed MDSO hospital patient is approaching his "maximum term of commitment," and the Director of Mental Health has cause to believe the patient remains dangerous, the director may alert the prosecutor to file a petition for extended commitment on that ground. If after a hearing with criminal safeguards the patient is found a still-dangerous MDSO, his commitment may be extended for two additional years, and indefinite two-year renewed commitments can be obtained under the same procedures. The patient may be transferred to a Department of Corrections facility if he is nonamenable to treatment in a state hospital or stricter security and supervision are required. Amenability to treatment is not a prerequisite to extended commitment, though the patient must be offered treatment in any facility to which he is confined. (Id., former § 6316.2.)

In People v. Saffell (1979) 25 Cal.3d 223, 157 Cal.Rptr. 897, 599 P.2d 92, this court held that the statutory exclusion of conduct and participation credits from computation of an MDSO's "maximum term of commitment" did not deny MDSOs equal protection of the laws when compared with criminals directly sentenced to state prison. The Saffell majority acknowledged that the "fundamental" interest in personal liberty was at stake, and that the "strict scrutiny" standard of equal protection analysis thus applied. (P. 228, 157 Cal.Rptr. 897, 599 P.2d 92.) Nonetheless, it found a "compelling interest" necessarily served by the MDSO statute's rule of exclusion.

Saffell reasoned as follows: The purpose of imprisonment is punishment, while the primary purpose of an MDSO commitment is treatment as a humanitarian alternative to punishment. The treatment mode requires flexibility in keeping the MDSO patient in hospital confinement. If conduct and participation credits were deducted from his maximum hospital confinement, mental health officials might be forced to resort prematurely to the cumbersome extended-commitment procedures to allow treatment to continue and protect public safety. (Pp. 230-232, 157 Cal.Rptr. 897, 599 P.2d 92.)

Saffell provided five further reasons why conduct and participation credits were unsuitable to an MDSO hospital commitment. First, the promise that...