People v. Saffell

• Decision Date: 05 September 1979
• Docket Number: Cr. 20837
• Citation: 157 Cal.Rptr. 897,25 Cal.3d 223
• Parties: , 599 P.2d 92 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Frank Edward SAFFELL, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 897

157 Cal.Rptr. 897

25 Cal.3d 223, 599 P.2d 92

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Frank Edward SAFFELL, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 20837.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Sept. 5, 1979.

Appellate Defenders, Inc., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, and Handy Horiye, San Diego, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger and George Deukmejian, Attys. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Daniel J. Kremer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Alan S. Meth and Henry R. Mann, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

RICHARDSON, Justice.

We consider and will reject the contention that the Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders Act (the Act) (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 6300 et seq.; all further statutory references are to that code unless otherwise cited) constitutes a denial of equal protection of the laws. The specific target of constitutional attack is that provision of the Act which automatically commits for a period of treatment equal to the upper term for the underlying criminal offense ( § 6316.1) those individuals found to be mentally disordered sex offenders (MDSOs) who are amenable to such treatment and precludes any credit for good behavior in the manner described by Penal Code section 2930 et seq. (Ibid.).

The identification and processing of MDSOs are carefully prescribed by statute. Section 6300 defines an MDSO as one "who by reason of mental defect, disease, or disorder, is predisposed to the commission of sexual offenses to such a degree that he is dangerous to the health and safety of others." When a person is convicted of any offense for which registration as a sexual offender is required by section 290 of the Penal Code or "any felony or misdemeanor which is shown by clear proof or the stipulation of the defendant to have been committed primarily for purposes of sexual arousal or gratification" ( § 6302, subd. (a)), the trial court may certify the person for a hearing and examination by the superior court if it is satisfied that there is probable cause to believe such person is an MDSO (Ibid.).

The alleged MDSO must then appear before the superior court where he must be "inform(ed) . . . that he is certified or alleged to be a mentally disordered sex offender, and inform(ed) . . . of his rights to make a reply and to produce witnesses in relation thereto." ( § 6305.) The person alleged to be an MDSO must be present at the commitment hearing and "if he has no attorney, the judge shall appoint the public defender or other counsel to represent him . . . ." ( § 6314.) If, after the hearing, which must include the consideration of the reports and testimony of two or three psychologists or psychiatrists who have personally examined the subject ( §§ 6307, 6308),"the court finds that the person is a mentally disordered sex offender and that the person Could benefit by treatment in a state hospital, or other mental health facility the court in its discretion has the alternative to return the person to the criminal court for further disposition, or may make an order committing the person to the department for placement in a state hospital, or may commit the person to the county mental health director for placement in an appropriate public or private mental health facility, . . . No person shall be admitted to a state hospital or other facility without having been evaluated by the county mental health director or his or her designee.

"If after examination and hearing, the court finds that the person is a mentally disordered sex offender but will Not benefit by care or treatment in a state hospital or other facility the court shall then cause the person to be returned to the court in which the criminal charge was tried to await further action with reference to such criminal charge. Such court shall resume the proceedings and shall impose sentence or make such other suitable disposition of the case as the court deems necessary." ( § 6316, italics added.)

In the case of a person found to be an MDSO amenable to treatment "the court shall state in the commitment order the maximum term of commitment, . . . (which) shall mean the longest term of imprisonment which could have been imposed for the offense or offenses of which the defendant was convicted, including the upper term of the base offense and any additional terms for enhancements and consecutive sentences which could have been imposed less any applicable credits as defined by Section 2900.5 of the Penal Code and disregarding any credits which could have been earned under Section 2930 to 2932, inclusive, of the Penal Code." ( § 6316.1, subd. (a).)

In order to commit a person beyond the "maximum term of commitment" prescribed in section 6316.1 the court must conduct a new hearing at which the patient has the right to be represented by an attorney and tried by a jury. At the hearing it must be proved that the person still "Suffers from a mental disease, defect, or disorder, and as a result of such mental disease, defect, or disorder, is predisposed to the commission of sexual offenses to such a degree that he presents a serious threat of substantial harm to the health and safety of others." ( § 6316.2, subd. (a)(2).) Recommitment is for a period of one year. (Id., subd. (b).)

On February 23, 1978, defendant, having waived a jury and following court trial, was convicted of forcible rape (Pen.Code, § 261) and forcible sexual perversion (Id., § 288a, subd. (c)), both offenses aggravated with the use of a dangerous weapon, a knife (Id., § 12022, subd. (b)).

On March 23, 1978, at the sentencing hearing, the court stated that it had probable cause to believe that defendant was an MDSO within the meaning of section 6300. The court thereupon adjourned the criminal proceeding and certified defendant to the psychiatric department of the superior court for hearing and examination pursuant to section 6302 to determine whether he was an MDSO. Two psychiatrists were appointed pursuant to section 6307 to make a personal examination of defendant.

On April 5, 1978, a judge of the psychiatric department of the San Diego Superior Court considered the separate written reports of the two psychiatrists appointed, heard the testimony of one of the psychiatrists, and found that defendant was an MDSO who Could benefit by treatment in a state hospital. Defendant was thereupon committed for six years to Patton State Hospital under the provisions of section 6316.1. Pursuant to section 6317 the court requested that the superintendent of the hospital report to the court every six months as to defendant's progress toward recovery.

On April 7, 1978, defendant filed his notice of appeal from his conviction and his commitment to state hospital. Defendant argues that following conviction had he been sentenced as a criminal rather than committed as an MDSO amenable to treatment he would have been eligible to be confined for the middle or lower term for the base criminal offense and could, additionally, receive "good time" credits which would, in combination, make his earliest possible determinate sentencing release date August 1981. He contends that the exclusion of these sentencing possibilities constitutes a denial of equal protection of the law. Under his MDSO commitment for the "maximum term of commitment" defendant has a tentative release date in April 1984. The issues of the automatic imposition of the upper term and the allowance of credits for good behavior are severable and we will examine each in turn.

We note, initially, that the most basic personal liberty interest is involved. While the degrees of restraint for an MDSO may vary considerably, from confinement in state hospital ( § 6316) to outpatient care ( § 6325.1), there is in any case a very considerable limitation on that freedom of action enjoyed by all other citizens. As we unanimously concluded in People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236, 131 Cal.Rptr. 55, 64, 551 P.2d 375, 384, "personal liberty is a fundamental interest, second only to life itself, as an interest protected under both the California and United States Constitutions." (P. 251, 131 Cal.Rptr. p. 65, 551 P.2d p. 385.)

We coupled that expression in Olivas with the holding that "once it is determined that (a) classification scheme affects a fundamental interest or right the burden shifts; thereafter The state must first establish that it has a Compelling interest which justifies the law and then demonstrate that the distinctions drawn by the law are Necessary to further that purpose." (Ibid., italics in original; In re Moye (1978) 22 Cal.3d 457, 465, 149 Cal.Rptr. 491, 584 P.2d 1097; People v. Feagley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 338, 355, 121 Cal.Rptr. 509, 535 P.2d 373; Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 597, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241.) Such a compelling interest here exists and the statutory design challenged is necessary to serve that interest.

While judicial attention to the MDSO is invoked by his commission of a criminal act, the entire statutory scheme providing for the diversion of MDSOs from the mainstream of the criminal justice system clearly indicates that "in MDSO cases, subsequent confinement of the . . . person is for purposes of Treatment, not punishment." (In re Moye, supra, 22 Cal.3d 457 at p. 466, 149 Cal.Rptr. 491 at p. 497, 584 P.2d 1097 at p. 1103; italics in original; see also In re Bevill (1968) 68 Cal.2d 854, 858, 69 Cal.Rptr. 599, 442 P.2d 679 (confinement is not for the criminal offense but because of status as an MDSO); People v. Rancier (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 579, 585, 49 Cal.Rptr. 876 (same); People v. Schaletzke (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 881, 887, 49 Cal.Rptr. 275 (MDSO commitment not a substitute for punishment).)

The Act contemplates that the only MDSOs who may be confined for the "maximum term of confinement" are those whom the court finds "could Benefit by treatment in a state hospital, or other mental health facility . . . ." ( § 6316, italics added.) The individual who is determined to be...