Hughes v. City of Phoenix
| Decision Date | 24 June 1946 |
| Docket Number | 4796 |
| Parties | HUGHES v. CITY OF PHOENIX et al |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Maricopa County; Harold R. Scoville Judge.
Judgment affirmed.
Thomas O. Marlar, of Phoenix, for appellant.
Richard Minne, City Atty., and William C. Fields, Asst. City Atty. both of Phoenix, for appellees.
This appeal involves the validity of Ordinance No. 3907 of the City of Phoenix, the title of which reads as follows:
Section 1 of the act prohibits the parking of any vehicle in violation of the ordinances of the City of Phoenix regulating the standing, or parking, of vehicles.
Section 2 of the act provides, in part, that any unoccupied vehicle found violating any provision of the ordinances relating to parking is a nuisance and a menace to the safe and proper regulation of traffic, and authorizes the chief of police to seize and impound it. The removal charges provide for a fee of $ 4, plus fifty cents a day for each day the vehicle is kept in custody.
Inferentially the appeal also questions the validity of the parking meter ordinace of the City of Phoenix, numbered 2546, the title of which reads as follows:
The various provisions of the ordinance are germane to the title. The act authorized the installation of parking meters, fixes a time limit and provides for a charge of five cents in the meters. The ordinance also designates certain streets of the City of Phoenix where the meters shall be installed. The appellant parked his car in a meter zone in violation of the ordinance in that he failed to deposit a nickel in the meter or left it in the parking place long after the parking time had expired. The appellee, Jerald McAlpin, a police officer, of the city, observed the motor vehicle so illegally parked and pursuant to the provisions of the ordinance first above referred to, caused the same to be removed from the street and taken for storage in the custody of the chief of police.
The appellant refused to pay the removal and storage charges, or impounding fees, prescribed in the ordinance, and filed this action for replevin on the succeeding day. Replevin bond was posted and the appellant's car immediately released.
After the pleadings were settled, the appellees duly filed their motion for summary judgment based on the affidavit of appellee McAlpin containing the allegations of fact concerning the seizure of the vehicle hereinbefore set forth. The affidavit was never controverted by the appellant who subsequently filed his motion for judgment on the pleadings. Both motions were heard on the same day by stipulation, the court granting appellees' motion for summary judgment and denying appellant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Thereafter, the appellees having elected to retake possession of the vehicle and retain the same until the removal and storage charges incurred by its impounding under the provisions of Ordinance No. 3907 were paid, and the court having so decreed, the appellant formulated this appeal.
Appellant has set forth a number of assignments of error and propositions in support thereof. We shall take cognizance only of those that we deem to have any merit and worthy of the attention of this court. One of these assignments is to the effect that "The court erred in holding that the automobile and medical instruments of a licensed physician and surgeon were subject to execution."
The appellant argues at length that a physician's automobile is an instrument and as such under subsection 3 of Section 24-601, A.C.A.1939, exempt from execution or attachment. Such a motor vehicle is not exempted by the provisions of subsection 3 of Section 24-601, supra, cited by the appellant. It is, however, expressly exempted by the provisions of subsection 10 of that section, which expressly provides:
The fact that a physician's motor vehicle is free from seizure and sale under legal process for the payment of his debts does not permit him to disobey laws which are designed to carry out a program for the safe use of the streets of a city by motor vehicles and automobiles. To adopt the construction contended for by appellant would permit any physician, surgeon, constable or clergyman, to park his motor vehicle in the middle of the streets or highways, on the sidewalks, or on the parkways, in violation of city ordinances or state laws, and the proper officers would have no authority to remove it. It would permit such owners to refuse to pay their state license fees, and would prevent the highway officials from seizing the vehicles under the state statutes until such fees were paid. It would permit the lawyer to establish his library on the street, the printer to run his shop on the sidewalk, the music teacher to give lessons on public thoroughfares, or the farmer to permit livestock to run at large throughout the public ways.
We have not been cited to any authority to the effect that such an exemption statute has been construed to permit the commission of a nuisance and to prevent the proper officer from abating it. The great weight of authority, however, is to the effect that personal property exemption laws do not prohibit the impounding of those items of personal property which are exempted from seizure or forced sale for debt for the violation of a valid ordinance adopted under the police power...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Sutton v. City of Milwaukee, Civ. A. No. 80-C-445.
...of that vehicle, as a reasonable exercise of the police power. Park v. Adams, 289 S.W.2d 829 (Tex.Civ.Ct.App. 1956); Hughes v. City of Phoenix, 170 P.2d 297 (Ariz.1946); Jackson v. Copelan, 198 N.E. 596 (Ohio Ct.App.1935); Steiner v. City of New Orleans, 136 So. 596 (La.1931). I find these ......
-
Park v. Adams
...357; Spear v. Ward, 199 Ala. 105, 74 So. 27; City of Birmingham v. Graves, 200 Ala. 463, 75 So. 395.' In the case of Hughes v. City of Phoenix, 64 Ariz. 331, 170 P.2d 297, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that a city ordinance declaring any unoccupied vehicle found violating the ordinance ......
-
Gear v. City of Phoenix
...clearly has the power to regulate the use of its streets, including ingress thereto and egress therefrom. Hughes v. City of Phoenix, 64 Ariz. 331, 170 P.2d 297 (1946); Wood v. Phoenix-Tempe Stone Co., 35 Ariz. 155, 275 P. 5 (1929). The regulation in this case sought to avoid the danger of c......
-
Fields v. Steyaert
...this type of statute is that law enforcement officers have a duty to keep the streets clear of public unisances. Hughes v. City of Phoenix, 64 Ariz. 331, 170 P.2d 297 (1946); Moton v. City of Phoenix, 100 Ariz. 23, 410 P.2d 93 (1966); see also Gear v. City of Phoenix, 93 Ariz. 260, 379 P.2d......