Hughes v. Edwards
| Citation | 220 S.E.2d 231,265 S.C. 529 |
| Decision Date | 03 December 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 20120,20120 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
| Parties | R. E. HUGHES, Respondent, v. Honorable James B. EDWARDS, Governor of the State of South Carolina, et al., Appellants. |
Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, Greenville, for respondent.
Phillip M. Grier and Timothy G. Quinn, Columbia, amicus curiae.
This, a taxpayer's action, was instituted against the State Budget and Control Board of South Carolina, seeking an interpretation of § 20B of the General Appropriation Act of the General Assembly for the year 1975--76. The taxpayer has asked the Court to enjoin the Board from borrowing money and pledging the credit of the State by issuance of certain bonds. From an order granting the injunction, the Board has appealed.
A study of the record and the briefs reveal that the order of the lower court sets forth and properly disposes of all of the exceptions raised in the appeal to this Court. The order of the Honorable Joseph R. Moss, Special Judge, shall be printed as the directive of this Court.
RHODES, J., not participating.
In this taxpayer's suit the plaintiff, R. E. Hughes, seeks to enjoin the State Budget & Control Board from approving the issuance of Capital Improvement Bonds contrary to what he contends is the meaning of Section 20B of the General Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1975--76. Section 20B is an amendment to Section 4 of Act 1377 of 1968 and reads in pertinent part as follows:
In 1968, when the Capital Improvement Program for the State of South Carolina commenced, the total amount of bonds authorized thereunder was $70,000,000. By 1975 that figure exceeded $500,000,000. This tremendous increase in the outstanding bonds necessarily brought about a tremendous increase in the debt service requirements for such bonds. The general financial condition of the country worsened perceptibly, and the largest City in the country was faced with a threatened default in its bond obligations.
For many years the State of South Carolina has enjoyed an enviable position with regard to its bonds. They have been consistently rated AAA, and such has resulted in a ready market for the bonds of this State at an advantageous price.
In view of the existing financial condition of the general economy and in view of the tremendous increase in the outstanding bonds and the consequent increase in debt service requirements, the General Assembly felt that the issuance of further General Obligation Bonds of the State should be curtailed or restricted so that the debt service requirements for General Obligation Bonds of the State, excluding highway bonds and institution bonds, should not exceed five percent of the general fund revenue for the preceding fiscal year. This restriction, or some such restriction, is certainly wise and plainly shows the intention of the General Assembly to maintain the fiscal integrity of this State.
A number of projects have been approved by the General Assembly prior to June 6, 1975, the effective date of Section 20B of the General Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1975--76. However, the Budget and Control Board had not specificially authorized the issuance of bonds for such projects, and on September 22, 1975 the Budget and Control Board did meet and did authorize, subject to Court approval, the issuance of $35,384.702.36 of bonds for projects which had been authorized but were not under contract or construction as of June 6, 1975 and an additional $4,436,301.90 for authorized projects other than construction which were not under contract as of June 6, 1975. Further, the Complaint alleges and the Answer admits that there are additional projects for which the Budget and Control Board will authorize the issuance of bonds if authorized by the Courts.
The general fund revenue for the fiscal year 1974--75 amounted to $841,575,000, and five percent of such general fund revenue amounts to $42,078,000. Debt service requirements for the fiscal year 1975--76 on bonds presently outstanding amounts to $44,241,400 and that, of course, exceeds five percent of the general fund revenue for the fiscal year 1974--75.
Plaintiff contends that since the debt service requirements for the fiscal year 1975--76 on presently outstanding bonds exceeds five percent of the general fund revenue for 1974--75, the Budget and Control Board cannot approve the issuance of any further bonds unless the issuance of such bonds is necessary to finance projects or purposes 'under contract' as of June 6, 1975.
Defendants contend that despite the five percent restriction it might authorize the issuance of bonds during the fiscal year 1975--76 for projects where work thereon had been performed under commitments to third parties even though construction contracts may not have been entered into if the Budget and Control Board determines that the completion of such projects would be to the best interest of the State of South Carolina.
It thus seems clear that the decision in this case hinges upon the meaning of the words 'may be necessary to finance projects or purposes now under contract.'
Plaintiff contends that unless there was an actual contract for the construction or purpose for which the bonds are sought to be issued as of June 6, 1975, the Budget and Control Board has no discretion in the matter. Defendants contend that enumerable complex situations and problems would arise if the proviso quoted above is constructed to literally mean that for bonds to be issued an actual contract must have been executed as of June 6, 1975.
One of the primary rules of statutory construction is that words used in a statute should be taken in their ordinary and popular significance unless there is something in the statute which requires a different interpretation. Investores Premium Corp. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 260 S.C. 13, 193 S.E.2d 642; Martin v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 256 S.C. 577, 183 S.e.2d 451; Hatchett v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 425, 137 S.E.2d 608. An exception to the aforesaid rule of statutory construction is that if the words used have a well recognized meaning in law different from their ordinary and popular significance, then the words are to be presumed to have been used in their legal meaning. Purdy v. Moise, 223 S.C. 298, 75 S.E.2d 605; Coakley v. Tidewater Construction Corp., 194 S.C. 284, 9 S.E.2d 724; Poole v. Saxon Mills, 192 S.C. 339, 6 S.E.2d 761.
For a contract to arise there must be an agreement between two or more parties. There must be an offer, there must be an acceptance, and there must be a meeting of the minds of the parties involved. Masonic Temple v. Ebert, 199 S.C. 5, 18 S.E.2d 584; Lee v. Travelers' Insurance Co., 173 S.C. 185, 175 S.E. 429. It would thus appear that for a project or purpose to have been under contract on June 6, 1975 there must have been an offer by one party, an acceptance by the other party, and a meeting of the minds. There can be no contract so long as, in the contemplation of the parties thereto, something remains to be done to establish contract relations. Insurance Company of North America v. United States, 159 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1947).
Does the fact that land may have been purchased for a project or services for a project contracted for make the 'project' under contract so as to authorize the issuance of bonds for the construction or completion of the project?
In Creech v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, 200 S.C. 127, 20 S.E.2d 645, our Supreme Court stated, 'The word 'project' in these latter years of State and Federal construction of public works, has a well known and generally recognized connotation which carries the meaning of a planned undertaking, a definitely formulated scheme or proposal.' In that case the Court went on to hold that 'project', as used in the Public Service Authority enabling legislation, did not include an operating utility plant but meant a new construction or new facility in the development of natural resources. To the same effect is the decision in South Carolina Electric and Gas v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, 215 S.C. 193, 54 S.E.2d 777.
In People ex rel. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Development Commission v. Town of Emeryville, 69 Cal.2d 533, 72 Cal.Rptr. 790, 446 P.2d 790 (1968), the Court said:
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...Armstrong v. Collins, Op. No. 4028 (S.C. Ct.App. filed Oct. 3, 2005) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 38 at 41); see also Hughes v. Edwards, 265 S.C. 529, 220 S.E.2d 231 (1975) (stating for a contract to arise there must be an agreement between two or more parties and an offer, acceptance, and meeti......
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Sadighi v. Daghighfekr, C/A No. 2:98-2648-18 (D. S.C. 1999)
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