Hughes v. State
| Decision Date | 10 September 1984 |
| Citation | 490 A.2d 1034 |
| Parties | Robert D. HUGHES, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. . Submitted: |
| Court | Supreme Court of Delaware |
Upon appeal from Superior Court. REVERSED.
Randy J. Holland (argued), Michael J. Rich, of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Georgetown, and Gerald I.H. Street, Dover, for appellant.
Charles M. Oberly, III, Attorney General (argued), John A. Parkins, Jr. and James B. Ropp, Deputy Attorneys General, Wilmington, for appellee.
Before HERRMANN, C.J., HORSEY and CHRISTIE, JJ.
In early 1980 defendant Robert D. Hughes was tried and convicted of murder in the first degree by a jury in the Superior Court, Kent County. On appeal, this Court, sitting en banc, reversed the conviction and remanded the case to Superior Court for a new trial. 1 At the second trial in July of 1982, a jury again found Hughes guilty of murder in the first degree. Defendant now appeals from that conviction.
The publicity surrounding the prosecution and trials of the defendant was extensive. Media coverage prior to the second trial focused not only on a recitation of the facts of the alleged crime but also contained prejudicial information in regard to the prior conviction of Hughes, the prior imposition of a life sentence, and his later rejection of plea bargains. Before the second trial, motions for a change of venue and jury sequestration, and a request for individual voir dire of each prospective juror were denied by the Superior Court. In addition, various motions for mistrial were denied during the course of the second trial.
Approximately 112 prospective jurors were assembled for the trial court's voir dire, which proceeded in the following manner:
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we are about to select a jury in the case entitled the State of Delaware vs. Robert D. Hughes. This case involves the murder of Serita Hughes who was found outside her home in Milford, Delaware, on August 31, 1976. The cause of death was strangulation.
The clerk will ask certain questions of you and read certain statements concerning the names of witnesses who will testify. After that I will ask certain questions of you and make certain explanations about the questions. Please listen very carefully to everything that is said by the clerk and by myself. All right.
THE DEPUTY PROTHONOTARY: We estimate that this trial will take four weeks.
Do you know anything about this case either through personal knowledge, discussion with anyone else or the news media?
Do you know the defendant or his friends or relatives?
The State is represented by Charles M. Oberly, III and James E. Liguori, Deputy Attorneys General; and the defendant is represented by Gerald I. Street and G. Francis Autman, Jr.
Do you know the attorneys in this case or any other attorney or employee in the offices of the Attorney General or defense counsel?
Do you know any of the following persons who might be called to testify as witnesses: [62 names were read].
Do you have any bias or prejudice either for or against the defendant?
Is there any reason why you cannot give this case your undivided attention and render a fair and impartial verdict?
THE COURT: Are you now or have you ever been related to anyone on the Attorney General's staff?
Are you now or have you ever been related to a police officer?
Are you now or have you ever been connected with any law enforcement agency?
Do you have now or have you ever had immediate relatives or close friends connected with any law enforcement agency?
Does your present job or has any past job ever caused you to work with the Delaware State Police and/or the Milford Police Department?
Are you now or have you ever been or is anyone related to you ever been affiliated with or a member of any auxiliary police organization?
Have you now or have you ever been a member of any group organized principally for law enforcement?
Did you know the deceased Serita Hughes during her lifetime or know any members of her family?
Were you related to her in any way?
Have you discussed this case with anyone or been present when anyone discussed the case?
Have you ever expressed an opinion about the case or formed or expressed an opinion concerning the guilt or innocence of the defendant?
Let me make one statement by way of explanation. The clerk read to you a question and I have alluded to it: Have you heard anything about the case or have you read anything about it in the press? You should not respond to this question if you merely know this is a pending case. What we are after is if you have read anything or heard anything about the case which has caused you to form an opinion concerning the case and which would make you unable to sit as a fair and impartial and open-minded juror in this case. Keep this in mind as you answer and respond to these questions that this is what we want to know.
We want to know if because of one of these questions you cannot sit as a fair and impartial and open-minded juror. Both the State and the defendant are entitled to that. They are entitled to have twelve jurors whose minds are not made up about the case, who are not subject to outside influence. The mere fact you may have heard that this is a pending case wouldn't disqualify you and wouldn't require you to answer. It is whether or not you have read or heard anything that would affect your ability to be a fair and open-minded and impartial juror.
With that explanation, if your answer to that question is yes or the answer to any of the other questions that were read to you by the clerk or by me are in the affirmative, please come quickly and quietly forward and give your name to the clerk. Do not hold a conversation with her. Just give her your name.
These questions and comments by the court and Prothonotary constituted the complete text of the pertinent voir dire prior to the routine selection of the jury. 2 Before the jury was sworn, these questions and comments were repeated to the persons ultimately selected.
Fifty-six persons responded affirmatively to the court's initial inquiry and were excused without any further questioning. No jurors responded affirmatively to the second questioning. The entire jury selection process was completed in approximately two hours.
Much of the evidence presented during the second trial was substantially the same as that which had been presented at the first trial. The most significant difference between the trials was that defendant testified at the second trial whereas he had not done so at the first trial. Following a six-week trial, Hughes was convicted for a second time of murder in the first degree after the jury had deliberated for about 4 hours.
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial setting forth many of the arguments which he now presents on appeal. This motion was denied by the trial court.
Defendant subsequently filed a new motion for reargument and sought a hearing to determine whether several jurors had violated their oaths. These applications were accompanied by affidavits tending to indicate that jurors were aware that Hughes had been previously convicted and that he had taken a polygraph examination, and that jurors had discussed these matters prior to their deliberations. These applications were denied.
On appeal after the second conviction this Court remanded the case to the Superior Court for a full evidentiary hearing as to extraneous prejudicial information which might have been improperly known to the jurors. 474 A.2d 140.
After a hearing, the Superior Court concluded that no extraneous prejudicial information had been brought to the jury's attention and that the jury had, in fact, been impartial.
However, our review of the transcript of the post-conviction hearing reveals the following:
(1) Four jurors and two alternate jurors knew, before trial, that the defendant had been convicted of first degree murder in a previous trial involving the same killing;
(2) At least one juror knew, before trial, that Hughes had taken a polygraph examination;
(3) At least one juror learned about defendant's prior conviction for the first time in the jury room. This testimony is corroborated by three other jurors who also heard discussion as to the defendant's prior conviction;
(4) Two jurors remember hearing discussions relating to Hughes taking a polygraph examination, for the first time, in the jury room. This testimony is corroborated by two other jurors, one of whom believes that a juror responded to an inquiry concerning the results of the polygraph by stating, "I think he failed it."
(5) At least one juror learned about defendant's prior murder conviction in the courtroom;
(6) The alternate juror who had initially contacted the defense attorneys about juror improprieties testified that she waited six weeks before doing so because she was not sure that discussions about the defendant's prior conviction and his submission to a lie detector test were improper.
The case is now before this Court for review of the second conviction in view of the record made at the second trial, the post-trial record made by the trial court, and the report thereon from the trial judge. Defendant-appellant raises several issues on appeal. Foremost among these is his contention that a fair and impartial jury was not impanelled in this case.
The accused's right to a trial by a jury of his peers is fundamental to our criminal justice system. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). An essential ingredient of that right is that the jury consist of impartial or indifferent jurors. 3 See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 85 S.Ct. 546, 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948).
It should be apparent that the jury's verdict was based solely on the evidence presented at trial, and that defendant was able to exercise his due process rights...
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