Hughes v. State
| Decision Date | 25 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | A11-0472 |
| Parties | Robert Michael Hughes, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Freeborn County
Office of Appellate Courts
Robert Michael Hughes, Bayport, Minnesota, pro se.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, John B. Galus, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Craig S. Nelson, Freeborn County Attorney, Albert Lea, Minnesota, for respondent.
1. Appellant's restitution claim lacks merit when the undisputed evidence in the record supports the trial court's finding that the restitution request was specific and when appellant received due process.
2. The admission at trial of nontestimonial statements made by a declarant who is unavailable at trial does not violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
3. The postconviction court did not err when it denied appellant's remaining claims without holding an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.
Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.
In October 2006 appellant Robert Michael Hughes was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2010), for the shooting death of his wife, Tammy Hughes. The trial court imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. Hughes was also ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $6,771.78 to the Crime Victims Reparations Board. We affirmed Hughes's conviction on direct appeal. State v. Hughes, 749 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 2008).
On November 8, 2010, Hughes filed a petition for postconviction relief. While the petition is not entirely clear, we read it as raising 18 claims.1 The two most significant claims are (1) the trial court's restitution order was improper because the restitution request lacked specificity, he was not responsible for his wife's death, his wife did not incur any out-of-pocket expenses, and he did not receive due process with respect to therequest; and (2) the Confrontation Clause was violated by the introduction at trial of statements made by his wife.2
The postconviction court denied Hughes's petition without a hearing, concluding that all of his claims were procedurally barred because they were either raised on direct appeal or were known but not raised on direct appeal. As to Hughes's Confrontation Clause claim, the postconviction court also concluded that Hughes was not entitled to relief because Hughes did not identify any testimonial statements that were introduced against him at trial. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
A postconviction court must hold an evidentiary hearing unless "the petitioner fails to allege facts sufficient to entitle him to relief." Laine v. State, 786 N.W.2d 635,637 (Minn. 2010). Mere "argumentative assertions without factual support" are not sufficient to require an evidentiary hearing. Id. (quoting Rainer v. State, 566 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Minnesota Statutes § 590.01 governs the grounds for relief a convicted person may assert in a petition for postconviction relief. For a party who has had a direct appeal—as Hughes has—the petition "may not be based on grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal of the conviction or sentence." Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2010); see also State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976).
We first address Hughes's argument that he was improperly ordered to pay restitution. Specifically, Hughes claims that: (1) the restitution request lacked specificity; (2) Hughes was not responsible for his wife's death; (3) his wife did not incur any out-of-pocket expenses; and (4) he did not receive due process in opposing the request.3
Although Hughes appealed the trial court's restitution order on direct appeal and we denied relief, we indicated that Hughes could raise his restitution claims in a subsequent petition for postconviction relief. State v. Hughes, 749 N.W.2d 307, 318 (Minn. 2008). On that basis, we conclude that the postconviction court erred when itfound that Hughes's restitution claims were procedurally barred because they had been raised on direct appeal. Although we would ordinarily remand for further proceedings in the postconviction court, we conclude that, in light of the specific facts of this case, the interests of judicial economy will be served by our consideration of the merits of Hughes's restitution claims.
Restitution is governed by Minn. Stat. §§ 611A.04-.045 (2010). Once restitution is requested, "[t]he court . . . shall request information from the victim to determine the amount of restitution owed." Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a). The statute requires, "if restitution is in the form of money or property," the information must include an itemization and description of the loss and reasons justifying the amounts claimed. Id. An offender may request a hearing to challenge the request for restitution but has the burden to produce evidence challenging requested items of restitution and/or the amount of requested restitution. Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3. The record must "provide a factual basis for the restitution award." State v. Fader, 358 N.W.2d 42, 48 (Minn. 1984).
The trial court's restitution order required Hughes to pay $6,771.78 for his wife's funeral expenses. Hughes argues that the restitution request for funeral expenses lacked specificity. He does not, however, identify in what way the request lacked specificity. Based on our review of the record, we conclude there is ample evidence to support a finding that the request for funeral expenses was sufficiently specific. The record indicates that the trial court explicitly deducted $145 for transportation expenses and $125 for a charitable donation from the restitution request. The trial court would not have deducted these expenses without an itemized restitution request. Based on therecord before us, we are satisfied that the restitution request for funeral expenses was sufficiently specific.
We need not dwell long on Hughes's argument that he was not responsible for his wife's death and is therefore not obligated to pay restitution. Having been convicted of first-degree premeditated murder for causing his wife's death, this argument is without merit. See Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a) ().
Next, Hughes argues that his wife did not incur any out-of-pocket expenses and that the county could not collect for its payment of the funeral expenses. This argument also fails. The definition of "victim" includes government entities that incur losses as a result of a crime and a victim may request restitution for funeral expenses. See Minn. Stat. §§ 611A.01(b) (2010), 611A.04, subd. 1(a). To the extent his argument is that the Crime Victims Reparations Board was not entitled to seek restitution because the county paid the funeral expenses, Minnesota law explicitly empowers the Crime Victims Reparations Board to seek restitution on behalf of the Board or on behalf of victims. See Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1a.
Finally, Hughes argues that he did not receive due process, but he does not specify how his constitutional right to due process was violated. The record indicates that Hughes had notice of the restitution request and that Hughes's attorney demanded a hearing based on the alleged lack of specificity in the request and the alleged unreasonableness of the request. The record further indicates that the trial court held a restitution hearing based on that demand and that Hughes was represented by counsel atthat hearing. Thus, the record supports the conclusion that Hughes received all the process he was due.
For all of these reasons, we hold that Hughes is not entitled to any relief on his restitution claims.
We next address Hughes's argument that Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008), entitles him to relief because the trial court's admission of statements made by his wife before her death to the police and her divorce attorney violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Before trial, the State moved to introduce out-of-court statements made by Hughes's wife before her death. Hughes argued that the statements were not admissible under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution because he was not able to cross-examine his wife about any of the statements. In response, the State argued that Hughes had forfeited his Confrontation Clause rights with respect to his wife's statements because he had procured her absence from the trial. The trial court granted the State's motion, in part applying the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine, based on its finding that Hughes was the cause of his wife's unavailability. In Giles, the Supreme Court held that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause does not apply unless it is shown that in procuring the witness's absence from trial the defendant's purpose was to prevent the witness from testifying. 554 U.S. at 367.
The postconviction court held that Hughes's claim, under Giles, was procedurally barred. According to the postconviction court, the claim was barred because Hughescould have raised the Giles issue in his petition for certiorari filed with the United States Supreme Court, but failed to do so. In the alternative, the postconviction court addressed the merits of Hughes's Confrontation Clause claim. The postconviction court essentially held that, to the extent the trial court erred in applying the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine, the error, if any, was harmless, reasoning that the Confrontation Clause did not bar the admission of the statements of Hughes's wife because the statements were not testimonial.
In response to the postconviction court's procedural ruling, Hughes argues that he could not have raised Giles...
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