Hughes v. State, 26115.

• Citation: 626 S.E.2d 805
• Decision Date: 13 February 2006
• Docket Number: No. 26115.,26115.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Parties: Mar-Reece Aldean HUGHES, Petitioner, v. STATE of South Carolina, Respondent.

626 S.E.2d 805

Mar-Reece Aldean HUGHES, Petitioner, v. STATE of South Carolina, Respondent.

No. 26115.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard October 19, 2005.

Decided February 13, 2006.

Teresa L. Norris, of the Center for Capital Litigation, of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, and Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, all of Columbia, for Respondent.

Justice BURNETT:

We are asked to decide whether Mar-Reece Aldean Hughes (Petitioner), who has been sentenced to die for the murder of a police officer, is mentally competent to waive his statutory right to pursue post-conviction relief (PCR) and be executed forthwith. We conclude Petitioner is not mentally competent at this time to waive his right to pursue PCR.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of murder, armed robbery, criminal conspiracy, possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime, and possession of a stolen vehicle at a trial in York County in September 1995. The jury found as an aggravating circumstance that the victim was a local law enforcement officer performing his official duties. Petitioner was sentenced to death. This Court affirmed the convictions and sentence. State v. Hughes, 336 S.C. 585, 521 S.E.2d 500 (1999), cert denied, Hughes v. South Carolina, 529 U.S. 1025, 120 S.Ct. 1434, 146 L.Ed.2d 323 (2000).

The convictions arose from the fatal shooting of police officer Brent McCants on September 25, 1992. Petitioner and Eric Forney, armed with a gun, accosted two college students in the parking lot of a restaurant in Charlotte, North Carolina, and stole their car. The two men then drove to Rock Hill where Officer McCants stopped them for driving without headlights. McCants was shot several times and his police-issue walkie-talkie was taken from his belt as he lay on the side of the road. Petitioner and Forney were apprehended shortly thereafter. Hughes, 336 S.C. at 589, 521 S.E.2d at 502.

The State sought the death penalty against both Petitioner and Forney. They were tried separately. At his trial, Forney claimed Petitioner was the triggerman. Forney was convicted of murder, criminal conspiracy, and armed robbery and was acquitted of possession of a pistol during the commission of a violent crime. Forney was sentenced to life imprisonment after the jury failed to return a unanimous verdict in the sentencing phase, and the convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. State v. Forney, 321 S.C. 353, 468 S.E.2d 641 (1996). At Petitioner's trial, Petitioner admitted he participated in the armed robbery of the vehicle and that he was driving at the time McCants stopped them, but claimed Forney shot McCants from the passenger seat and stole the officer's walkie-talkie.

On May 11, 2000, we remanded Petitioner's case to the circuit court for a competency hearing after Petitioner wrote the Attorney General requesting to waive further proceedings and be executed. Petitioner changed his mind before a competency hearing was held and filed a post-conviction relief (PCR) application on September 21, 2000. Less than a week later, Petitioner filed a pro se motion requesting counsel be relieved and he be executed.

After a court-ordered evaluation but before a competency hearing, Petitioner again changed his mind and decided to pursue PCR. A competency hearing began on February 25, 2002, but was continued because Petitioner had been forcibly medicated in violation of a court order. Petitioner indicated to counsel during a recess in the hearing that he wished to waive his right to PCR and be executed. Petitioner's mental status was re-evaluated and a competency hearing was held in April 2002.

Judge Paul E. Short, Jr. on September 18, 2002, ruled Petitioner was competent to waive his right to counsel and PCR and competent to be executed. An appeal of that ruling was pending before us when, acting sua sponte on March 7, 2003, we ordered Petitioner's appeal be held in abeyance pending a decision in Council v. Catoe, 359 S.C. 120, 597 S.E.2d 782 (2004). We subsequently held in Council that a mentally incompetent PCR applicant is not entitled to a stay of proceedings pending a determination of his competency to proceed. Instead, a mentally incompetent applicant and his counsel are required to pursue PCR on issues which do not require the applicant's assistance. The applicant will have an opportunity to raise fact-based issues requiring his assistance at a later PCR proceeding if he regains competence. Id. at 125-30, 597 S.E.2d at 785-87.

On June 25, 2004, we remanded the case to circuit court for another hearing on whether Petitioner is presently competent to waive his right to pursue PCR and whether that decision is knowing and voluntary pursuant to the standard established in Singleton v. State, 313 S.C. 75, 437 S.E.2d 53 (1993).

A competency hearing was held on September 15, 2004, before Judge Paul M. Burch following two court-ordered evaluations. Judge Burch on September 24, 2004, ruled Petitioner is presently competent under the Singleton standard to waive his right to PCR and his decision was knowing and voluntary.

ISSUE

Did the circuit court err in ruling that Petitioner is mentally competent to waive his right to pursue PCR with counsel's assistance and that his decision to do so was knowing and voluntary?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court is charged with the responsibility of issuing a notice authorizing the execution of a person who has been duly convicted in a court of law and sentenced to death. The Court will issue an execution notice after that person either has exhausted all appeals and other avenues of post-conviction relief in state and federal courts, or after that person, who is determined by this Court to be mentally competent, knowingly and voluntarily waives such appeals. See In re Stays of Execution in Capital Cases, 321 S.C. 544, 471 S.E.2d 140 (1996); Roberts v. Moore, 332 S.C. 488, 505 S.E.2d 593 (1998); S.C.Code Ann. § 17-25-370 (2003) and § 16-3-25 (2003). When considering a request by an appellant who has been sentenced to death to waive the right to appeal or pursue PCR, and to be executed forthwith, it has been our practice to remand the matter to circuit court for a hearing and ruling on whether the appellant is mentally competent to make such a waiver, and whether any waiver of appellate or PCR rights is knowing and voluntary. We remand such a matter when we deem it necessary to further develop or explore the facts of a case. Following that competency hearing, the parties are required by this Court to file briefs and an appendix containing the testimony and evidence considered by the circuit court. The appellant is required, when directed by the Court, to appear at oral argument and personally respond to questions regarding the waiver of his appellate or PCR rights. See State v. Passaro, 350 S.C. 499, 567 S.E.2d 862 (2002); State v. Torrence, 317 S.C. 45, 451 S.E.2d 883 (1994) (Torrence II); Singleton v. State, 313 S.C. 75, 437 S.E.2d 53 (1993).

This procedure is necessary and appropriate because it provides the parties an opportunity to fully explore the issues and develop a record for our review. We are not bound by the circuit court's findings or rulings, although we recognize the circuit court judge, who saw and heard the witnesses, is in a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their testimony. Cf. Cherry v. Thomasson, 276 S.C. 524, 280 S.E.2d 541 (1981). This matter is similar to one arising in our original jurisdiction because it is this Court which must finally determine whether a particular appellant is mentally competent to make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his appellate or PCR rights. Passaro, 350 S.C. at 506, 567 S.E.2d at 866 ("Importantly, this Court is the final body to decide whether to grant [an appellant's] waiver."); State v. Torrence, 322 S.C. 475, 477 n. 2, 473 S.E.2d 703, 705 n. 2 (1996) (Torrence III) (no appeal lies from the remand of case for fact finding on the issue of competency; such a case is similar to one arising in the Court's general jurisdiction in which the Court may provide for fact finding as necessary).

In deciding the issue of an appellant's competency, we carefully and thoroughly review the appellant's history of mental competency; the existence and present status of mental illness or disease suffered by the appellant, if any, as shown in the record of previous proceedings and in the competency hearing; the testimony and opinions of mental health experts who have examined the appellant; the findings of the circuit court which conducted a competency hearing; the arguments of counsel; and the appellant's demeanor and personal responses to our questions at oral argument regarding the waiver of appellate and PCR rights. See Passaro, 350 S.C. at 504-08, 567 S.E.2d at 865-67 (reviewing evidence presented at competency hearing, including testimony of mental health experts, as well as appellant's responses to Court's extensive questioning of him at oral argument, in concluding he was mentally competent to waive right to direct appeal and be executed); Torrence III, 322 S.C. 475, 473 S.E.2d 703 (after reviewing the record of a competency hearing in circuit court which included testimony from mental health experts and the record of the Court's prior questioning of appellant, Court concluded the record "overwhelmingly supports a determination that [appellant] is indeed competent" to knowingly and voluntarily waive his appellate rights and be executed); Torrence II, 317 S.C. 45, 451 S.E.2d 883 (where appellant wished to waive right to direct appeal, Court remanded case for circuit court to conduct a competency hearing "allowing the introduction of testimony, exhibits, and evidence, to provide a full record for this Court's evaluation"; Court questioned appellant personally about the waiver of his...