Hughey v. Grand River Dam Authority

• Decision Date: 30 May 1995
• Docket Number: Nos. 78183,79649,s. 78183
• Parties: Richard A. HUGHEY, Administrator of the Estate of Rachel Ann Hughey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The GRAND RIVER DAM AUTHORITY, a public Oklahoma corporation, Defendant-Appellee. Carl Mack GLIDEWELL, Administrator of the Estate of Larry Mack Glidewell, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The GRAND RIVER DAM AUTHORITY, a public Oklahoma corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 1138

897 P.2d 1138

1995 OK 56

Richard A. HUGHEY, Administrator of the Estate of Rachel Ann

Hughey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The GRAND RIVER DAM AUTHORITY, a public Oklahoma

corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

Carl Mack GLIDEWELL, Administrator of the Estate of Larry

Mack Glidewell, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The GRAND RIVER DAM AUTHORITY, a public Oklahoma

corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 78183, 79649.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

May 30, 1995.

As Corrected June 1, 1995.

On Certiorari to the Court of Appeals, Div. 4.

The District Court, Delaware County, Sam C. Fullerton, Judge, ruled summarily for the Grand River Dam Authority in wrongful death actions brought by the personal representatives of the estates of Rachel Ann Hughey and Larry Mack Glidewell, concluding that the Authority was shielded from liability both by the provisions of Oklahoma's Recreational Land Use Act and by the terms of the Government Tort Claims Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

ON CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED, THE MEMORANDUM OPINIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE VACATED AND THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENTS IN CAUSES NO. 79,649 AND NO. 78,183 ARE AFFIRMED.

Daniel B. Gossett and Cheryl Bisbee, Stipe, Gossett, Stipe, Harper, Estes, McCune & Parks, Tulsa, for plaintiffs-appellants.

John F. McCormick, Jr., William A. Caldwell, Pray, Walker, Jackman, Williamson & Marlar, Tulsa, and Waldo F. Bales and Allen Pease, Gen. Counsel, Grand River Dam Authority, Vinita, for defendant-appellee.

OPALA, Justice.

Certiorari was granted to resolve the first-impression public-law issue whether the Grand River Dam Authority--a public entity ¹--may claim the cloak of tort immunity from premises liability afforded by Oklahoma's Recreational Land Use Act? We answer in the affirmative.

I ANATOMY OF LITIGATION

The personal representatives [plaintiffs] of the estates of Larry Mack Glidewell and Rachel Ann Hughey [decedents] brought separate ² wrongful death actions against the Grand River Dam Authority [Authority] occasioned by an incident in which decedents drowned after their boat had struck at night an abandoned railroad bridge in the Horsecreek area of Grand Lake. They alleged the Authority (1) had knowledge of the bridge and (2) negligently failed to provide lights or warning signs in the vicinity of the hazard's location.

The Authority moved for summary judgment, arguing (1) the Recreational Land Use Act [RLUA] ³ shields it from legal responsibility In separate opinions the Court of Appeals affirmed the nisi prius orders. Certiorari was sought to resolve the first-impression ⁷ issues whether (1) RLUA immunity extends to the Authority, (2) certain exceptions to that immunity may be applied ⁸ to these claims and (3) the Authority is protected by the terms of the GTCA. The two appeals stand consolidated for disposition by a single opinion. Because we answer the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative we need not reach the last issue.

                and (2) it is also protected by the terms of the Government Tort Claims Act [GTCA] 4 whose provisions exempt it from civil liability. 5  In two identical orders--one in each case--the trial court ruled summarily for the Authority on both grounds. 6
                

II

UNDER THE GTCA SCHEME OF IMMUNITY, GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY IS COEXTENSIVE WITH THAT OF PRIVATE TORTFEASORS

Neither the RLUA nor the GTCA was enacted in a vacuum. The former--a statute governing premises liability in tort for harm to recreational users of property--must be construed together with the GTCA to effect that act's intent. The overarching principle embodied by the GTCA is that private tort law is neither constricted nor enlarged by that act. Rather, it is made applicable to governmental entities by the state's explicit waiver of sovereign immunity, unless otherwise statutorily specified. ⁹ The definitional provisions in the RLUA are sufficiently

                inclusive so that the Authority could claim that act's immunity aegis either as a private person or as a governmental entity. 10  If the Authority is a governmental entity within the meaning of the GTCA, its immunity from tort liability to a recreational user of its waters is derivative, thus shielding it in the same manner as if the Authority were a private landowner.  In light of the GTCA's mandate that government and private tort liability be coequal or coextensive, we hold today the Authority may claim the immunity afforded by the RLUA.  Our pronouncement is in conformity with legislatively crafted rules of statutory construction 11 and with the preferable approach taken by those jurisdictions which have settled this issue. 12  Today's holding does not offend the purpose for which the RLUA 13 was enacted
                

III

NO ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED BY THE AUTHORITY ON THE LOCUS DELICTI BRING IT WITHIN ANY EXCEPTION TO THE RLUA'S IMMUNITY GRANT

By its express terms the RLUA withholds immunity from premises liability where (1) entrance fees are charged to recreational users of the land/water areas or activities for profit are conducted within the area ¹⁴ or (2) the injury for which liability is sought to be imposed was deliberate, willful or malicious. ¹⁵ The record does not disclose that the Authority charges recreational users of its property an entrance fee. There is no record trail of the variety of commercial or for-profit activity in the Grand Lake area, which are contemplated by the RLUA's exception Nor does the record contain evidentiary material of the Authority's deliberate, willful or malicious action toward decedents. In short, no exception from the immunity affordable by the general terms of our RLUA could be made applicable to the claims in suit.

                clause.  The plain reading of the RLUA indicates that the type of commercial activity which takes a landowner out of the purview of immunity must be connected with the invitees' recreational use of the lands or waters.  The Authority's generation of electricity on the land in question--its only commercial activity established by this record--has not been shown to have any profit-related nexus to the admitted public's presence upon the premises or with its free use of the locus delicti. 16  In short, there is here no probative material of the profit-related link required by law
                

IV

THERE IS NO EVIDENTIARY MATERIAL RAISING A COMMERCIAL-ACTIVITIES ISSUE

A defendant who moves for summary judgment by interposing an affirmative (absolute) defense against liability must show that there is no substantial controversy over the applicable facts that are material to that defense and that all inferences which may be reasonably drawn from undisputed facts tendered are in the moving party's favor. ¹⁷ Once the moving party has made the required showing, the adverse party must then assume the burden of demonstrating the existence of a material fact that would justify a trial of that issue. ¹⁸

In an appeal from summary judgment, review is always limited to the issues shown by the record to have been actually presented at nisi prius and actually tendered before the trial judge. ¹⁹ For support of their commercial-activity-exception claim the plaintiffs relied below and do so here solely on the Authority's generation of electricity in the Grand Lake vicinity--the locus in quo. Because they produced no evidentiary material to show the presence upon the critical place of some disputed commercial activity in addition to the Authority's admitted generation of electricity, there is no need to theorize about its potential legal effect.

V

PRUDENCE DICTATES THAT THE ABSTRACT QUESTION--WHETHER THE AUTHORITY IS EXEMPTED FROM LIABILITY BY THE TERMS OF THE GTCA--NOT BE REACHED IN THIS CASE

Courts are not allowed to forecast what they might do about an issue that is not before them. ²⁰ It is wise that we

                remain true to this principle today and not speculate in gratis dicta concerning the GTCA's effect on the Authority's claimed immunity. 21  It suffices to hold that the Authority is immune by the RLUA in the same manner as private landowners.  It does not matter if (a) the § 155 exemptions in the GTCA might also protect the Authority or (b) that the Authority falls within the protective cloak of the GTCA.   To settle either of these purely academic issues in the context of this appeal would amount to nothing more than a needless judicial gaze into Odin's well.  We elect today to resist the temptation
                

VI CONCLUSION

The Authority is immune from liability for plaintiffs' loss regardless of whether it is a private person or a governmental entity. This is so because by the provisions of the GTCA the state and any of its political subdivisions bear tort accountability in the same manner and to the same extent as a private entity. Neither the Authority's activity on the situs of the injury nor any of its acts (or omissions) toward decedents can bring these two claims within any exception to RLUA-conferred immunity. Today's holding makes moot the tendered dispute over the Authority's claimed exemption from liability under the GTCA. ²²

ON CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED, THE MEMORANDUM OPINIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE VACATED AND THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENTS IN CAUSES NO. 79,649 AND NO. 78,183 ARE AFFIRMED.

HODGES, LAVENDER, SIMMS and HARGRAVE, JJ., concur.

ALMA WILSON, C.J., KAUGER, V.C.J., and SUMMERS and WATT, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.

SUMMERS, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

In Boyd v. U.S. ex rel. U.S. Army Corps, 830 P.2d 577 (Okla.1992) we left unresolved the question of whether the Recreational Use Act (2 O.S.1991 § 1301-315) applies to the State of Oklahoma and its subdivisions. That was because the presence of commercial activity in the park area eliminated any possibility of the Act's availability as a defense, and thus the issue was not before us. Today's opinion resolves the unanswered question in favor of applicability of the Act for the benefit of the Grand River Dam Authority (GRDA), ¹ and I agree.

Prior...