Hughlett v. United States, 1:13-CV-204/1:10-CR-84
| Decision Date | 22 October 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:13-CV-204/1:10-CR-84,1:13-CV-204/1:10-CR-84 |
| Parties | ELLIS HUGHLETT, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM
Ellis Hughlett ("Hughlett"), by and thorough counsel, Attorney Anthony Martinez, has filed a motion and memorandum pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), requesting the Court to reduce his sentence, and a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 asking the Court to vacate his sentence and resentence him (Criminal Docs. 24, 27, & 28).1 Both motions rely on Dorsey v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2321 (2012) () and the retroactivity of the FSA.
Hughlett pleaded guilty, with the benefit of a plea agreement, to the one-count Indictment filed against him for distribution of fifty grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A) and was sentenced to the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months imprisonment. Hughlett alleges his sentence is unconstitutional and he is entitled to be re-sentenced under the 2010 Fair SentencingAct ("FSA") pursuant to Dorsey v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2321 (2012). Although the United States agrees in its response to Hughlett's § 2255 motion that, because Hughlett was sentenced after August 3, 2010, for an offense involving crack cocaine, the "new, more lenient mandatory minimum provisions" of the FSA apply to him and reduce his mandatory minimum sentence to five years, it defers to the Court's discretion whether to modify Hughlett's sentence in light of Dorsey, subject to consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors (Criminal Doc. 31).
After reviewing the parties' filings, the relevant law, and the record, the Court concludes the motion to reduce Hughlett's sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) will be DENIED (Criminal Doc. 24) and the § 2255 motion will be GRANTED (Criminal Doc. 28). The judgment of conviction entered against Hughlett on January 4, 2011, will be AMENDED and CORRECTED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to the following limited extent. The sentence in criminal case number 1:10-cr-84 will be VACATED and the Clerk will be ORDERED prepare a new judgment to reflect Hughlett's corrected and recalculated sentence based on the applicable FSA's reduced mandatory minimum that is applicable to him.
Prior to filing his § 2255 motion, Hughlett filed a motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) raising the same arguments as he does in his § 2255 motion, i.e., he is entitled to be resentenced under the FSA and Dorsey (Criminal Doc. 24).2 In Dorsey, the Supreme Court concluded the more favorable provisions of the FSA appliedto defendants sentenced after its effective date, including the changes made to mandatory minimum sentences.
The government opposes the motion, in effect arguing that § 3582(c)(2) permits a sentenced to be reduced only when a defendant's sentencing range has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission, not when Congress establishes a new mandatory minimum sentence or as a result of a Supreme Court decision. Therefore, according to the government, § 3582(c)(2) provides Hughlett with no avenue for relief under Dorsey. See United States v. Passmore, 503 Fed. Appx. 340, 341 (6th Cir. 2012) ().
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) prohibits the Court from modifying a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except under very limited circumstances, none of which are applicable to Hughlett's case. Section 3582(c)(2), in pertinent part, only gives the Court authority to reduce a sentence "of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o). . . ."
Given that Hughlett was sentenced pursuant to a statute, and not under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, there was no "sentencing range" which could be subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission. Because the retroactive Guidelines amendment itself does not alter the mandatory minimums, § 3582(c)(2) does not confer jurisdiction of this Court to resentence Hughlett. Although in hindsight ofDorsey, the mandatory minimum was improperly imposed in Hughlett's case and he is subject to the lower mandatory minimums, § 3582(c)(2) is not the proper vehicle for obtaining relief because it "permits modification of a sentence only where the sentence was based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission." United States v. Parker, 358 Fed. Appx. 632, 633-34 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting § 3582(c)(2)). In order to benefit from a later-amended Guideline, a defendant's sentence must have been "based on" the guideline rather than another provision, such as a mandatory minimum sentence. Id.; United States v. Johnson, 564 F.3d 419 (6th Cir. 2009).
Although Hughlett's sentencing guideline range was 87 to 108 months, his effective guideline range was 120 months based on the minimum mandatory term of imprisonment pursuant to Title 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). Consequently, Hughlett's sentence was not based on a subsequently lowered guideline range, it was based on a subsequently lowered mandatory minimum. The Court sentenced Hughlett to 120 months, as the Court believed it was required to by statute at the time. Based on the language of § 3582, the Court concludes it lacks the authority to reduce Hughlett's mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(2).
Instead, it appears the Court's authority to correct Hughlett's sentence in this circumstance is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See e.g., United States v. Passmore, 503 Fed. Appx. 340, 341 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Floore, 2012 WL 3765132 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2012) (). As previously noted, Hughlett has submitted a § 2255 motion requesting the Court to vacate his sentence andresentence him based on the FSA and the Supreme Court's opinion in Dorsey. Therefore, the Court now turns to Hughlett's § 2255 motion.
A federal prisoner may file a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his conviction or sentence on the ground that it was imposed in violation of the United States Constitution. This Court must vacate and set aside the conviction or sentence if it finds that "the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).
To obtain relief under § 2255 based on an alleged constitutional error, the burden is on a movant to establish an error of constitutional magnitude which had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the criminal proceedings. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962); Griffin v. United States, 330 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2003); Watson v. United States, 165 F.3d 486, 488 (6th Cir.1999). To warrant relief under § 2255, a movant is required to show a fundamental defect in the criminal proceedings which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice or an egregious error that rises to the level of a violation of constitutional due process. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974); Griffin, 330 F.3d at 736; Gall v. United States, 21 F.3d 107, 109 (6th Cir.1994).
When a defendant files a § 2255 motion, he must set forth facts which entitle him to relief. Green v. Wingo, 454 F.2d 52, 53 (6th Cir.1972); O'Malley v. United States, 285F.2d 733, 735 (6th Cir.1961). "Conclusions, not substantiated by allegations of fact with some probability of verity, are not sufficient to warrant a hearing." Green v. Wingo, 454 F.2d at 53; O'Malley, 285 F.2d at 735 (citations omitted). A motion that merely states general conclusions of law without substantiating allegations with facts, is without legal merit. Loum v. Underwood, 262 F.2d 866, 867 (6th Cir.1959); United States v. Johnson, 940 F.Supp. 167, 171 (W.D.Tenn.1996). Thus, a motion consisting of mere legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations is insufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing or § 2255 relief. Short v. United States, 504 F.2d 63 (6th Cir. 1974) ().
On May 25, 2010, the Grand Jury for the Eastern District of Tennessee, Chattanooga Division, filed a one-count indictment charging Hughlett with distribution of cocaine base in violation 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) (Criminal Doc. 1).
Hughlett pleaded guilty to the indictment on August 11, 2010, pursuant to a written plea agreement with the United States (Criminal Doc. 15). The presentence investigation report ("PSR") calculated Hughlett's sentence based on 52 grams of crack cocaine for a base offense level of 30 (PSR, ¶ 10). After a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, his total offense level was 27 (PSR, ¶¶ 16 & 17). Although Hughlett's criminal history category of...
To continue reading
Request your trial