Huie v. Bowen
| Citation | 788 F.2d 698 |
| Decision Date | 05 May 1986 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 85-7067,s. 85-7067 |
| Parties | , 13 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 256, Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 16,779 Bobby HUIE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant. Fannie P. ALSTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant. Willie C. WEST, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant. Arvetter D. TUCKER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant. John D. McKIBBEN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant. Mary A. HARRIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant. Edna NORRIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant. Richard F. TUCKER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant. Jasper SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant. Aubrey L. ROGERS, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee. Katheryn L. SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant. Douglas ROMINE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant. John D. MOORE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant. Charles L. FORD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant. Billy L. BOWERS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant. Tommie D. PARKER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant. to 85-7081 and 85-7218. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Frank W. Donaldson, Jenny L. Smith, U.S. Attys., Birmingham, Ala., William Kanter, Mark B. Stern, Civ. Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendant-appellant.
R. Michael Booker, Shores & Booker, Birmingham, Ala., George W. Harris, Legal Services Corp. of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Ala., for plaintiffs-appellees.
Gary E. Davis, Centre, Ala., for McKibben.
Gene M. Hamby, Jr., Sheffield, Ala., for Harris.
Jan Cox, Tarver & Veigas, Birmingham, Ala., for Norris.
J. William White, Legal Services Corp. of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Ala., for Rogers.
Roger H. Bedford, Bedford, Bedford & Rogers, P.C., Russellville, Ala., for Bowers.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
Before KRAVITCH and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges, and DUMBAULD *, Senior District Judge.
Appellees (hereinafter claimants) are disability recipients whose cases have been consolidated for this appeal. They filed this lawsuit to challenge the Department of Health and Human Services's termination of their benefits. The district court reinstated benefits retroactive to date of termination. We affirm the district court.
On October 9, 1984, President Reagan signed into law the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984. Pub.L. No. 98-460 (the Act). The Act listed new standards for determining when disability benefits paid pursuant to various titles of the Social Security Act are to be terminated. Section 2(a). It further provided that any "actions relating to medical improvement" pending in federal courts on September 19, 1984, be remanded to the Secretary of Health and Human Services (hereinafter Secretary) for reconsideration under the new standards. Section 2(d)(2). See Parker v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 1474, 1475 (11th Cir.1985). On September 19, 1984, the claimants' cases were pending in federal court. The district court and this court granted the Secretary's motions to remand all pending cases for consideration under the Act. 1 The district court also ordered that the claimants' benefits be reinstated from the date of termination. In response to that order, the Secretary filed a motion to alter or amend the portion of the judgment awarding benefits from date of termination. The Secretary contended that the Act intended that benefits be restored only after the Secretary's determination that the claimant is disabled under the new standards. 2 The district court denied the Secretary's motion. The Secretary now appeals the district court's award of retroactive benefits.
We address two issues: First, we must determine whether the district court's orders remanding the cases to the Secretary are appealable orders. Second, we must determine whether the district court acted within its power in awarding benefits to the claimants pending the Secretary's reconsideration of the cases.
The Secretary advances three theories supporting this court's jurisdiction. The Secretary claims that this court has jurisdiction because (1) the district court's order is a final order under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291; (2) it is an appealable collateral order under the Cohen doctrine; and (3) it is appealable as an injunction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(a)(1).
Appellate jurisdiction generally depends on the entry of a final order. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2457, 57 L.Ed.2d 351, 357 (1978). A final order is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893, 104 S.Ct. 239, 78 L.Ed.2d 230 (1983) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 L.Ed. 911, 916 (1945)). The finality requirement of section 1291 is meant to avoid the drain upon judicial resources caused by the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal litigation. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. at 471, 98 S.Ct. at 2459, 57 L.Ed.2d at 359. Generally, an order of a district court remanding a case to the Secretary of Health and Human Services for further consideration is not an appealable order. Biddle v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 1321 (11th Cir.1983); Howell v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 524 (11th Cir.1983).
As support for the claim that the district court's remand is a final order, the Secretary points to section 2(d)(4) of the Act. That section provides that the decision of the Secretary following remand "shall be regarded as a new decision" of the Secretary that "supersedes" the prior determination that was pending on judicial review. This argument is unpersuasive. On remand, the Secretary must follow the standards outlined in the Act to reconsider the earlier decision to terminate the claimants' benefits. In another social security disability benefits case, this court noted: Farr v. Heckler, 729 F.2d 1426, 1427 (11th Cir.1984). The district court's order is not a final order because it does not end the litigation.
The Farr court noted that "[i]f the order does not end the litigation, it must come within an exception to the final judgment rule to be reviewable on appeal." 729 F.2d at 1427. The Supreme Court has created an exception for certain collateral orders which are not final orders. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The Cohen Court recognized that the finality provision of section 1291 has historically been given a "practical rather than a technical construction." 337 U.S. at 546, 69 S.Ct. at 1226, 93 L.Ed. at 1536. The Cohen doctrine allows appeals to be taken from orders that (1) finally determine claims entirely collateral to and separable from the substance of other claims in the action, (2) require review because they present significant, unsettled questions, and (3) cannot be reviewed effectively once the case is finally decided. 337 U.S. at 545, 69 S.Ct. at 1224, 93 L.Ed. at 1536.
In Cohen, a shareholder brought a derivative action against a corporation. The corporation claimed that the shareholder was subject to a New Jersey statute requiring that shareholders holding below a threshold amount of equity who institute derivative actions may be required to post security in order to allow for payment of the corporation's attorney's fees and other expenses if the corporation prevails. The corporation appealed the district court's finding that the statute was inapplicable, and the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court held that the district court ruling was appealable because the decision "appears to fall in the small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." 337 U.S. at 546, 69 S.Ct. at 1225-26, 93 L.Ed. at 1536. The Court found that immediate review was proper because the decision on the applicability of the New Jersey statute was not a step toward a final decision of the case, and would not become a part of the final decision that could eventually be reviewed. The Court noted that if the order of the district court were not reviewed prior to termination of the litigation, "it will be too late effectively to review the present order and rights conferred by the statute, if it is applicable, will have been lost, probably irreparably." 337 U.S. at 546, 69 S.Ct. at 1225, 93 L.Ed. at 1536.
This exception to the general rule of finality was applied to a district court order remanding...
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