Hull v. State
| Decision Date | 10 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2D20-2772 |
| Parties | Justin Marshall HULL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender; Eric S. Gardner, Jr., Assistant Public Defender; and Daniel Muller, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General; Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Chief Deputy Solicitor General; Kevin A. Golembiewski, Deputy Solicitor General (withdrew after briefing); and Rachel R. Siegel, Deputy Solicitor General (substituted as counsel of record), Tallahassee, for Appellee.
In 2008, Justin Hull was sentenced to eight years’ probation after he pled guilty to lewd or lascivious battery of a minor. Mr. Hull's judgment and sentence imposed various "mandatory court costs," which included a "public defender fee," "filing fees," "service charges," "the cost of prosecution," and other administrative costs. Mr. Hull has not paid those costs, and they remain outstanding.
About a year after Mr. Hull pled guilty, the trial court revoked his probation and sentenced him to four years in prison. Upon his release from prison, Mr. Hull was required to—and did—register and report as a sexual offender. However, in 2019, he was charged with violating section 943.0435(14)(a), Florida Statutes (2019), for failing to report biannually as a sexual offender.
Mr. Hull moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that he didn't qualify as a "sexual offender" as defined by section 943.0435(1)(h) 1 because he hadn't paid the costs assessed in his underlying case and thus hadn't been "released from the sanction imposed" in that case. Mr. Hull relied upon this court's decision in State v. James , 298 So. 3d 90 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (). The trial court denied Mr. Hull's motion, finding James inapposite because it involved failure to pay fines, not costs. Mr. Hull then pled guilty to the charge of failing to register and reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. This appeal ensued. We affirm for the reasons discussed below.
This court's decision in James
In James , we considered the 2017 version of subsection 943.0435(1)(h)1, which defined "sexual offender" as a person who has been convicted of a qualifying offense and who "has been released ... from the sanction imposed" for that offense. The statute further provided that the term sanction "includes, but is not limited to, a fine, probation, community control, parole, conditional release, control release, or incarceration in a state prison, federal prison, private correctional facility, or local detention facility." § 943.0435(1)(h) 1.a.(II).1 After being convicted of attempted lewd or lascivious molestation, Mr. James was sentenced to fifteen years’ prison and a $10,000 fine. James , 298 So. 3d at 91. Following his release from prison, Mr. James was charged with failing to report as a sexual offender. Id . Mr. James moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that he did not qualify as a sexual offender under section 943.0435(1)(h) 1 because he had not paid the $10,000 fine and therefore had not been released from "the sanction imposed" for his underlying conviction. Id .
The trial court granted Mr. James’ motion and dismissed the charges, and this court affirmed. Id . Section 943.0435(1)(h)1.a.(II) defined "sanction" to specifically include fines, so we concluded that the fine was "a portion of" Mr. James’ sanction. James , 298 So. 3d at 92. Because the statute "mandates that the person be released from ‘the sanction imposed’ "—as opposed to a sanction imposed—we held that "Mr. James does not qualify as a ‘sexual offender’ because his sanction, which includes a $10,000 fine, has not been released." James , 298 So. 3d at 93–94 (emphasis added). We acknowledged that the legislature "may not have intended" the outcome whereby a person otherwise required to register and report as a sexual offender could unilaterally avoid the registration and reporting requirements simply by choosing not to pay a fine. Id . But we explained that was an issue for legislative, not judicial, resolution. Id . at 94.
The clarifying amendment to section 943.0435
Ch. 2021-156, § 2, Laws of Fla. (corresponding to § 943.0435(1)(h) 1.a.(II), Fla. Stat. (2021)).
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. See Richards v. State , 288 So. 3d 574, 575 (Fla. 2020). The dispositive question in this case is whether we should consider the legislature's clarifying amendment in our interpretation of the preamendment version of the statute. We answer this question in the affirmative, recognize that our decision in James has been abrogated, and affirm the order denying Mr. Hull's motion to dismiss.
Mr. Hull argued below that fines and costs are interchangeable so the term "sanction" in section 943.0435(1)(h) 1.a.(II) should be construed to include costs. The State responded that costs are not included in—and should not be read into—the statutory definition of sanction. Mr. Hull also argued that the holding of James should extend to costs as well as fines, and the State resisted, contending inter alia that the holding of James should be limited to fines.3 The trial court agreed with the State.
On appeal, the State's primary focus has shifted to the legislature's 2021 clarifying amendment. The State argues that under the "recent-controversy" rule,4 the legislature's clarification of its intent—not our decision in James —controls the interpretation of section 943.0435. See, e.g., Madison at Soho II Condo. Ass'n, v. Devo Acquisition Enters. , 198 So. 3d 1111 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). As we explained in Madison , "the legislature's clarification of the prior version of a statute after a recent controversy, such as a court's interpretation of the statute in contravention of the legislature's intent, is permissible." Id . at 1116.
Madison guides our analysis and informs our resolution of this case. There, the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant unit owner in a dispute over unpaid condominium assessments, relying on St. Croix Lane Trust v. St. Croix at Pelican Marsh Condominium Ass'n , 144 So. 3d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014), a decision of this court interpreting section 718.116, Florida Statutes (2011). Madison , 198 So. 3d at 1114–15. While the Madison appeal was pending, the legislature—in the first legislative session following our St. Croix Lane Trust decision—passed an amendment clarifying section 718.116. Id. at 1113. On appeal, the plaintiff condominium association invoked the recent-controversy rule to argue that the amendment required us to interpret section 718.116 at odds with the decision in St. Croix Lane Trust ; we agreed and reversed the judgment. In so doing, we addressed several key principles that apply with equal force here.
We first acknowledged that "it may appear that a court's consideration of a legislature's clarification of its intent with regard to the passage of an earlier statute is akin to retroactively applying an amended statute to pending litigation," which creates potential constitutional concerns. See Madison , 198 So. 3d at 1116. We determined that retroactivity principles were not in play because the association was asking "us to revisit our prior construction of the pre-amended section 718.116(3), not to retroactively apply a newer version of [it]." Id. The same is true here—the State is not asking us to retroactively apply the 2021 version of the statute, it is asking us to revisit our prior construction of the preamendment version of the statute.
Next, we addressed the unit owner's argument that the judgment should be affirmed because principles of stare decisis required the trial court to apply St. Croix Lane Trust at the time it entered judgment. Id . at 1117. As we explained, "The clear legislative directives, coupled with the close temporal proximity of the amendment to St. Croix Lane Trust , leave no room for any ... reasonable conclusion" other than that the legislature acted in response to the controversy arising out of this court's construction of the statute in St. Croix Lane Trust . Id. Thus, we decided "to reexamine St. Croix Lane Trust in...
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