State v. La Vel James
| Decision Date | 15 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2D18-2552 |
| Citation | 298 So.3d 90 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Ray La Vel JAMES, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Elba Caridad Martin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.
Ray La Vel James, Appellee.
The State appeals the trial court's order granting the motion to dismiss the information charging Ray La Vel James with two counts of failing to report quarterly as a sexual offender under section 943.0435(14)(b), Florida Statutes (2017). The trial court found Mr. James does not qualify as a "sexual offender" under section 943.0435(1)(h)(1) because he has not yet been released from the sanction imposed in his underlying case; therefore, Mr. James is not required to report and register as a "sexual offender" under section 943.0435(14)(b). We agree with the trial court and affirm the dismissal.
In case number 02-CF-015590, Mr. James was convicted of attempted lewd and lascivious molestation in violation of section 800.04, Florida Statutes (2001). Mr. James was sentenced to fifteen years' prison and a $10,000 fine pursuant to section 775.083, Florida Statutes (2001). After Mr. James was released from prison, the State filed a two-count information alleging Mr. James failed to report quarterly, in person, to the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office to register as a "sexual offender" as required by section 943.0435(14)(b). Mr. James moved to dismiss the information, arguing he did not qualify as a "sexual offender" under section 943.0435(1)(h)(1) and he was not required to register and report, notwithstanding his release from prison, because his $10,000 fine has not yet been released or discharged. The trial court agreed and dismissed the charges.
Under section 943.0435(1) :
(Emphasis added.)
Here, Mr. James was convicted of attempted lewd and lascivious molestation under section 800.04, for which the trial court imposed a sanction of fifteen years' prison and a $10,000 fine. The fine was not imposed as a lien, nor was it imposed as a cost. See § 938.30(6) - (9), Fla. Stat. (2017) ; Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1298 (N.D. Fla. 2019) (). Mr. James was not sentenced to any sex offender probation. The State concedes the $10,000 fine has not been released and remains outstanding. However, the State argues the plain language of the statute requires that Mr. James be released from a sanction, which could be a fine or incarceration. According to the State, the statute does not require Mr. James be released from both incarceration and the fine to qualify as a "sexual offender" under section 943.0435(1)(h)(1) and trigger the registration requirements. This is a constrained reading of the statute and one that we cannot follow.
Courts must afford statutory language "its plain and ordinary meaning, giving due regard to the context within which it is used." Hampton v. State, 103 So. 3d 98, 110 (Fla. 2012) ; see also Brittany's Place Condo. Ass'n. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 205 So. 3d 794, 797-98 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). The plain language of section 943.0435(1)(h)(1)(a) provides that to qualify as a "sexual offender" under that section—thereby triggering the registration requirement—the person must be released from "the sanction imposed" for any conviction of an offense enumerated in the previous subsection (which includes Mr. James' conviction for attempted lewd and lascivious molestation under section 800.04 ). § 943.0435(1)(h)(1)(a)(I). The statute further provides the "sanction ... includes, but is not limited to, a fine, probation, community control, parole, conditional release, control release, or incarceration in a state prison, federal prison, private correctional facility, or local detention facility." § 943.0435(1)(h)(1)(a)(II) (emphasis added).
Here, Mr. James' entire "sanction" for his conviction under section 800.04 consists of fifteen years' prison and a $10,000 fine. Mr. James' release from incarceration has no effect on the $10,000 fine, which is a portion of his sanction for his conviction. Accordingly, his sanction, as a whole, has not been released, and he does not qualify as a "sexual offender" for purposes of reporting and registration under section 943.0435.
The State urges this court to read the statutory language as meaning a release of either the period of incarceration or the fine triggers the registration requirement. The State's interpretation of the legislature's use of the word "or" does not comport with the plain reading the statute. The statute clearly mandates that the person be released from "the sanction imposed," which "includes, but is not limited to, a fine, probation, community control, parole, conditional release, control release, or incarceration in a state prison, federal prison, private correctional facility, or local detention facility." § 943.0435(1)(h)(1)(a)(II). The statute does not say the person must be released from either "a sanction" or "the incarcerative portion of the sanction" to qualify as a "sexual offender." See § 943.0435(1)(h)(1)(a)(II).
Nor did the legislature provide for an automatic designation as a "sexual offender" upon conviction for certain crimes in the body of the statute. If the legislature intended for an automatic designation as a "sexual offender" upon the conviction of certain offenses, it could have so provided, as it did in Florida's Sexual Predator Act. See § 775.21, Fla. Stat. (2017). Under section 775.21, the legislature provides:
(Emphasis added.)
The legislature declined to include this automatic designation in section 943.0435, as it did in the Sexual Predator Act. And when the legislature has included a provision in one statute, but omitted it in an analogous statute, courts should not read it into the statute from which it has been excluded. See Mesen v. State, 271 So. 3d 164, 169 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) ; see also Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So. 2d 294, 299 (Fla. 2000) (); Ocala Jockey Club, LLC v. Rogers, 981 So. 2d 1245, 1247 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) ().
The State also argues that to interpret section 943.0435(1)(h)(1)(a) to require both portions of Mr. James' sanction to be released to qualify as a "sexual offender" is contrary to the legislative intent of the statute and would lead to an absurd result. But courts must "presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there." Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) ; see also Cason v. Fla. Dep't of...
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