Hulse v. Wilfvat

• Decision Date: 17 June 1981
• Docket Number: No. 64681,64681
• Parties: Gregory A. HULSE, Plaintiff, v. The Honorable Van WIFVAT, Judge of the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Defendant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 707

306 N.W.2d 707

Gregory A. HULSE, Plaintiff, v. The Honorable Van WIFVAT, Judge of the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Defendant.

No. 64681.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 17, 1981.

Gregory A. Hulse of Van Werden & Hulse, Adel, pro se.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Lona Hansen, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Alan Shirley, Dallas County Atty., for defendant.

Considered en banc.

McCORMICK, Justice.

In this certiorari case we must interpret section 815.7, The Code, which fixes the standard for compensation of attorneys who are appointed by the court to represent indigent defendants in criminal cases. Plaintiff Gregory A. Hulse, an Adel attorney, brought this action against defendant district Judge Van Wifvat (the district court) to challenge the adequacy of the attorney fee allowed plaintiff for defending Ralph Kuecker, an indigent charged with murder. The questions presented are whether the district court erred in interpreting the statutory requirement of reasonable compensation and in refusing to allow fees for services rendered in the case by plaintiff's law partner, associate and law clerk. Because we find the court erred in part in interpreting the statutory standard for compensation, we sustain the writ, delineate what we believe to be the correct standard, and remand for further proceedings.

In relevant part, section 815.7 provides:

An attorney appointed by the court to represent any person charged with a crime in this state shall be entitled to a reasonable compensation which shall be the ordinary and customary charges for like services in the community to be decided in each case by a judge of the district court, including such sum or sums as the court may determine are necessary for investigation in the interests of justice .... Only one attorney fee shall be so awarded in any one case except that in class "A" felony cases, two may be authorized.

We have not previously interpreted section 815.7.

Before January 1, 1978, the governing statute was section 775.5, The Code 1977. We interpreted that provision in several cases. See Soldat v. District Court, 283 N.W.2d 497 (Iowa 1979); Parrish v. Denato, 262 N.W.2d 281 (Iowa 1978); Furey v. Crawford County, 208 N.W.2d 15 (Iowa 1973); Woodbury County v. Anderson, 164 N.W.2d 129 (Iowa 1969). In Soldat, we recognized that section 815.7 is a substantive departure from section 775.5. See 283 N.W.2d at 498. However, we did not decide what the difference is. We must now do so.

I. The compensation standard. Plaintiff was appointed to represent Kuecker on April 9, 1979. The murder case was tried from June 22, 1979, until July 13, 1979. A mistrial resulted because of the jury's inability to agree on a verdict. Although a retrial was scheduled, Kuecker entered a plea of guilty to involuntary manslaughter in September 1979 pursuant to a plea bargain with the State.

In his application for fees, plaintiff itemized 494.9 hours of his own time on the case and also requested compensation for 58.6 hours expended by his partner, 221 hours expended by an associate and 14 hours expended by a law clerk. He also sought reimbursement of $2,179.43 in expenses.

Plaintiff and several other attorneys testified in two hearings on the fee application. Testimony was given about plaintiff's experience and ability, the nature and complexity of the case, trial preparation and strategy, prevailing charges for similar defense work for nonindigents, and other matters which plaintiff and the county considered relevant on the compensation issue. In ruling upon plaintiff's application, the district court interpreted "ordinary and customary charges for like services in the community," in section 815.7, to mean "what is charged for the defense of indigent defendants" in the community. In accordance with that standard, the court allowed plaintiff $6,250 based on $25 an hour for 250 hours of trial preparation time, $2,500 based on $200 a day for twelve and one-half days of trial work, and $2179.43 for expense reimbursement, for a total of $10,929.43. In its final total, the court used $6,500 instead of $6,250 as the portion of the fee for trial preparation. Because a partial payment of $2000 had previously been made, the court entered an order allowing $9,179.43 as compensation. The court refused to allow any compensation for the services of plaintiff's partner, associate, and law clerk.

Plaintiff initially contends the court misinterpreted section 815.7. He asserts that the statute entitled him to compensation at the prevailing community rate for nonindigent criminal defense services.

This is an issue of law, not of discretion. Applying the correct legal standard, a court has broad discretion in determining attorney fees. See Soldat, 283 N.W.2d at 499. However, ascertaining the correct legal standard is a matter of law. See State v. Lindsey, 302 N.W.2d 98, 101-02 (Iowa 1981).

Two elements inhere in any standard providing for reasonable attorney fees. Both the necessity and valuation of the services must be determined. The services must have been reasonably necessary and the valuation must be reasonable in amount. See In re Estate of Myers, 269 N.W.2d 127, 129 (Iowa 1978) ("the burden is on the applicant for fees to prove the services were reasonably necessary and the charges are reasonable in amount").

A. Reasonable necessity. In Conway v. Sauk County, 19 Wis.2d 599, 604, 120 N.W.2d 671, 674-75 (1963), the court described the court's task in determining what services are reasonably necessary:

Determination of the character and extent of the services reasonably necessary requires the careful exercise of judgment. When the court fixes the attorney's fee after trial, it has certain advantages of hindsight which counsel did not have when he prepared for the defense. All practicing attorneys have shared the experience, however, when the time for billing a client has arrived, of foregoing charges for time hopefully spent in research and investigation on "thin leads" which turned out to be fruitless. This is one of the hazards of the profession. The court should carefully consider the judgment which the attorney exercised in deciding what investigation and preparation would be useful, but the ultimate responsibility rests on the court and it is not bound by the attorney's decision. The court has the power and duty to take into consideration its own observations of the trial and the facts developed by the evidence.

In a later Wisconsin case the court noted:

Every attorney knows there is no limit to how much preparation one can give a lawsuit, but defense counsel must be practical and use good judgment. In such matters he proceeds at his peril.

State v. Kenney, 24 Wis.2d 172, 179-80, 128 N.W.2d 450, 454 (1964).

The district court must exercise independent judgment in determining the extent of reasonably necessary services. See In re Condemnation of Lands, 261 Iowa 146, 153, 153 N.W.2d 706, 710 (1967) ("But counsels' estimate of the reasonable number of hours necessary for preparation to satisfy their own professional ethics, however commendable, cannot bind the court."). See also Simon v. Bittner, 288 N.W.2d 549, 552 (Iowa 1980) ("In endeavoring to ascertain a reasonable legal fee, relevant factors include the time necessarily spent by the attorney ...."). In exercising its independent judgment, however, the court must put itself in the position of a reasonable attorney at the time the services were undertaken. The court must recognize the high standard of diligence and preparation which is demanded of counsel in criminal cases and all of the relevant facts and circumstances in the individual case.

This element in determining reasonable compensation was unaffected by the enactment of section 815.7. The difference between that statute and former section 775.5 relates to valuation of services rather than their necessity. In the present case, no basis appears for finding that the district court did not apply the proper legal standard in determining the extent of plaintiff's services which were reasonably necessary. Thus, unless an abuse of discretion is demonstrated, we are bound by the court's determination. Soldat, 283 N.W.2d at 498.

Of the 494.9 hours of his own services itemized by plaintiff, 377.3 hours were consumed in out-of-court research and preparation and the remaining 117.6 hours were spent in court. The court approved 250 hours for preparation and research and converted the court time to twelve and one-half days of trial. Among other grounds for its determination, the court disagreed with counsel concerning the necessity of certain investigative activities and believed that some portion of the time was devoted to plaintiff's self-education.

We hold that the court employed the correct legal standard and did not abuse its discretion in determining the extent of plaintiff's services which were reasonably necessary.

B. Valuation. Under former section 775.5, a court-appointed attorney was entitled to "reasonable compensation to be decided in each case by the court." Counsel is still entitled to reasonable compensation, but under section 815.7 reasonable compensation is "the ordinary and customary charges for like services in the community." The district court held that "like services" means similar services rendered to indigent defendants pursuant to court appointments. Thus, under the court's view, the only purpose of the change was to require uniformity in fees paid for indigent defense services. The court then determined plaintiff's fee based on the allowance of $25 per hour for preparation time and $200 a day for court time.

We separately examine the court's interpretation of the statute and its valuation of compensation. We first look at the background against which section 815.7 was enacted.

Before 1959, fees were established by statute. See, e. g., § 775.5, The Code 1958. In 1959 the legislature amended section 775.5 to give the district court authority to allow...