State v. Lindsey

• Decision Date: 18 February 1981
• Docket Number: No. 64974,64974
• Citation: 302 N.W.2d 98
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Greg Allen LINDSEY, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 98

302 N.W.2d 98

STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Greg Allen LINDSEY, Appellee.

No. 64974.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 18, 1981.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Roxann M. Ryan, Asst. Atty. Gen. and Peter Berger and James Smith, Asst. Polk County Attys., for appellant.

Linda Del Gallo and Alfredo G. Parrish of Parrish & Del Gallo, Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered by REYNOLDSON, C. J., and LeGRAND, McGIVERIN, LARSON and SCHULTZ, JJ.

SCHULTZ, Justice.

The State appeals from a trial court ruling granting defendant Greg Allen Lindsey a new trial. Whether the trial court properly sustained defendant's motion for a new trial ultimately depends on whether the jury was properly instructed regarding the presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proving defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We hold the jury was properly instructed and remand the case for entry of judgment and sentencing.

On April 5, 1979, defendant was charged by county attorney's information with robbery in the first degree in violation of sections 711.1-.2, The Code Supp.1977. Defendant entered a plea of not guilty, and the case came to trial on July 25, 1979. After presenting their evidence, the parties were given an opportunity to object to the trial court's proposed jury instructions. Defendant excepted to proposed instruction number five, concerning the presumption of innocence in criminal cases. Instruction number five provided:

The defendant is presumed by law to be innocent and not guilty of the offense charged. This presumption of innocence requires you to ignore all suspicion which might arise from the arrest, Trial Information or the present situation of the defendant. The presumption of innocence remains with the defendant throughout the trial and must prevail unless the evidence establishes the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The jury will always bear in mind that the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden of proof as to any fact or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence.

Defendant excepted by requesting that his proposed instruction number one be substituted for instruction number five. Defendant's proposed instruction number one provided:

The defendant is presumed to be innocent of the offense charged, and of any offenses included therein, and the burden is upon the State to overcome this presumption and establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. No mere weight of evidence is sufficient unless it excludes all reasonable doubt as to his guilt. No proof of guilt must be inconsistent with any other rational supposition.

The jury will always bear in mind that the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden of proof as to any fact or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence.

(emphasis original). Defendant's proposed instruction number one was denied on July 27, and on the same date the jury returned a verdict of guilty of first-degree robbery.

Defendant promptly filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that the trial court erred in refusing to submit defendant's proposed instruction to the jury in place of instruction number five, because the latter instruction "lessened the State's burden of proof since the jury was not told that full and satisfactory proof is required before an accused can be convicted of a crime." (emphasis original). The trial court initially overruled defendant's motion. Prior to sentencing, however, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the ruling, and after several delays the court reheard arguments on the motion and by order filed February 22, 1980, granted defendant a new trial.

In urging the trial court to grant the new trial defendant strongly emphasized the nature of the trial. Defendant had relied on the defense of diminished responsibility to negate specific intent, which is an essential element of the crime of robbery. See § 711.1, The Code Supp.1977. Two psychologists testified as expert witnesses during trial, one on behalf of the defendant and the other on behalf of the State. Their testimony concerning whether defendant possessed sufficient mental capacity to render him capable of forming the requisite specific intent necessary to commit the crime of first-degree robbery was conflicting. Defendant contended that his proposed instruction would have provided the jury guidelines for evaluating their conflicting testimony.

The trial court, in its order granting the new trial, indicated that the proposed instruction was one that the court always gave, and that the particular wording at issue had been inadvertently omitted when the court updated its set of instructions. The court also stated that in a case of this nature the jury should have been clearly instructed on "weight of evidence" and "exclusion of reasonable doubt," and that although nine separate instructions dealt with these items, when considered together, the instructions were confusing and unnecessarily prejudiced defendant's rights. The court further stated that the nature of the case raised the level of significance of the omitted portion of the proposed instruction, and that instruction number five inadequately instructed the jury concerning the weight and sufficiency of evidence required for a guilty verdict.

I. A new trial may be granted when the trial court has misdirected the jury in a material matter of law or has improperly instructed the jury. Iowa R.Crim.P. 23(2)(b)(5), (7). The State may appeal from an order granting a defendant a new trial. § 814.5(1)(c), The Code 1979. Prior to the adoption of the new Iowa Criminal Code, however, appeal could only be taken from a final judgment, § 793.2, The Code 1977, and the State could not appeal from an order granting a new trial. State v. Coughlin, 200 N.W.2d 525, 526 (Iowa 1972). Consequently, there is a paucity of case authority concerning the circumstances under which a trial court may properly grant or refuse to grant a new trial in a criminal case.

Generally, the decision whether to grant a new trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and that decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless the complaining party carries the heavy burden of proving that the trial court abused its discretion and prejudice resulted therefrom. State v. Gartin, 271 N.W.2d 902, 910 (Iowa 1978). See also Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(3) ("In ruling upon motions for new trial the trial court has broad but not unlimited discretion in determining whether the verdict effectuates substantial justice between the parties."). Discretion is accorded in this area because of the trial court's proximity to the trial process: "the trial court is in as good or better position than the appellate court to make a determination in accordance with the demands of justice." State v. Gartin, 271 N.W.2d at 910. However, when the sole determining factor in a trial court's decision to grant or deny a new trial involves a question of law, this rationale is not applicable.

Thus, in Julian v. City of Cedar Rapids, 271 N.W.2d 707, 709 (Iowa 1978), a civil case in which the trial court's granting of a new trial was grounded upon an erroneous instruction to which no objection had been made, we reversed and stated:

The court did not base the new-trial grant on the failure of the verdict to effectuate justice or a similar discretionary ground, but on the basis that it had erred as a matter of law with respect to the burden of proof. In these circumstances the trial court's discretion is not involved, and its decision stands or falls on the legal correctness of its ruling on the legal question. The case comes within the rule that "the granting or refusal of a new trial on account of alleged errors of law occurring in the course of the trial is not a matter of discretion and is fully subject to review by the appellate court." 58 Am.Jur.2d New Trial § 212 at 433. As this court stated in Hart v. Stence, 219 Iowa 55, 59, 257 N.W. 434, 436, "We have also held that where the ruling upon a motion for a new trial presents a pure question of law, there is no room for the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court, and that the abuse of discretion lodged in the trial court, under such circumstances, will be reviewed by this court, and the ruling of the trial court reversed if found to be erroneous." Here the court erred as to a matter of law in considering an alleged error in an instruction not raised by exception, contrary to the express prescription of rule 196....

See Brown v. Lyon, 258 Iowa 1216, 1222, 142 N.W.2d 536, 539 (1966) (trial court does not have discretion to deny motion for new trial when misstatement of law appears in instructions); cf. Farley v. Glanton, 280 N.W.2d 411, 415 (Iowa 1979) ("When a trial court bases the exercise of its discretion upon an error of law, that conduct may amount to an abuse of discretion."); Schipper v. Brashear Truck Co., 132 S.W.2d 993, 1001 (Mo.1939) (trial court's grant of new trial on mistaken view of law in refusing requested instruction constituted abuse of discretion).

In the present case the trial court's granting of defendant's motion for a new trial was based exclusively upon its determination that the instructions given inadequately instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence and the quantum of evidence necessary for the State to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The reasons for the ruling were limited to the inadequacy of the subject matter contained in the instructions and were not grounded upon any sensory perceptions of the trial court. Thus, the trial court was not in a better position than an appellate court to determine the correctness of the instruction. The determination was based solely upon a question of law; therefore, we must determine whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury rather than determine whether the trial court abused its discretion.

The trial court is obligated to instruct fully on...