Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Flanagan
| Decision Date | 14 October 1942 |
| Docket Number | No. 9097.,9097. |
| Parties | HUMBLE OIL & REFINING CO. v. FLANAGAN et al. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, 126th District, Travis County; Roy C. Archer, Judge.
Proceeding between the Humble Oil & Refining Company and M. T. Flanagan and others involving the validity of an order of the Railroad Commission granting a permit to drill an oil well as an exception to spacing Rule 37. From a judgment upholding the permit, Humble Oil & Refining Company appeals.
Permit canceled and production enjoined.
Rex G. Baker, of Houston, and J. A. Rauhut and Powell, Rauhut & Gideon, all of Austin, for appellant.
Gerald C. Mann, Atty. Gen., and James L. Noel, Tom D. Rowell, Jr., Ed Roy Simmons, Fagan Dickson, and James D. Smullen, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee Railroad Commission of Texas.
Wheeler & Wheeler, of Austin, for appellee M. T. Flanagan.
Rule 37 case. The appeal is from a final judgment upholding a permit to drill a well upon a .42-acre tract voluntarily segregated by lease of a 57.35-acre tract out of a 57.77-acre tract in the East Texas Oil Field. The well had been drilled under a prior permit which was cancelled by district court decree affirmed by this court in Railroad Comm. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., Tex.Civ.App., 123 S.W.2d 423, (error dismissed, correct judgment), temporary injunction against production having been previously granted by this court in Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Railroad Comm., Tex.Civ.App., 99 S.W.2d 1052, error refused.
The present permit was granted to prevent confiscation, and the question of waste is not in issue. See Railroad Comm. v. Shell Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 165 S.W. 2d 503, for authorities on this point.
At the outset the question is presented whether the prior judgment is res judicata of the right to the permit, absent a showing of changed conditions occurring between the dates of the two permits, which would warrant granting the second permit. The former suit was tried after the Century decision (Railroad Comm. v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 130 Tex. 484, 109 S.W. 2d 967) and prior to the Atlantic decision (Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., 134 Tex. 59, 131 S.W.2d 73) upon the theory that the right attaching to the entire 57.77 a. tract for an additional well was involved, although the permit was applied for and granted to protect only the .42 a. tract. The respective contentions in this regard are:
Of appellant: That the former judgment is res judicata of the rights of the parties as of the date of the first permit, because the suit was tried, judgment rendered and upheld upon the theory that the rights of the entire 57.77 a. tract were involved, and the appeal was expressly decided upon that issue and upon the holding that the 57.77 a. tract was as a matter of law not entitled to an additional protective well. The Century decision was cited as the basis of this holding.
Of appellees: That the former judgment is not res judicata of rights as of the date of the first permit, for the reason that the 57.77 a. tract was not involved in that permit order (Railroad Comm. v. Shell Oil Co., above), and rights predicated upon that tract could not be adjudicated in that case. See Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Potter, Tex.Civ.App., 143 S.W.2d 135, and Railroad Comm. v. Miller, Tex.Civ.App., 165 S.W.2d 504.
After careful consideration of the statement of facts we have reached the conclusion that the permit cannot be supported as an exception to Rule 37 to protect the vested rights of the 57.77 a. tract, as they existed at the permit order date; and this independently of the prior decision. We, therefore, find it unnecessary to decide the issue of res judicata.
We refer to our former opinion (123 S. W.2d 423) for a full statement of the evidence showing the conditions with reference to the 57.77 a. tract at the time of the first permit order. The only change in conditions occurring subsequently to that order which has any bearing upon the issue of confiscation, consisted in the drilling of additional wells on the 57.77 a. tract and on tracts in the eight times circular and rectangular surrounding areas. The respective densities and daily per acre allowables at the time of the instant permit order were:
Daily
Allowable
Average Per Acre
Density (bbls)
Circular eight times area around
Johnston 57.77 acres............ 5.64 3.573
Rectangular eight times area
around Johnston 57.77 acres..... 5.64 3.575
Average of all leases adjoining...To continue reading
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Byrd v. Shell Oil Co., 11392.
...797, and the companion case in 170 S.W.2d 506. In the following cases writs were refused for want of merit: Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Flanagan, Tex.Civ. App., 165 S.W.2d 508; Marine Production Co. v. Shell Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 165 S.W. 2d 934, where the same condition existed throughou......
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