Hummel v. Marten Transport

• Decision Date: 22 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 17496.,No. 17494.,17494.,17496.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Debra HUMMEL v. MARTEN TRANSPORT, LTD., et al.

923 A.2d 657

282 Conn. 477

Debra HUMMEL v. MARTEN TRANSPORT, LTD., et al.

No. 17494.

No. 17496.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 12, 2006.

Decided May 22, 2007.

Albert E. Desrosiers, Stratford, with whom, on the brief, was Michael Feola, Bridgeport, for the appellant in the first case, appellee in the second case (plaintiff).

William F. Gallagher, with whom were Erica W. Todd, and, on the brief, Joseph F. Trotta, New Haven, and Hugh D. Hughes, for the appellees in the first case, appellants in the second case (defendants).

Andrew M. Dewey, Rocky Hill, filed a brief for the Connecticut Defense Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

James Moran and Robert F. Carter, Woodbridge, filed a brief for the Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association and the Workers' Compensation Section of the Connecticut Bar Association as amici curiae.

BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and BISHOP, Js.¹

PALMER, J.

This certified appeal raises two principal issues: (1) whether, under the plain meaning rule of recently enacted General Statutes § 1-2z,² we are obliged to overrule our precedent importing a final judgment requirement into General Statutes § 31-301b,³ which governs appeals from the compensation review board (board) to the Appellate Court, because § 31-301b does not refer to such a requirement; and (2) if not, whether we nevertheless should reconsider and abandon our long-standing interpretation of § 31-301b as containing a final judgment requirement. The plaintiff, Debra Hummel, sought survivor's benefits pursuant to General Statutes § 31-306 following the death of her husband, Henry Hummel, an employee of the named defendant, Marten Transport, Ltd. (Marten). The workers' compensation commissioner for the fifth district (commissioner) found that the plaintiff was entitled to survivor's benefits but did not determine the amount of benefits to which she was entitled. Marten and its insurer, the defendant Crawford and Company,⁴ appealed from the decision of the commissioner to the board, which affirmed the commissioner's finding of compensability. The defendants appealed from the board's decision to the Appellate Court, which dismissed the appeal on the ground that the decision of the board was not a final judgment because the board had not determined the amount of benefits to be paid. Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., 90 Conn.App. 9, 14, 15, 875 A.2d 575 (2005). We granted the parties' petitions for certification to appeal,⁵ limited to the issue of whether the Appellate Court properly had dismissed the defendants' appeal. Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., 275 Conn. 913, 882 A.2d 671 (2005). On appeal to this court, the parties claim that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the decision of the board is not an appealable final judgment for purposes of § 31-301b. The parties also claim that, if the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the decision of the board is not a final judgment, the legislature effectively has overruled our precedent incorporating a final judgment requirement into § 31-301b by virtue of its enactment of § 1-2z because the plain language of § 31-301b does not contain such a requirement. The parties further contend that, even if the legislature has not overruled our precedent importing a final judgment requirement into § 31-301b, we should do so because there is no indication that the legislature intended to impose that jurisdictional requirement on workers' compensation appeals. We reject the parties' claims and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The following facts and procedural history are set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court. "The commissioner found the following facts [in connection with the plaintiff's claim for survivor's benefits]. The plaintiff's husband, Henry Hummel, was a cross-country driver of an eighteen wheel tractor trailer for Marten. He was found dead in the sleeper cab of his truck on November 25, 1997. He had returned home from a cross-country trip early in the afternoon of November 24, 1997, looking dirty, tired and agitated. He had a heated dispute with a Marten official over the telephone about whether he was entitled to be paid following an apparent problem with the paperwork that he had submitted earlier. [According to the plaintiff] she had known her late husband for more than thirty years and had never seen him in such an agitated state. She feared he would have a heart attack. Following a shower and some rest, he left home between 10 p.m. and 11 p.m. He parked near his drop off point in Waterbury so that he could sleep and then drop off his load early the next morning. He died in the sleeper cab before morning.

"The commissioner also found that Marten had urged Henry Hummel to drive as much as possible. [Henry Hummel] falsified his log books to hide from the transportation authorities the number of hours he drove. On the three week trip completed shortly before his death, he had driven an average of 569 miles per day, and it was not unusual for him to drive 5000 miles in a week. He slept only two or three hours a day and never exercised. He did not eat a proper diet, nor did he eat on a regular schedule. He was a lifelong smoker and sometimes used cigars to wake himself up by burning his fingers when he fell asleep while driving. He was sixty-four years old at the time of his death.

"The commissioner concluded that `[t]he stress of [Henry Hummel's] job and its limitations on his time for other activities [were] . . . substantial factor[s] in the chain of events which led to [his] fatal ischemic heart disease.' The commissioner accordingly ordered the payment of benefits pursuant to . . . § 31-306, which provides for the manner in which benefits are paid to dependents following death resulting from an accident or occupational disease. The commissioner did not determine the amount of benefits to be paid.

"The defendants appealed to the board, claiming that the plaintiff [had] failed to prove within a reasonable degree of medical probability that [Henry Hummel's] employment was a substantial factor in the cause of his death. The board reviewed all of the testimony, including that of two medical experts, and concluded that an adequate evidentiary basis existed for the commissioner's finding of compensability. The board did not issue a remand order from its decision despite the [commissioner's] failure to determine the amount of the award. Thereafter, the defendants appealed to [the Appellate Court], raising the same sufficiency of the evidence claim." Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., supra, 90 Conn.App. at 10-12, 875 A.2d 575.

Following the defendants' appeal to the Appellate Court, it came to the attention of that court that, after the board upheld the commissioner's finding of compensability and did not issue a remand order to determine the specific amount of benefits, "the plaintiff ... brought [a] separate proceeding [before the commissioner] to determine, among other things, the amount of benefits to be paid. In addition to the calculation of [survivor's] benefits, the plaintiff sought an order pursuant to General Statutes § 31-301(f)⁶ that the defendants pay her benefits [during the pendency of] this appeal and sought the imposition of penalties under General Statutes §§ 31-300 and 31-303. The commissioner entered the § 31-301(f) order and held open the issue of penalties. The defendants responded by raising the issue of whether, under General Statutes [Rev. to 1997] § 31-307(e),⁷ any benefits to which the plaintiff was entitled would be offset by social security old age insurance benefits that the defendants claim the plaintiff receives. After the commissioner issued his decision, the board heard another appeal on the issues related to the award, penalties and offsets, and issued a remand order for a final calculation of benefits." Id., at 12-13, 875 A.2d 575.

In light of the separate benefits proceeding, which was ongoing, the Appellate Court, sua sponte, raised the issue of whether the defendants had appealed from a final judgment. Thereafter, both the plaintiff and the defendants appeared before the Appellate Court for oral argument on the defendants' appeal and argued that the board's decision from which the defendants were appealing was an appealable final judgment under this court's decision in Hunt v. Naugatuck, 273 Conn. 97, 868 A.2d 54 (2005).⁸ The Appellate Court disagreed and, accordingly, dismissed the defendants' appeal.⁹ Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., supra, 90 Conn.App. at 14, 15, 875 A.2d 575.

We granted the parties' petitions for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment?" Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., supra, 275 Conn. at 913, 882 A.2d 671. The case originally was argued before a panel of five justices. At that time, both the plaintiff and the defendants maintained that the Appellate Court incorrectly had concluded that the decision of the board does not constitute a final judgment. Thereafter, this court, sua sponte, ordered that the case be considered en banc. In addition, we ordered the parties, and invited the amici curiae,¹⁰ to file supplemental briefs on the issue of whether we should overrule our holding in Hall v. Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 241 Conn. 282, 297-98, 695 A.2d 1051 (1997), in which we reaffirmed our prior case law importing a final judgment requirement into § 31-301b. In particular, we sought the views of the parties and amici as to whether the plain meaning rule embodied in § 1-2z requires us to overrule our case law interpreting § 31-301b as containing a final judgment requirement. We now reject the parties' claim that the board's decision is an appealable final judgment. We also reject the parties' contention that § 1-2z overrules our prior precedent construing § 31-301b to require a final judgment. Finally, we decline the parties' invitation...