Humphrey v. Riley

• Decision Date: 10 September 2012
• Docket Number: S12X0945.,Nos. S12A0910,s. S12A0910
• Citation: 291 Ga. 534,12 FCDR 2753,731 S.E.2d 740
• Parties: HUMPHREY, Warden v. RILEY, Riley, v. Humphrey, Warden.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

291 Ga. 534

731 S.E.2d 740

12 FCDR 2753

HUMPHREY, Warden

v.RILEY,

Riley,

v.Humphrey, Warden.

Nos. S12A0910, S12X0945.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Sept. 10, 2012.

Michael Lawrence Brown, Alston & Bird, Mary Elizabeth Wells, Law Office of M.E. Wells, Atlanta, for appellant in No. S12X0945.

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Richard Tangum, Asst. Atty. Gen., Mary Beth Westmoreland, Deputy Atty. Gen., Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, Layla Hinton Zon, Dist. Atty., Office of the District Attorney, Covington, for appellee in No. S12X0945.

Richard Tangum, Asst. Atty. Gen., Mary Beth Westmoreland, Deputy Atty. Gen., Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, Layla Hinton Zon, Dist. Atty., Office of the District Attorney, Covington, for appellant in No. S12A0910.

Michael Lawrence Brown, Andrew Jacob Tuck, Alston & Bird LLP, Mary Elizabeth Wells, Law Office of M.E. Wells, Atlanta, for appellee in No. S12A0910.

HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice.

A jury convicted William David Riley of murdering his three children and of first degree arson, and the jury imposed death sentences for the murders. This Court unanimously affirmed Riley's convictions and sentences in 2004. See Riley v. State, 278 Ga. 677, 604 S.E.2d 488 (2004). Riley filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on September 8, 2005, and he amended his petition on July 31, 2007. The habeas court held an evidentiary hearing on March 24–27, 2008. The habeas court granted Riley's petition in an order filed on January 20, 2012, vacating both Riley's convictions and his sentences. The Warden has appealed in case number S12A0910, and Riley has cross-appealed in case number S12X0945. We reverse the habeas court's decision to vacate Riley's convictions and sentences in the Warden's appeal, we affirm the habeas court's denial of relief on the grounds addressed in Riley's cross-appeal, and we remand for the consideration of Riley's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim.

I. Factual Background

The evidence at trial showed the following facts. On August 16, 2000, there was a fire at the mobile home rented by Riley, who lived with the following: his girlfriend, Jaquelyn Hampton; his three children, Ashley, William, and Samantha; and a friend who slept on the couch, Wayne Atnip. All of the adults escaped the fire, although no one but Riley was fully clothed. All three children died in their bedroom. Firefighters and neighbors testified that Riley seemed unemotional, that he did not make efforts to save his children other than banging on the side of the home a few times and perhaps breaking the children's window, that he was wearing a full set of clothes and boots, that he had some soot on his face and in his nasal passages and had some singed hairs in his nasal passages, but that he had no burns on his body and had no singed hairs on his arms.¹

Riley's former girlfriend testified that he had used derogatory names for the children, had forced the children to stay in their rooms “at all times when he was at home,” and had threatened that he would kill the children before he would allow the Department of Family and Children Services to take them. Other testimony showed that Riley was having financial problems, that he was two days away from being evicted, and that he had stated previously that he would burn his home before he would allow himself to be evicted. His wife testified that he asked her about a week before the fire if she would take the children but that she told him that she was not financially able to do so and did not have room for them. Three days before the fire, neighbors heard Riley say that he wished that his girlfriend and children were dead. Just hours before the fire, neighbors heard a loud, protracted argument between Riley and his girlfriend.

After the fire, Riley suggested at the scene of the murders that the fire might have been caused by an electrical short. He stated that he had attempted to reach into the small room where the children and fire were located but that he could not stand the intense heat. An arson investigator testified that he found no problems with the electrical system, appliances, furnace, or water heater during his inspection after the fire. A “certified chief electrical inspector,” who had inspected the home in May of 2000, testified that he had found no electrical problems at that time.² Riley's landlord and the man in charge of maintenance at the mobile home park both testified that Riley had not made any complaints about the electrical system in his home. A lighter was found on the ground eight feet away from the home.

In a second interview after the fire, Riley began to change his story: he now claimed that he had intentionally set fire to the corner of his son's bed as his children slept; claimed that he set the fire only to scare his girlfriend; and claimed that, by the time he returned to the children's small bedroom, the fire had grown out of control and he was unable to reach in to save them. A fellow inmate testified that Riley had admitted that he started the fire while his children lay in their bed and that Riley had stated that he was planning to “pretend that he was out of it” when the fire began and to claim that the fire was caused by “faulty wiring.”

II. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Claims

To prevail on his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, Riley must show that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally deficient performance and that actual prejudice of constitutional proportions resulted. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687(III), 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782, 783–784(1), 325 S.E.2d 362 (1985). To show sufficient prejudice, Riley must show that “there is a reasonable probability (i.e., a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome) that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different [Cit.].” Smith, 253 Ga. at 783(1), 325 S.E.2d 362. We accept the habeas court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we apply the facts to the law de novo. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052;Head v. Carr, 273 Ga. 613, 616(4), 544 S.E.2d 409 (2001). We conclude that the habeas court erred by concluding that there is a reasonable probability that Riley's trial counsel's deficiencies changed the outcome of his trial and, therefore, erred by granting relief based on Riley's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. See Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 811–812 n. 1, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007) (holding that the combined effect of trial counsel's deficiencies should be considered); Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440–441(3), 435 S.E.2d 600 (1993) (noting that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim can be resolved based solely on a lack of prejudice without addressing the separate question of whether trial counsel actually performed deficiently).

A. Failure to Provide Timely Discovery

The trial court found that trial counsel had failed to comply with pre-trial discovery requirements and, therefore, excluded testimony from Dr. James Stark, a psychologist, regarding whether Riley's lack of emotion at the scene of the murders was due to a personality disorder.³ We held on direct appeal that any error in excluding this testimony was “harmless in light of all the other evidence.” Riley, 278 Ga. at 683(4), 604 S.E.2d 488. We now also hold that any deficient performance by trial counsel in failing to disclose this testimony pre-trial was not significantly prejudicial when considered in the context of Riley's overall ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which we analyze as a unified claim below in Division II(K). See Holsey, 281 Ga. at 811–812 n. 1, 642 S.E.2d 56.

B. Arson Expert

The record shows that trial counsel consulted with two arson experts. One of those experts, John Lentini, visited the scene of the murders and inspected the remains of the home, specifically including the circuit breaker. Lentini gave an unfavorable opinion regarding Riley's guilt based on his inability to determine that the fire was caused accidentally and based on Riley's inculpatory statements. Trial counsel also consulted with a second expert, William Dodd. Riley claims that his trial counsel performed deficiently by retaining Dodd, because Dodd had informed trial counsel that he did not wish to testify at Riley's trial in light of his involvement in another case and his worry that his testimony in Riley's case would be exploited by the State in that other case.

In his habeas testimony, Dodd testified that his investigation into Riley's case was limited to reviewing the reports, photographs, and testimony of the State's expert. He testified that a photograph showed that “most of” the circuit breakers in Riley's home were in the tripped position after the fire, and he generally asserted that the fire damage was inconsistent with Riley's having set the fire at the corner of his children's bed, as Riley had claimed during his interrogation. The record shows that trial counsel consulted with Dodd and used his opinions at trial to cross-examine the State's expert, who was emphatic that he had inspected the home's electrical system and had found no evidence of short circuiting or any tripped circuit breakers during his in-person examination of the scene. The State's expert also offered at trial to provide a further explanation regarding the circuit breakers, but defense counsel changed the subject, and the State never followed up on the matter on redirect examination of the witness.

Riley has not undermined the conclusion that the jury almost certainly made at trial and that it very likely would still have made if Dodd had testified as he did in the habeas court, which is that the expert who personally inspected the circuit breakers and found that none was in the tripped position was in the best position to give an opinion on the relevance of...