Lajara v. State
| Decision Date | 18 October 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. S93A0652,S93A0652 |
| Citation | 263 Ga. 438,435 S.E.2d 600 |
| Parties | LAJARA v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Garland B. Cook, Jr., Decatur, for Lajara.
Michael H. Crawford, Dist. Atty., Clarkesville, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Matthew P. Stone, Staff Atty., Dept. of Law, Atlanta, for State.
Luis Anado Lajara was convicted of felony murder in the death of David Alley and sentenced to life imprisonment. 1 He appeals and we affirm.
(1) The facts when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution are sufficient to prove that Lajara became involved in an altercation with the victim outside a bar and fatally stabbed the victim in the abdomen during the course of that altercation. After reviewing the record, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found Lajara guilty of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
(2) Lajara claims that he was prejudiced by the court's charge concerning the method the jury should follow in considering the offenses of felony murder and voluntary manslaughter. Lajara maintains that the court's charge was sequential in that it required the jury to first acquit him of felony murder before it could consider the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter.
In Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865, 414 S.E.2d 463 (1992) we adopted a modified version of the merger rule to ensure that persons would not be convicted of felony murder in cases where the facts otherwise warrant a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. To ensure that juries consider the offense of voluntary manslaughter during their deliberations, we expressly disapproved of sequential charges in the felony murder, voluntary manslaughter context. Sequential charges concerning these two offenses allow the jury to stop deliberation once they have reached a guilty verdict on the felony murder charge without first considering the mitigating factors of provocation and passion which are present in cases of voluntary manslaughter. See Head v. State, 262 Ga. 795, 426 S.E.2d 547 (1993), Hunt, P.J., concurring. Having reviewed the charge, we conclude that the trial court did give a sequential charge as Lajara contends. 2
Our holding in Edge was designed to preclude juries from automatically finding defendants guilty of felony murder without any consideration of voluntary manslaughter. See Shaw v. State, 263 Ga. 88, 428 S.E.2d 566 (1993). Although the trial court did not follow Edge in giving its charge, the facts show that the jury did consider voluntary manslaughter. Specifically, the jury entered the words "not guilty" next to the offense of voluntary manslaughter on the verdict form they returned to the court. Moreover, during jury deliberations, the jury asked for and received a recharge from the court solely on the issue of voluntary manslaughter. We find that the jury's verdict form and request for a recharge on voluntary manslaughter prove that the jury did, in fact, consider the charge of voluntary manslaughter and that the purpose of Edge was achieved despite the sequential charge given by the court. This enumeration is therefore without merit. 3
(3) Lajara's co-defendant, Boterf, testified at the trial after a grant of testimonial immunity by the court. Lajara argues that his trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to request charges from the court concerning the meaning and effect of testimonial immunity.
In order to show ineffective assistance of counsel, Lajara must show that counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for the alleged ineffective act, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Jowers v. State, 260 Ga. 459, 396 S.E.2d 891 (1990). 4 "[B]oth the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698, 104 S.Ct. at 2069.
Although the Supreme Court in Strickland discussed the performance component prior to the prejudice component, it acknowledged that a court addressing the ineffective assistance issue is not required to approach the inquiry in that order or even...
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