Humphreys v. Allstate Ins. Co.

Citation627 S.W.2d 933
PartiesMarion J. HUMPHREYS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
Decision Date16 February 1982
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Francis I. Breazeale, Chattanooga, for defendant-appellant.

Charles C. Guinn, Jr., Athens, for plaintiff-appellee.

HARBISON, Chief Justice.

In this case the employer appeals from an award of worker's compensation benefits to an employee who had an admittedly serious compensable injury on July 25, 1977. Suit was not filed until March 11, 1980. The employer insists that the statute of limitations barred the claim. The Chancellor held that the statute had been waived by the employer and his insurance carrier. Substantial material evidence supports that conclusion, in which we concur, and we affirm the award made by the trial judge.

The award, however, does not appear to have included all of the medical expenses which the employee incurred as a result of his compensable injury. It is the duty of the courts to see that an employee receives all of the benefits to which he is entitled under the Worker's Compensation Act. See T.C.A. §§ 50-918, 1006. To this end, we remand the cause to the trial court to reconsider the issue of medical expenses and to allow the parties to present such additional evidence as may be necessary to reimburse the employee for all proper medical and other related expenses to which he is entitled under the statute.

Appellee and several other carpenters employed by a contractor, Danny Blevins, were injured when scaffolding on which they were working fell on July 25, 1977. Appellee sustained a skull fracture, several fractured ribs and numerous other serious injuries which have left him with a substantial permanent partial impairment, both physical and mental or psychological. The trial judge allowed forty percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, an award which was clearly justified under the evidence, both lay and medical.

The employee's injuries were such that his recuperation was slow, despite the fact that he returned to work on a limited basis during October 1977. The worker's compensation insurance carrier for the employer paid medical and hospital bills through November 14, 1978. Thereafter the insurer made no further payments, even of some bills which had been outstanding for a considerable period of time. This concerned both the employee and his employer Mr. Blevins. Mr. Blevins finally paid some of these bills himself in 1979, and two of them in January 1980, only a month before the suit was brought. He called upon the insurance carrier to reimburse him for these, but received no reply.

This, alone, probably was enough to toll the statute of limitations under T.C.A. § 50-1003, which expressly permits one year "from the time the employer shall cease making such payments...." The employer and the insurance carrier are, of course, treated as one for most purposes under the Worker's Compensation Act, unless otherwise expressly provided. T.C.A. § 50-902(a).

Wholly apart from this, however, it is undisputed that counsel for the insurance carrier on several occasions during 1978 and 1979 had telephone conversations with Mr. Blevins and with appellee, and he wrote letters to the employee, indicating that the insurance carrier would be willing to effect a settlement, or to negotiate toward a settlement, of his admittedly substantial claim, at any time. The employee, in his last conversation with counsel, on February 22, 1979, advised counsel that it might be at least another year before he was in position to settle. Seemingly no objection was made to that suggestion. 1 On that occasion counsel offered appellee Eight Thousand Dollars. He wrote a further letter in April 1979 stating that:

"... we look forward to hearing from you at anytime you feel comfortable in discussing settlement of your case."

Because the employee did not file suit or settle within one year from the date of the last payment by the insurance carrier, November 14, 1978, it is insisted that the statute of limitations has barred the claim. We do not think that this is a tenable position...

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2 cases
  • Blocker v. Regional Medical Center At Memphis
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • January 5, 1987
    ...Lusk v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., supra, at 919-920; Crowder v. Klopman Mills, supra, at 932-933; Humphreys v. Allstate Insurance Co., 627 S.W.2d 933, 934-935 (Tenn.1982); Hibner v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co., supra, at 110-111; Bellar v. Baptist Hospital, Inc., supra, at 789; Norton......
  • Merrimon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., No. M2003-01978-WC-R3-CV (Tenn. 5/24/2006), M2003-01978-WC-R3-CV.
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • May 24, 2006
    ...benefits. 2. The statute of limitations was not pleaded as an affirmative defense, and consequently is waived. Humphreys v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 627 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tenn. 1982). PER This case is before the Court upon the motion for review filed by Robert Merrimon pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann.......

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