Humphries v. Riveland

• Decision Date: 18 November 1965
• Docket Number: No. 37101,37101
• Citation: 407 P.2d 967,67 Wn.2d 376
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Beatrice HUMPHRIES, Appellant, v. Dale RIVELAND, James D. Humphries, as Administrators of the Estate of Edward J. Humphries, and the Estate of Edward J. Humphries, Respondents.

Page 376

67 Wn.2d 376

407 P.2d 967

Beatrice HUMPHRIES, Appellant, v. Dale RIVELAND, James D. Humphries, as Administrators of the Estate of Edward J. Humphries, and the Estate of Edward J. Humphries, Respondents.

No. 37101.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Nov. 18, 1965.

Rehearing Denied March 9, 1966.

Horace H. Davis and William R. Roetcisoender, Seattle, for appellant.

Terhune, Schlosstein, Riveland & Elliott, Dale Riveland, Seattle, for respondents.

DONWORTH, Judge.

Appellant filed a claim against the estate of Edward J. Humphries (who died April 9, 1962) for $30,000 or, in the alternative, for one half of the value of the real personal property in his estate. This claim was rejected by respondents, who are coadministrators of Mr. Humphries' estate, and she instituted this action against them in their representative capacities.

In her complaint, appellant alleged that she and the decedent had lived together for 13 years and that they had shared their earnings and resources, including their income and efforts, and had purchased property with their combined earnings, most of which was placed in the decedent's name. Respondents claimed that all of this property was a part of the estate, whereas appellant alleged that she owned a half interest therein.

Her claim (as alleged in her complaint) was based on an alleged contract alternatively stated as follows:

1. That the principal assets owned by the two parties was their house which was built with money and labor supplied from both Beatrice Humphries and from Edward J. Humphries. That the plaintiff, Beatrice Humphries, did a great deal of the work in building the house owned by the two parties. That the plaintiff and the deceased had always considered that each had a one-half interest in said property, even though they were not husband and wife.

or

2. That the administrators held in trust for appellant's benefit a one-half interest in the real property occupied by appellant and the decedent at the time of his death, known as number 13742--41st Avenue N.E. in Seattle (herein referred to as the home property); or

3. That the decedent and appellant were partners at the time of his death, and that the building constructed on the home property was a partnership project, and hence she is entitled to a one-half interest therein, or

4. That the decedent and appellant were joint adventurers, and hence she is entitled to one half of the home property which was created by the joint adventure.

At the time appellant began this action (which was seven months after the decedent's death) she was still in possession of the home property and had refused to vacate the premises.

Accordingly, respondents in their answer, besides denying the material allegations of the complaint sought to obtain exclusive possession thereof.

Briefly stated, the testimony at the trial concerning the background of the relationship between appellant and the decedent is as follows:

The decedent was married to Susan Humphries in 1926. He and his wife lived together until May, 1945, when they separated. They had six children.

In July, 1947, his wife started an action for divorce on the ground of physical cruelty and personal indignities. A default interlocutory decree was granted to her in October, 1947, by which she was given the custody of three of their minor children and he was awarded custody of two minor sons. The decedent was ordered to pay his wife $25 per month for each child in her custody and $50 per month for her own support. She was given one parcel of real estate and he was awarded two other parcels. This decree became absolute August 11, 1949, and thereupon the decedent became free to marry.

Shortly prior to this time, the decedent and appellant (who was then about 45 years of age) commenced living together as husband and wife, and so represented themselves to others. In fact, several of their neighbors and friends testified that they were very surprised to learn after decedent's death, on April 9, 1962, that these parties were not married.

Several years after the decedent and appellant commenced living together, he entered into an agreement with a contractor to construct the house on the home property. He paid the contractor $16,500 in cash at that time (which the contractor thought was in 1953). The contractor used this money to purchase in his own name the lots on which the house was built and to start the construction. After the house was partially constructed, work was suspended for about a year. Appellant and the decedent moved into the house in 1954 after the first phase of the work was done.

The contractor and his wife, on March 23, 1955, conveyed the property to the decedent by deed, in which he was named as the sole grantee. This was done after a conference with appellant, the decedent, and the grantors was held as to how the transaction was to be consummated. Construction work was resumed at this time and the house was completed in December, 1955. The property was appraised as of the date of the decedent's death in 1962 at $42,000.

There was other testimony relating to the decedent's financial status and earning capacity, which will be referred to later.

Appellant's claim to a half interest in the home property appears to be based on her allegation that she and the decedent 'had always considered that each had a half interest in said property,' and on the very substantial work which she had performed in assisting him in improving the house and yard, such as painting and papering, and in doing a 'man's work' in building a bulkhead and rockery and planting shrubbery and similar work.

Under the decisions of this court in similar cases, the trial court must, before considering the nature and amount of services allegedly rendered to the decedent by the claimant, decide whether a contract existed, and, if so, what the provisions of the contract were.

In Blodgett v. Lowe, 24 Wash.2d 931, 167 P.2d 997 (1946), the plaintiff had lived in decedent's home for 23 years and had cooked, washed, ironed, had taken care of the lawn and driven her car for her and had performed other similar services at her request. Several witnesses testified as to statements made to them by decedent to the effect that she was going to leave all her money to the plaintiff and other similar statements. After reviewing several of our prior decisions on the subject, this court said:

In order to establish a contract such as here alleged to have been made, it is necessary that the person asserting it show by evidence that is conclusive, definite, certain and beyond legitimate controversy (1) that a contract as alleged was entered into between the deceased and the person asserting the contract; (2) that the services contemplated as consideration for such agreement have been actually performed; and (3) that such services were performed in reliance upon the agreement. See Dau Pence, supra (16 Wash.2d 368, 133 P.2d 523 (1943)).

We are of the opinion that proof should be made in the order above indicated. There are many reasons why the terms and conditions of an alleged contract should be established before evidence of services claimed to have been performed pursuant to the terms of the alleged contract is admissible.

We are unable to see how a trial court could pass upon whether or not certain acts of one asserting such a contract were relevant or material, unless and until it was shown by competent evidence that there was such a contract, and the terms and conditions of such contract disclosed.

We are of the opinion the instant case is typical of the situation last above referred to. While we are of the opinion the services performed by appellant in and around the home of Mrs. Buroker might have afforded ample consideration for an agreement, how was it possible for the trial court to say that the services performed by appellant were the services contemplated by the agreement until an agreement was shown to have been made?

We are clearly of the opinion that the evidence in this case wholly fails to show that deceased ever made or entered into a contract with appellant, such as alleged. This being true, it follows that the evidence wholly fails to show that the services performed by appellant were so performed in reliance upon the alleged contract.

All the testimony of the several witnesses who testified in this case shows is that Mrs. Buroker indicated that she intended to make some provision for appellant upon her death, because he had been good to her, but no witness testified that deceased made any statement directly or to the effect that any provision to be made by her for appellant was based upon any agreement, or the terms of any agreement, or specifically because appellant was to take care of her for the balance of her life.

Appellant failed to prove the existence of any contract with the decedent (written or oral) as required by the rule quoted in the Blodgett case.

In her complaint, appellant sought to establish an undivided half interest in the home property on one of four alternate theories, as above stated. Each basis for recovery necessarily rests upon proof of the existence of a contract between her and the decedent prior to his death. As the trial court in effect found, no contract of any kind was proved to exist between them with reference to the home property. Therefore, since (as stated below) we have accepted the findings of fact in the present case as verities, under the Blodgett case, we have no occasion to pass upon the factual questions of whether the services allegedly rendered by appellant were actually performed, and, if so, whether they were performed in reliance upon the alleged contract.

While the present case does not specifically involve an alleged promise by the decedent to devise any interest in the home property to appellant in consideration of her labors in connection with the construction of the house and landscaping of the yard, our en banc ...