In re Marriage of Pennington

• Decision Date: 21 December 2000
• Docket Number: No. 67900-2.,67900-2.
• Citation: 14 P.3d 764,142 Wash.2d 592
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: In re the MARRIAGE OF Sammi PENNINGTON, a/k/a Evelyn Lorraine Van Pevenage, Petitioner, and Clark Melvyn Pennington, Respondent. In re the Meretricious Relationship of Diana J. Chesterfield, Respondent, and James E. Nash, Petitioner.

14 P.3d 764

142 Wash.2d 592

In re the MARRIAGE OF Sammi PENNINGTON, a/k/a Evelyn Lorraine Van Pevenage, Petitioner, and

Clark Melvyn Pennington, Respondent.

In re the Meretricious Relationship of Diana J. Chesterfield, Respondent, and

James E. Nash, Petitioner.

No. 67900-2.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued February 15, 2000.

Decided December 21, 2000.

Edwards, Sieh, Smith & Goodfriend, Catherine Wright Smith, Seattle, Charles Wiggins, Kenneth Masters, Bainbridge Island, Troup, Christnacht, Michael Joseph McKasy, Tacoma, for Petitioners.

Smith, Alling, Lane, Edward Marshall Lane, Tacoma, Mary Louise Gaudio, Daniel Leward Modeen, Bellevue, for Respondents.

JOHNSON, J.

In these consolidated cases, we must determine whether the legal requirements to establish a meretricious relationship were satisfied so as to allow for equitable relief under our holdings in Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash.2d 339, 898 P.2d 831 (1995) and In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wash.2d 299, 678 P.2d 328 (1984). We hold the facts of these cases do not support concluding the existence of stable, cohabiting relationships for either of the parties. Furthermore, we hold neither party made a sufficient showing to justify recovery under other equitable theories. We affirm the Court of Appeals in Pennington v. Pennington, 93 Wash.App. 913, 971 P.2d 98 (1999), reverse the Court of Appeals in Chesterfield v. Nash, 96 Wash. App. 103, 978 P.2d 551 (1999), and remand both cases to the trial courts.¹

FACTS

Pennington v. Pennington

Respondent Clark Pennington met petitioner Evelyn Van Pevenage (aka Sammi Pennington)² in March 1983. At this time, both Pennington and Van Pevenage were married to other people. Van Pevenage's divorce was finalized in December 1983. Pennington separated from his wife in October 1983, but remained married until 1990. Pennington and Van Pevenage began dating each other and, in August 1985, moved in together at Pennington's residence in Kapowsin, Washington. The parties also commenced a sexual relationship.

The Kapowsin residence was an airplane hangar with an unfinished apartment upstairs. Clark Pennington and his wife, Jane Pennington, paid the utilities and mortgage payments. Van Pevenage paid for groceries as well as some home furnishings; her income derived from her work as a bartender and lounge manager at various restaurants. Pennington's income derived from his proprietorship of Exacto, Inc., a corporation manufacturing aircraft and machine parts.

Van Pevenage testified at trial that towards the end of 1986 Pennington proposed marriage to her and gave her an engagement ring. Pennington denied ever proposing marriage and characterized the gift as a "cocktail ring."

In 1987, Pennington purchased a lot in Yelm, Washington. He did so by assuming the underlying real estate contract on the land and agreeing to make cash payments of $700 per month. Pennington made the contract payments from his wages and from rent paid to him by Exacto, Inc. The deed to the property conveyed the land to "Clark M. Pennington, a married man dealing with his separate estate." Ex. 41. Pennington's wife, Jane Pennington, quitclaimed her interest in the Yelm property to him in 1988. Pennington then took out a loan solely in his name to pay off the real estate contract and finance construction of a hangar and a new home on the property. Van Pevenage testified she participated in the interior design of the home, although the housing contractor testified he did not take instructions from her. Pennington and Van Pevenage moved into the Yelm home in December 1988. The home loan payments were made from Pennington's Exacto, Inc. wages and from the sale of the Kapowsin residence.

During the course of their relationship, Pennington provided vehicles for Van Pevenage to drive and placed her on his automobile insurance policy.³ He also named Van Pevenage as the beneficiary of a $50,000 life insurance policy. Van Pevenage acquired credit cards in the name of "Sammi Pennington," and registered Clark and herself in the Yelm telephone book as "Pennington Clark & Sammi." Pennington and Van Pevenage also held joint checking accounts. Pennington denied authorizing Van Pevenage to use his last name for either the telephone book or the credit cards, and testified he had no knowledge she had done so until after the relationship terminated.

Van Pevenage lived with Pennington in the Yelm home continuously until 1991. In April 1991, she moved into an apartment, but returned to the Yelm residence shortly thereafter.⁴ Several months later, Pennington suffered a stroke and was hospitalized. Van Pevenage temporarily quit her job to help Pennington around the house, but Pennington returned to work only one week after his release from the hospital. After the stroke, Exacto, Inc. provided Van Pevenage with medical insurance coverage and paid her a salary of approximately $1,000 per month, although Van Pevenage did not have an "active role" in the corporation's business. The salary continued intermittently until 1996. After his stroke, Pennington also gave Van Pevenage signing privileges on the corporate account.

Van Pevenage moved out of the Yelm residence from March 1993 until October 1994. In May 1994, Van Pevenage commenced a sexual relationship with another man, whom she resided with in September of that year. Pennington dated another woman during this time period. Van Pevenage eventually returned to the Yelm residence for one more year, before leaving again in October 1995. Her relationship with Pennington was not sexual during this last year.

In 1996, Van Pevenage filed a complaint in superior court for dissolution of a meretricious relationship between Pennington and herself. The trial court concluded such a relationship did exist, determined that certain property acquired during the relationship should be treated as community property for the purpose of making a just and equitable division of such property, and awarded Van Pevenage a total judgment of $214,200, less amounts already received. Pennington appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. Pennington, 93 Wash.App. 913,971 P.2d 98. The Court of Appeals held no meretricious relationship existed between Pennington and Van Pevenage, primarily because "during most of the period that the trial court terms `meretricious,' the parties were not free to marry legally, did not intend to marry, or punctuated their living together with a third party relationship." Pennington, 93 Wash.App. at 919,971 P.2d 98. Van Pevenage filed a petition for review with this court, which we granted.

Chesterfield v. Nash

Petitioner James Nash and respondent Diana Chesterfield began a casual dating relationship in August 1986. A few months later the relationship became sexually intimate. Chesterfield worked as a salesperson at Nordstrom, and Nash operated a dental practice he had purchased in 1985. Chesterfield was married, although separated, at the time she began dating Nash. Chesterfield filed for divorce in November 1987. The parties dated from 1986 until 1989, although Nash dated other women during this time period. In July 1989, Nash and Chesterfield moved into a home purchased the previous year by Chesterfield.

While living together, Nash and Chesterfield opened a joint checking account to which they both contributed funds. The account was opened for the purpose of funding living expenses; it was used to pay the mortgage and taxes on the house, as well as groceries, utility bills, and other miscellaneous matters. Contributions to the account were initially equal, but over time Nash contributed more than Chesterfield.⁵ Nash testified he also paid nearly all expenses for their numerous vacations, and a disproportionate amount of their dining out expenses. Chesterfield had a profit sharing plan at Nordstrom, but refused to invest those funds in Nash's dental practice unless the two were married. Chesterfield also testified she would not invest in a house with Nash until they were married. Overall, Chesterfield's spending patterns did not change during the period of cohabitation, although she received promotions and pay increases at Nordstrom.

Nash and Chesterfield periodically assisted each other professionally. Nash aided Chesterfield with work-related travel logs and offered her the use of the computer at his dental practice. Chesterfield aided Nash as a temporary dental assistant, helped process accounts payable for several months, and performed word processing tasks. Nash offered to compensate Chesterfield for her help, but she refused.

Nash and Chesterfield ceased living together in October 1993. Chesterfield closed the joint account and made a mortgage payment with the remaining funds. In 1994, Nash and Chesterfield briefly reconciled and began dating again, although they did not resume living together. They discussed marriage and Nash purchased a diamond for Chesterfield, but in November 1995 they permanently ended their relationship.

Chesterfield filed a petition for disposition of property rights of a meretricious relationship in superior court. The trial court found Nash and Chesterfield had a meretricious relationship, certain property acquired during that relationship should be treated as community property for the purposes of making a just and equitable division of that property, and a 60/40 percent ratio in favor of Nash was the appropriate basis of division. The trial court entered a judgment of $75,594 plus costs, in favor of Chesterfield. Included in the court's valuation and division of property was a $40,000 increase in the goodwill of Nash's dental practice. Nash timely appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Chesterfield, 96 Wash. App. at 117,978 P.2d 551. The Court of Appeals concluded Nash and Chesterfield had a meretricious relationship primarily because they "lived together continuously in a stable, mutually-supportive relationship for longer than four years, functioning as...