Hunot v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 24 February 1976
• Citation: 55 Cal.App.3d 660,127 Cal.Rptr. 703
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Arthur L. HUNOT et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA, Respondent; FIRE FLYERS, INC., Real Party in Interest. Civ. 47768.

Page 703

127 Cal.Rptr. 703

55 Cal.App.3d 660

Arthur L. HUNOT et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA, Respondent FIRE FLYERS, INC., Real Party in Interest.

Civ. 47768.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

Feb. 24, 1976.

Rehearing Denied March 17, 1976.

Hearing Denied April 22, 1976.

Paul, Hastings & Janofsky and Thomas D. Phillips, Los Angeles, for petitioners.

No appearance for respondent.

Benton, Orr, Duval & Buckingham and Edwin Duval, Ventura, for real party in interest.

THE COURT: ^*

In this proceeding petitioners, Arthur L. Hunot, Frank Hamp, Avrom R. Handleman, Douglas Hamp, and Monsanto Company, seek a writ of prohibition to restrain respondent superior court from taking further proceedings in, or a writ of mandate to compel said court to dismiss, a pending action for lack of prosecution pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 583, subdivision (b), ¹ because it was not brought to trial within five years after plaintiff filed its action. We have concluded that the writ should issue.

Herein follows the chronology of pertinent procedural facts. On October 30, 1970, the real party in interest, Fire Flyers, Inc. (hereinafter plaintiff), filed a complaint against petitioners (hereinafter defendants) and Does one through five for treble damages for restraint of trade and unfair trade practices. On January 8, 1971, defendants Monsanto and Frank Hamp filed their answers. On January 12, 1971, defendants Hunot and Douglas Hamp filed their answers. On April 14, 1971, Monsanto and Frank Hamp filed a demand for security for costs pursuant to section 1030. On June 3, 1971, Monsanto and Frank Hamp filed a motion to dismiss the complaint due to plaintiff's failure to post security for costs, which was heard and denied on June 25, 1971. At this time the court 'suspended' the proceedings for ten days to permit an undertaking to be filed. An undertaking was filed on July 1, 1971. No formal notice of posting the undertaking was given to defendants other than the transmission of a copy of the letter of enclosure sent to the court. On July 5, 1972, defendant Handleman filed his answer. On August 28, 1975, four years and ten months from the filing of the complaint, plaintiff caused an at-issue memorandum to be filed. A pretrial conference was not requested; a trial setting conference was set for December 2, 1975. On November 6, 1975, defendants noticed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that it was not brought to trial within five years. (§ 583, subd. (b).) On November 10, 1975, plaintiff filed a memorandum of points and authorities and declaration in opposition to the motion to dismiss. Plaintiff also noticed a motion to advance or specially set the case for trial. Defendants' motion to dismiss and plaintiff's motion to advance or specially set the case for trial came on for hearing on November 14, 1975; respondent court took the matter under submission. On November 18, 1975, the court filed its order denying defendants' motion to dismiss and plaintiff's motion to advance or specially set the case for trial and ruled that the five-year period had been extended by at least 82 or perhaps 85 days. On December 8, 1975, defendants noticed a second motion to dismiss under section 583 together with a motion to reconsider the court's previous ruling. The motions came on for hearing on December 12, 1975; respondent court took the matter under submission. On December 16, 1975, the court denied defendants' motions. A settlement conference was held on December 18, 1975, and the action was set for trial on January 19, 1976.

Discussion

Since no direct appeal lies from the denial of a motion to dismiss, an appeal from the judgment after trial is an inadequate remedy when the motion is meritorious. 'Either a writ of mandate to compel dismissal or a writ of prohibition to restrain the trial is a proper remedy to enforce the trial court's duty to dismiss (an action) pursuant to section 583, subdivision (b). (Citations.)' (McDonough Power Equipment Co. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.3d 527, 530, 105 Cal.Rptr. 330, 332, 503 P.2d 1338, 1340.)

An action not brought to trial within five years after it was commenced is subject to mandatory dismissal under section 583, subdivision (b). Under subdivision (f), however, the time during which the jurisdiction of the court to try the action is suspended is not included in computing the five-year period. ² In the instant case the five years elapsed on October 31, 1975. We are, therefore, presented with the question whether the five-year period has been extended.

The purpose and interpretation of dismissal statutes such as section 583 were succinctly stated in Crown Coach Corp. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.3d 540, 546--548, 105 Cal.Rptr. 339, 503 P.2d 1347. Dismissal statutes both promote the trial of cases before evidence is lost, or deteriorates in some fashion, and protect defendants from being subjected to the indefinite pendency of unmeritorious actions. In support of these policies the mandatory five-year provision of section 583 requires dismissal upon the motion of a defendant, or by the court on its own motion, unless the action is brought to trial within five years after it has been filed except where the parties stipulate in writing that the time may be extended. Certain exceptions have been decisionally established where it would be impossible, impracticable or futile Due to causes beyond a party's control to bring an action to trial during the five-year period. Whether it is impossible, impracticable or futile to proceed to trial must be determined in light of the circumstances of each particular case. (McRoberts v. Gorham, 18 Cal.App.3d 1040, 1044, 96 Cal.Rptr. 427.) As conveniently cataloged in Crown Coach Corp., supra, '(a) broad range of factors has been recognized as giving rise to impossibility, impracticability or futility in proceeding to trial within the five-year period.' ³ (Crown Coach Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 547, 105 Cal.Rptr. at p. 343, 503 P.2d at p. 1351, fn. omitted.) The policies that are balanced in the rule and its exceptions are the salutary preference for disposing of litigation on the merits rather than on procedural grounds and the duty of the plaintiff to exercise diligence in proceeding to trial. "The net effect of the decisions appears to be that no implied exceptions will be created, and no excuses for noncompliance with C.C.P. 583 will be accepted, unless they may fairly be said to make a trial impracticable.' (Citation.) It is settled that the implied exceptions to the five-year period prescribed by section 583 do not contemplate 'that time consumed by the delay caused by ordinary incidents of proceedings like disposition of demurrer, amendment of pleadings and the normal time of waiting for a place on the court's calendar or securing a jury trial is to be excluded from a computation of the five year period. (Citation.)' (Citations.) '(T)he duty rests upon a plaintiff at every stage of the proceedings to use due diligence to expedite his case to a final determination.' (Citations.)' (Crown Coach Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 548, 105 Cal.Rptr. at p. 343, 503 P.2d at p. 1351.)

In the instant case petitioners contend that the five-year period was not tolled on April 14, 1971, when they, as defendants below, made a demand for security for costs under section 1030, ⁴ which demand was not complied with until July 1, 1971 and that, therefore, the period of time between April 14 and July 1 should be included in computing the five-year period.

Section 1030 protects California defendants against costs and charges that they may be awarded in suits by nonresident plaintiffs. (Becker v. Schmidlin, 153 Cal. 669, 671, 96 P. 280.) For the protection of defendants, once a proper demand is made, all proceedings in the action are stayed pending the filing of the undertaking. (Carter v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 752, 757--758, 169 P. 667.) The right of resident defendants to security for costs under section 1030 is a procedural and not a 'fundamental' right. (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280, 288, 109 P.2d 942; cf. Nail v. Osterholm, supra, 13 Cal.App.3d 682, 686--687, 91 Cal.Rptr. 908.) The trial court's jurisdiction over the subject matter or the cause is not affected by the stay. The court's power to act, however, is suspended: it cannot act without the occurrence of a certain procedural prerequisite--the filing of the undertaking. (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, supra, 17 Cal.2d at pp. 288--289, 109 P.2d 942; 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1970) Jurisdiction, § 193, pp. 725--726.) Upon plaintiff's compliance with section 1030 the stay of proceedings terminates. ⁵ Thus a defendant's exercise of its right under section 1030 effectively shifts to plaintiff the power to control the duration of the stay inasmuch as plaintiff and only plaintiff can perform the procedural prerequisite.

Section 1030, like section 583, which protects a defendant 'from being subjected to the annoyance of an unmeritorious action remaining undecided for an indefinite period of time' (Crown Coach Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 546, 105 Cal.Rptr. at p. 342, 503 P.2d at p. 1350), is procedural and not jurisdictional. (Cf. Nail v. Osterholm, supra, 13 Cal.App.3d 682, 686, 91 Cal.Rptr. 908.) Being procedural, section 1030 must be construed in such a way that defendants' exercise of its right thereunder does not necessarily entail the risk of forfeiting the protection of section 583. (Cf. Id.) Accordingly, we hold that the period of time during which proceedings are stayed subsequent to a demand for security for costs under section 1030 does not operate as a suspension of the court's jurisdiction within the meaning of section 583, subdivision (f), so as to toll the five-year statute. To hold that the five-year statute is...