Moore v. Powell
Decision Date | 09 June 1977 |
Citation | 138 Cal.Rptr. 914,70 Cal.App.3d 583 |
Parties | Richard S. MOORE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Donald F. POWELL et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 17242. |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Christian Brun Henrichasen, Thousand Oaks, for plaintiff and appellant.
Thompson & Colegate and Jim D. Bishop, Riverside, for defendants and respondents Barton C. Gaut, Donald F. Powell, Enos C. Reid, John D. Babbage and Horace O. Coil, individually and Reid, Babbage & Coil, a partnership.
Schell & Delamer and Douglas W. Richardson, Los Angeles, for defendants and respondents Ronald T. Deissler, Carl L. Elver and Deissler & Elver, a partnership.
In an action seeking damages for legal malpractice and conspiracy, plaintiff appeals from a judgment of dismissal. The court below ordered the dismissal after ruling that plaintiff had failed to bring the action to trial within five years, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 583, subdivision (b). 1 Plaintiff's contention is that the five-year period was tolled by a change of venue.
Plaintiff filed the action in Ventura County Superior Court in July 1971. None of the defendants were served until February 1973. 2 In February and March of 1973 all defendants moved for change of venue to Riverside County, alleging that all defendants resided in Riverside County and all events pertinent to the action had occurred there. The motion was granted on March 30, 1973. The transfer of the action to Riverside County was not completed until December 1973, however, because the transfer fees were not paid until that date. The transfer fees were paid by plaintiff.
The motion to dismiss the action for failure to bring it to trial within five years was heard and granted in August 1976.
As stated above, the action was filed in July 1971 and dismissed in August 1976. Thus more than five years had elapsed and the dismissal was proper unless the period was tolled for some reason. Plaintiff contends the period was tolled by virtue of subdivision (f) of section 583 which provides: '(f) The time during which the defendant was not amenable to the process of the court and the time during which the jurisdiction of the court to try the action is suspended shall not be included in computing the time period specified in any subdivision of this section.'
The filing of a motion for change of venue operates as a supersedeas or stay of proceedings, and must be disposed of before any other steps can be taken. 3 (Pickwick Stages System v. Superior Court, 138 Cal.App. 448, 449, 32 P.2d 433; cf., Gutierrez v. Superior Court, 243 Cal.App.2d 710, 723--725, 52 Cal.Rptr. 592.) It has been stated that the filing of the motion 'suspends the power of the trial court to act upon any other question until the motion has been determined.' (Beard v. Superior Court,39 Cal.App.2d 284, 286, 102 P.2d 1087; see County of Riverside v. Superior Court, 69 Cal.2d 828, 831, 73 Cal.Rptr. 386, 447 P.2d 626; Brady v. Times-Mirror Co., 106 Cal. 56, 62, 39 P. 209.) This effect has been called a suspension of the court's jurisdiction. (Pickwick Stages System v. Superior Court, supra, 138 Cal.App. at p. 449, 32 P.2d 433; Bender v. Bender, 170 Cal.App.2d 325, 327, 338 P.2d 927; see 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed.) Actions, § 524, p. 1344.)
An interesting statement on this issue is found in Walsh v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.App. 31, 185 P. 998. There, in a divorce proceeding, the wife moved for an award of attorney's fees pendente lite while husband's motion for change of venue was pending. The court refused to entertain the wife's motion and on appeal this ruling was declared correct. The appellate court stated at pages 32--33, 185 P. at pages 999: (Emphasis supplied.)
When a motion for change of venue has been granted by the transferor court, but the transferee court has not yet assumed jurisdiction, the transferor court has limited powers. The court may, upon proper motion, vacate its previous order granting the change of venue. (Badella v. Miller, 44 Cal.2d 81, 86, 279 P.2d 729.) Also, the court may dismiss the action if the transfer fees are not paid within the time provided. (§ 399 (formerly § 581b); London v. Morrison, 99 Cal.App.2d 876, 879, 222 P.2d 941.) Outside of these limited powers, the court is said to be without jurisdiction. (London v. Morrison, supra, at p. 879, 222 P.2d 941.)
As the foregoing authorities indicate, it would not be incorrect to say that during the period between the filing of a motion for change of venue and the completion of the transfer by payment of transfer fees the jurisdiction of the court is suspended. Nonetheless, we are not persuaded that the court's jurisdiction is suspended within the meaning of subdivision (f) of section 583.
(1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed.) Jurisdiction, § 1, p. 526.)
'A court should interpret legislation reasonably and should attempt to give effect to the apparent purpose of the statute.' (Kesler v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 1 Cal.3d 74, 77, 81 Cal.Rptr. 348, 350, 459 P.2d 900, 902.) 'The literal meaning of the words of a statute may be disregarded to avoid absurd results or to give effect to manifest purposes that, in the light of the statute's legislative history, appear from its provisions considered as a whole.' (Silver v. Brown, 63 Cal.2d 841, 845, 48 Cal.Rptr. 609, 612, 409 P.2d 689, 692.)
'The dismissal statutes, like statutes of limitation, (Citation.) Thus in applying the mandatory five-year provision of section 583 we have said that '(u)nless an action is brought to trial within five years after it has been filed, except where the parties stipulate in writing that the time may be extended or in certain cases where the defendant is absent from the state, the action must be dismissed upon motion of the defendant. (Citations.)" (Crown Coach Corp. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.3d 540, 546, 105 Cal.Rptr. 339, 342, 503 P.2d 1347, 1350.)
Subdivision (f) of section 583, previously quoted, was added to the statute in 1970. It merely codifies a principle previously established in the case law. Accordingly, cases decided prior to 1970 may be consulted in construing the subdivision.
The guiding principles have been summarized as follows: (Crown Coach Corp. v. Superior Court, supra,8 Cal.3d 540, 546--548, 105 Cal.Rptr. 339, 342--344, 503 P.2d 1347, 1350--1352.)
In the case at bench the change of venue was sought, and by implication granted, solely on the ground that the court designated in the complaint was not a 'proper court.' (§ 397, subd. (1).) Ordinarily, the proper...
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