Hunsucker v. Fallin, 116,131

Decision Date19 December 2017
Docket NumberNo. 116,131,116,131
Citation408 P.3d 599
Parties John HUNSUCKER, on behalf of himself and his clients; Bruce Edge, on behalf of himself and his clients; Charles Sifers, on behalf of himself and his clients; Stephen Fabian, on behalf of himself and his clients, Petitioners, v. The Honorable Mary FALLIN, Governor, in her official capacity; The Honorable Senator Mike Schulz, Senate President Pro Tempore, in his official capacity; The Honorable Representative Charles McCall, Speaker of the House, in his official capacity; Michael Thompson, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Oklahoma Department of Public Safety ; David Prater, in his official capacity as District Attorney for Oklahoma County; Steve Kunzweiler, in his official capacity as District Attorney for Tulsa County; Respondents.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

Brian K. Morton, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; & Sonja R. Porter, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for petitioners.

M. Daniel Weitman, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for respondents Senator Mike Schulz, Oklahoma Senate President Pro Tempore, and Representative Charles McCall, Speaker of the Oklahoma House of Representatives.

Mithun Mansinghani, Solicitor General; Kevin McClure, Assistant Attorney General; Lauren E. Hammonds, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondents Gov. Mary Fallin, Commissioner Michael Thompson, District Attorney David Prater, and District Attorney Steve Kunzweiler.

EDMONDSON, J.

¶ 1 Petitioners filed applications for the Court to assume original jurisdiction and grant extraordinary declaratory and injunctive relief. Petitioners have four constitutional claims. Two claims attack the constitutionality of Oklahoma Senate Bill No. 643, the Impaired Driving Elimination Act 2 (IDEA2). Two claims attack the constitutionality of the Governor's Executive Order 2017–19, promulgated on June 8, 2017, and designed to implement a portion of S.B. No. 643.

¶ 2 We hold the Impaired Driving Elimination Act 2 is unconstitutional in its entirety due to violating the single subject rule in Okla. Const. Art. 5 § 57. We hold one provision of the Act, section 13, violates the Due Process Clause in Okla. Const. Art. 2 § 7. Because we conclude the provisions of the Act are not severable and the Act is unconstitutional in its entirety, we need not adjudicate petitioners' additional claims challenging the Act and the Governor's Executive Order. We hold these petitioners possess standing. We further hold respondents Schulz and McCall are not proper parties, and their motion to be dismissed as parties is granted.

I. Petitioners' Standing

¶ 3 The new Impaired Driving Elimination Act 2 (IDEA2) contains seventeen numbered sections and according to its title includes, but is not limited to, provisions which relate to revocation, modification, and reinstatement of driver licenses, ignition interlock devices installed in vehicles, making certain acts unlawful, clarifying and deleting procedures relating to blood and breath tests for the presence of alcohol, surrender of driver licenses, and authorization to the Department of Public Safety to create the Impaired Driver Accountability Program by June 30, 2018. Petitioners, four Oklahoma lawyers and licensed drivers raise two constitutional claims on behalf of themselves and their clients and argue they will be adversely affected when the Act is scheduled to become effective on November 1, 2017. Respondents challenge the standing of the petitioners to bring an action challenging a new Act which has not yet been made effective.1 Standing is a preliminary or threshold issue adjudicated prior to an examination of the merits.2

¶ 4 Petitioners allege they possess standing based upon one or more of five criteria: 1. They are subject to potential criminal prosecution pursuant to the new legislation; 2. They are subject to potential civil drivers' revocation in the future; 3. They represent the interests of future clients subject to civil and criminal proceedings within the scope of the new Act; (4) The new Act will have an adverse economic impact on their businesses which represent many Oklahomans in criminal and civil proceedings related to the subject matter of the new Act; and (5) They possess "public interest" standing. We need not analyze the issues raised by petitioners and respondents relating to petitioners' standing based upon potential criminal proceedings,3 potential and hypothetical civil proceedings, their representation of hypothetical future clients, or any potential adverse business impact to their practice of law.4 We find petitioners possess a public interest standing in this matter as we now explain.

¶ 5 This Court possesses discretion to grant standing to private parties to vindicate the public interest in cases presenting issues of great public importance.5 This discretion is properly exercised to grant standing where there are "competing policy considerations" and "lively conflict between antagonistic demands."6

¶ 6 A matter that affects the rights of the citizens of the State is publici juris .7 During oral argument before the Court all parties commented on publici juris attributes of this controversy, including the great number of Oklahoma citizens in all counties of the State subject to the provisions in the new Act related to impaired driving and other provisions;8 and additionally certain administrative procedures authorized for Department of Public Safety creation to supplement the Act, but which have not yet been created or approved for the effective date of November 1, 2017; and other administrative procedures which the Department has legislative approval to delay creation until June 30, 2018.

¶ 7 The adjective-law9 component to standing in an Oklahoma state court, while creating a barrier in a private-law original jurisdiction action, does not hinder this Court from giving adequate relief in a publici juris original jurisdiction proceeding.10 Any potential Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 1 jurisdictional/"judicial power" or justiciability components to standing11 which may act as potential barriers to petitioners' standing to obtain declaratory relief are resolved by our findings: (1) Petitioners possess interests in challenging this specific Act which are opposed to those of respondents and the controversy presents a "lively conflict between antagonistic demands;" (2) The controversy is publici juris due to the negative consequences attendant to enforcing alleged unconstitutional provisions statewide which relate to both criminal and civil adjective and substantive law involving operating a motor vehicle; (3) The controversy has an exigent nature due to the effective date for the Act which is linked to an allegation of delayed or untimely administrative regulations affecting substantive rights granted under the Act;12 and (4) Petitioners' standing to enforce public officials' compliance with constitutional requirements by means of declaratory relief is not a prohibited advisory opinion, but has a common-law prototype "in both the historic prerogative writ of mandamus and the bill in equity for an injunction which tested the legality of public officials' conduct."13 We conclude these petitioners possess standing to vindicate the public interest in a case presenting issues of great public importance.

II. Motion to Dismiss Filed by Respondents Schulz and McCall

¶ 8 Oklahoma Senate President Pro Tempore, Senator Mike Schulz, and Speaker of the Oklahoma House of Representatives, Representative Charles McCall, were named as respondents by petitioners. These two respondents filed a response and motion to dismiss the action against them. They assert they are immune from petitioner's action, and they are correct.

¶ 9 Petitioners allege these two respondents "in their official capacities violated the Oklahoma Constitution's single subject provision in passing SB 643."14 In their response to the motion to dismiss, petitioners argue respondents' legislative immunity applies "only to certain criminal charges and lawsuits seeking damages." They further argue without citation of authority: "Because the legislators are the ones who passed the bill, it is only appropriate that they be made a party to the suit that seeks to have the bill voided."15 We disagree with petitioners' interpretation of respondents' constitutionally granted legislative immunity.

¶ 10 The language of Oklahoma Constitution, Article 5 § 22 states: "Senators and Representatives shall, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during the session of the Legislature, and in going to and returning from the same, and, for any speech or debate in either House, shall not be questioned in any other place." We have explained this language: The Speech or Debate Clause of the Oklahoma Constitution, Art. 5, § 22, absolutely protects legislators from suit calling for judicial inquiry into their performance "within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity."16 We added:

Legislators may not be haled into court, either to account for acts that occurred in the course of legislative process or for judicial inquiry into their motivation for those acts. The legislative privilege has never been limited to words spoken in debate. The constitution's immunity shields all enactment-related conduct, whether a legislator be sued (1) personally, (2) in an official capacity, or (3) as the Legislature's leader. The line separating protected from unprotected legislative activity lies in the distinction between "purely legislative activities" and those that are nongermane "political matters".

Brock v. Thompson , 1997 OK 127, ¶ 14, 948 P.2d 279, 287–288 (notes omitted).

¶ 11 Petitioners have haled into this Court these two legislators for the purpose of giving an account and defense for their participation in enacting a piece of legislation while serving in the Oklahoma Legislature. The petitioners' claim against these respondents...

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