Hunt v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Corp.

• Decision Date: 04 May 1915
• Docket Number: 9089.
• Citation: 85 S.E. 229,101 S.C. 64
• Parties: HUNT v. ATLANTIC COAST LUMBER CORPORATION.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

85 S.E. 229

101 S.C. 64

HUNT v. ATLANTIC COAST LUMBER CORPORATION.

No. 9089.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

May 4, 1915

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Berkeley County; C.J Ramage, Special Judge.

Action by N. A. Hunt against the Atlantic Coast Lumber Corporation. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

The following are the exceptions:

(1) That the court erred in refusing the motion of the defendant's attorney, at the close of the plaintiff's testimony, that the jury be directed that it could not find for more than the sum of $111, tendered by the defendant before going into the cause in open court; the error being that the motion should have been granted for the reason that there was an absolute failure, and even absence of testimony to show that any greater amount of timber had been cut, and that having been shown only by the defendant's admission.

(2) That the court erred in refusing to grant the motion of defendant's attorney for a nonsuit as to punitive damages; the error being that the motion should have been granted, for the reason that there was not a word of testimony in the case to support a verdict for punitive damages, there being nothing to show wantonness or gross or willful negligence, or even ordinary negligence, the evidence clearly showing that great precautions were taken to avoid going over the line on to plaintiff's timber.

(3) That the court erred in admitting the testimony of the plaintiff, Hunt, as to the quantity and value of the timber, and the damage done, without which testimony there would have been nothing to go to the jury on; the error being that this testimony was clearly hearsay, and was so admitted to be by the plaintiff witness, and said testimony was admitted over the earnest protest of the attorney for the defendant.

(4) Because the jury found for the plaintiff in the sum of "$600," under the prayer of the complaint which asked for "$600 as actual damages, and the further sum of $2,000 by way of punitive damages"; the jury evidently intending its verdict to be for the sum of $600 as actual damages, and there being no testimony whatever to support a verdict for a greater amount of actual damages than $111, tendered by the defendant before trial.

(5) That the court erred in refusing the motion of defendant's attorney to strike out all of the testimony of the plaintiff, Hunt, with reference to the timber, after the witness had admitted that he knew nothing about it of his own knowledge; the error being that such testimony was confessedly pure hearsay.

(6) Because the court erred in interrupting the testimony of one of the defendant's most important witnesses (Grant) to make his ruling on the question of permitting the case to go to the jury, and, in so doing, in using the following language:

"I have had the stenographer to read me the testimony in this case, and it appears from the testimony that Mr. Sanderson talked to Mr. Pearce after this timber was cut and before it was moved. The complaint alleges that the defendants willfully and wantonly cut and removed certain timber from the lands of the plaintiff; and, in my judgment, there is sufficient testimony to go to the jury. The case of Beaudrot v. Railway, 69 S.C. 160, 48 S.E 106, holds that it is a question for the jury when a man goes on another man's land without making the proper effort to find out where the lines are. Therefore, under the facts of the case, if they removed the logs from there after they had knowledge that they were cutting the timber of some one else, I think that would carry the question to the jury." The error being that, while this was not a portion of the charge, it was tantamount to an expression of opinion as to the facts; the language used being such that, if it had been used in the charge, it would have constituted a charge on the facts, and would have been reversible error.

(7) Because the charge of the court, it is respectfully submitted, when taken as a whole (this exception being intended to apply to the entire charge), was misleading to the jury, in that, while most...