Hunt v. Davis

• Decision Date: 30 June 1838
• Citation: 20 N.C. 36
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: JAMES W. HUNT, ADMINISTRATOR, v. ANTHONY DAVIS.

20 N.C. 36

JAMES W. HUNT, ADMINISTRATOR,

v.ANTHONY DAVIS.

SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

JUNE TERM, 1838

Deed for Slave.

1. A gift, by a deed, of a slave, reserving a life estate in the donor, passes no interest to the donee at common law. And a deed of bargain and sale of a slave for the life of the bargainee, in consideration of an annuity to the bargainor, conveys the entire interest to the bargainee.

2. The cases of Graham v. Graham, 2 Hawks, 322; Foscue v. Foscue, 3 Hawks, 538, and Sutton v. Hallowell, 2 Dev. Rep., 186, approved.

3. A lease for life of a chattel, if made by deed, is subject to the same construction as a conveyance for life, and no remainder is left, at common law, in either case.

DETINUE for a negro slave by the name of Enoch, tried at Carteret on the last circuit before his Honor, Judge Saunders, when the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the court upon the following facts:

Blandinah Morse, the intestate of the plaintiff, being the owner of the slave in controversy, on 27 October, 1809, executed a deed to her daughter Susan, whereby, in consideration of natural affection, she gave, granted and confirmed the said negro slave to her said daughter Susan, after her (the said Blandinah's) death, thereby reserving the use and benefit of the said negro during her, the donor's, life. On 6 May, 1822, Blandinah Morse executed a deed to Jacob Rumley, whereby, in consideration of the sum of eight dollars per annum, she bargained, sold, and delivered unto the said Jacob the said negro slave during her natural life. Blandinah Morse "died in February, 1827, and shortly before her death Susan Morse made an exchange of a negro girl with Rumley for the negro boy Enoch, and in September, 1831, conveyed Enoch to the defendant. The plaintiff administered upon the estate of Blandinah Morse in 1836, and soon afterwards instituted this action.

The defendant claiming thus under both the deeds aforesaid of the plaintiff's intestate, two question of law arose, the first whether the gift to Susan Morse was not invalid, because made to take effect after a life estate in the donor; and the second whether the deed to Rumley transferred the whole legal estate of the bargainor. His Honor was of opinion for the plaintiff upon the first question, and for the defendant upon the second, and thereupon the plaintiff was nonsuited and appealed.

GASTON, J., after stating the case as above, proceeded as follows: According to the settled law of the land, before the act of 1823, sec. 1 (Rev.

Stat., ch. 37, sec. 22) making certain limitations of slaves by deed valid, a conveyance of a slave by deed, after a life estate, or with a reservation of a life estate therein, was void. Graham v. Graham, 2 Hawks, 322; Foscue v. Foscue, 3 Hawks, 538; Sutton v. Hollowell, 2 Dev. Rep., 186. These decisions were founded...